

CITIZENS LEAGUE REPORT

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**Analysis of Minneapolis City Government  
Suggestions for Reorganization**

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AN ANALYSIS OF  
MINNEAPOLIS CITY GOVERNMENT  
WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS  
FOR ITS REORGANIZATION •

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AN ANALYSIS OF  
MINNEAPOLIS CITY GOVERNMENT  
WITH SOME  
PROPOSALS FOR ITS REORGANIZATION

(preliminary, not for publication until after review and revision)

"Organizational efficiency can contribute more to a company's growth than any other controllable factor." That is the judgment of Paul S. Gerot, president of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., and it is shared by many others responsible for the management of large-scale enterprises.

Minneapolis' city government is a large-scale enterprise, spending currently about \$70,000,000 a year and employing over 9,000 people. Good organization is as important to its efficient operation, as it is in private enterprise. Good organization of city government is more difficult to achieve because the city's organization is written into its charter and can be changed only by charter amendment while private company organization can be readily changed by executive action or by action of the Board of Directors.

Good government of course is not the same as good organization, and charter changes alone will not assure good government. The kind of people who hold public office and their responsiveness to the citizenry are of primary importance. But second in importance, and of significance in attracting the right kind of people, is the soundness of the organization which is written into the law under which the city is governed and administered.

This paper presents:

1. An examination of the responsiveness and effectiveness of Minneapolis government under the present Minneapolis charter.
2. Conclusions as to the need for reorganization of Minneapolis government.
3. Alternative possibilities for reorganization of Minneapolis government.

## PART I. THE NEED FOR AMENDMENT OF MINNEAPOLIS' CHARTER

### A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINNEAPOLIS CHARTER DEVELOPMENT

The nature of Minneapolis' charter is better understood in the light of its historical development.

Until 1920, Minneapolis operated under a legislative charter. Special acts of the legislature established the framework of the government and carefully enumerated its powers and functions. The first such charter was granted in 1867 when Minneapolis became a city. In 1872, by another legislative act, Minneapolis was combined with St. Anthony Falls, and in 1881 a complete revision of the legislative charter was made. Thereafter the legislature continued to revise the city's system of government with every session, practically down to 1920, but never during this period of 40 years did it completely codify all the laws governing Minneapolis as a city. As a result, until the charter commission of 1920 completed a codification, no complete copy of the Minneapolis charter existed, and very few people had knowledge of what it contained.

In 1895, the home rule amendment to the State Constitution was passed, authorizing cities and villages to frame charters for their own government. But the voters of Minneapolis rejected charter after charter proposed by the charter commission: in 1898, 1900, 1904, 1906, 1907 and 1913. As a result, in 1920 the charter commission simply codified most of the legislative acts which made up the old charter, and then went before the voters with the request that they make the codification a home rule charter by adopting it as such. This the voters did, and the present Minneapolis charter came into being.

Although Minneapolis has had what is known as a "home rule charter" since 1920, the city has actually continued with a governmental structure created by legislative acts, and subject to change biennially by the Legislature. This is because:

1. The 1920 charter was largely a compilation of the state laws governing the city.
2. The charter incorporates many state laws by reference, although they are not contained in the document itself.
3. The practice of going to the Legislature to change the charter has persisted since the "home rule" charter was adopted.

The history of the charter suggests its nature. Instead of a document deliberately drawn to meet the complex needs of a modern metropolitan city, it is a patchwork of many separate laws written over the past 87 years as emergencies arose, or as growth of the city made former processes of government intolerable.

The 1948 codification of the charter contains over 100,000 words. The form, arrangement and contents are so detailed and disorganized that a 60 page index is required.

In contrast, the U. S. Constitution contains about 10,000 words. The Constitution outlines the fundamental form of government and its relationships with the individual citizens and with other levels of government. It is not cluttered up with the kind of unnecessary and inflexible details which burden the Minneapolis Charter. The Model City charter of the National Municipal League has about 45,000 words.

B. EVALUATION OF THE RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MINNEAPOLIS  
GOVERNMENT UNDER THE PRESENT MINNEAPOLIS CHARTER

Appraisal of a large, complex city government cannot be lightly undertaken or quickly made. Facts must be carefully and impartially gathered and standards for measurement and comparison of performance must be developed. If, as here, it is the effectiveness and responsiveness of the organization that is being assessed, it is necessary to try to isolate it from the personalities involved.

In private enterprise there is a flexibility which permits the use of the type of organization which is best suited to the particular employees on hand or who can be hired. Organization and personnel are constantly being tailored to each other. In city government, with the limitations and inflexibilities of charters, statutes and civil service, it is necessary to set up the best organization possible on the assumption that competent people will be employed.

To determine if Minneapolis' present organization is good and, if not, how it could be improved, experts could be hired to make a survey as Public Administration Service (PAS) was in 1947, or the public officials could make a self-survey, as the Citizens League unsuccessfully urged the City Council to do in 1956, or a non-partisan organization, such as the Citizens League, that works constantly with city agencies on city problems, can review its experiences and committee reports and attempt an appraisal. This report is such an attempt, though it includes many references to the PAS survey and many ideas which city officials have mentioned publicly and to the Citizens League from time to time.

Criteria for judging city government organization:

Professors William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner in their book American City Government (1950) make this statement at page 367:

"By what criteria, then, do the authors of this book attempt to evaluate the various schemes of municipal organization? We take the view that under popular democratic control, city governments should be organized to facilitate municipal action, not to obstruct it; to render the public services that are needed under twentieth-century urban conditions and that are made possible by modern science and technology; to administer the city's functions honestly, effectively, and without waste of resources; to coordinate all the city's services so that all may be planned together and advanced in unison according to the public's opinion as to their relative importance; to be adaptable to changing circumstances and prepared to meet crises as they arise; to maintain the highest available standards of technical skill and efficiency in conducting the public services; to be equitable in its dealings with all citizens; and to be quick and sympathetic to care for the unfortunate according to their needs. Even to approach these objectives a city government needs to be democratic, unified, expert, unpartisan in administration, simple in structure, and organized along lines of direct responsibility from the voters through their representatives and straight down through the administration."

The Citizens League has prepared and presented to the Minneapolis Charter Commission and the public a statement of suggested principles of charter improvement. They are set out in Appendix A. We believe that these principles provide a good yardstick for measuring the soundness of the city's present organizational structure. They will be discussed in order and the conformance of Minneapolis' governmental structure with them determined.

It will be helpful if readers who are unfamiliar with Minneapolis' government will study the organization chart set out as Appendix B before considering the charter principles and their application to Minneapolis.

**PRINCIPLE #1                      DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED TO ENCOURAGE  
CITIZENS INTEREST, PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL**

- A. To accomplish this the organization should have visibility. Government can be held responsible more easily when powers are located where all can see them when the relationships between governmental officials and groups are clear and governmental machinery is simple.

Who is responsible for forming city policies? Who is responsible for carrying them out? The complexity of the answers to these questions suggests the "low visibility" of the Minneapolis government.

Formulation of policy is shared by the City Council and many boards and commissions, including the Board of Education, Board of Park Commissioners, Library Board and Board of Estimate and Taxation. This points up the first and one of the most basic weaknesses. Our city government is splintered into many governments.

For example, citizens are most concerned about who sets financial policy-- the amount and kind of taxes paid and the services performed in return. Minneapolis citizens can get no simple answer as to who is responsible. An attempt at an answer sounds like this: The Board of Estimate and Taxation sets the maximum property tax that may be levied within legal limits, although this is largely a formality since most rates are regularly set and approved at the maximum permitted. Within the limits set by law or by the Board of Estimate and Taxation, the City Council, Park Board, Library Board and Board of Education set the actual tax levies. The levy for bonds is set by the City Council, but the Board of Estimate and Taxation can affect Council action through its power to set bond maturities. Pension fund levies are mandatory. The Board of Estimate and Taxation sets the levy for its own expenses.

On the spending side these various agencies go their own way, for no person or agency has the effective power to insist that their programs be coordinated. Actually, another agency is added, for the City Council has only general control over the expenditure of one large segment of the funds it levies for, depending upon the Board of Public Welfare to supervise and control the \$8,000,000 or so which the Board spends.

Who is responsible for the amount of bonds issued en toto or in any given year? Bond funds can be authorized only by the Board of Estimate and Taxation but not in excess of the amount approved by the City Council and the request in the first instance must come from the agency seeking the bond funds.

This "low visibility" in determining who makes the city's key financial decisions is equally apparent in other fields such as planning, wage and salary decisions, personnel practices, budgeting, etc.

Even where the particular board can be identified as the one making the policy decisions we encounter a second problem as to visibility. Memberships on the board may be obtained in such a variety of ways as to give the public little chance to express approval or disapproval of the board's actions. Take the Board of Estimate and Taxation as an example. Two members are elected directly to the Board by the public for staggered four year terms but the remaining five are ex officio and are not elected. Three of these are chosen after election by their colleagues on the School or Park Board or City Council.

Table 1 on page 6a points up the number of separate policy-forming agencies in Minneapolis government and their relationship to operating and staff departments.

Ex officio memberships -- those filled by officials by virtue of their holding other positions -- further complicate and confuse the Minneapolis organizational structure. Nineteen such memberships exist on five boards or commissions which have major policy-making or administrative responsibility. The Mayor is a member of the Park, School, Estimate and Welfare boards and the Planning Commission. Aldermen hold six memberships on the Park, Estimate, and Welfare boards and the Planning Commission. The Library and Estimate boards have a School Board member, and the Planning Commission and Estimate Board have a Park Board member.

The resulting criss-cross of interlocking powers renders impossible any clear lines of authority and responsibility. It has other serious effects. Sometimes it places an ex officio member of a body in a position of passing on a recommendation which is to be made to a superior body of which he is a primary member. For example, an alderman as an ex officio member of the Board of Public Welfare must take an action which he may have to defend before his colleagues when it comes to the City Council for final determination, as on overall budget matters. Similarly, the aldermanic member of the Planning Commission is on the spot in relation to planning and zoning matters which are recommended by the commission to the Council for final determination.

Finally, there is at least one case where the functions of the board bear little relationship to the agency for which the official designated is held primarily responsible. This is the membership which the President of the University of Minnesota has on the Library Board. Another drawback of this particular ex officio membership is that the member can give his attention to it only at a sacrifice of his primary functions and responsibilities. The result of course is that the University President is seldom at Library Board meetings, which sometimes has made it difficult to get a quorum.

Table I

## POLICY-FORMING AGENCIES IN MINNEAPOLIS GOVERNMENT

and their relationships to operating and staff departments

<u>Policy-determining bodies</u>	<u>Operating departments</u>	<u>Staff departments</u>
City Council	Public works Fire Police Building inspection Assessment Licenses, Weights and Measures Elections Water Auditorium Civil defense	Legal Research and budget Purchasing City Clerk Capital Long Range Improvements Comm.
Board of Public Welfare	General Hospital Poor relief Correctional institutions Public Housing Health	
Planning Commission		Planning
Housing and Redevelopment Authority	Housing, redevelopment, relocation	Planning, redevelopment,
Civil Service Commission		Personnel
Board of Estimate and Taxation	Tax limit and bond control	Budget compilation  Comptroller - accounting  Treasurer
Board of Education	Schools	Accounting Certificated personnel Statistical Budgeting Planning
Park Board	Parks and recreation	Legal Accounting Budgeting Planning

The citizens are equally confused about who is responsible for getting the work done once policies are determined. The Mayor has little overall responsibility, although from reading the charter the citizen might think otherwise, since the Mayor is directed by the Charter to see that "the laws of the State and the ordinances of the City are duly observed and enforced within the city.... and that all other officers of the City discharge their respective duties."

The School, Library and Park Boards have their own individual chief administrators. The City Council, on the other hand, with the major functions of fire, sanitation and public works, plus financial control over police, has no single administrator. About a dozen department heads report directly to the Council.

The Council itself is thus responsible for administration but it consists of 13 aldermen, each elected by ward, each without the power to give a "yes or no" answer, varying greatly in skill, experience and time to devote to the job.

Finally, the Board of Public Welfare appoints and directs the administrators of the Health Department, General Hospital, Workhouse and Relief Division. Yet it must go to the Council for funds to carry on these activities.

A common complaint of Minneapolis aldermen is that their constituents hold them responsible for all tax increases and poor services, yet the charter and laws place much of the responsibility elsewhere in the City structure. Perhaps this is as good a proof as any that the Minneapolis government under its present charter has poor visibility. It also bears out the fact that in many cases the governmental units individually do not have powers to match their responsibilities.

PRINCIPLE #1      DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED TO ENCOURAGE  
CITIZEN INTEREST, PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL

- B. To accomplish this the organization should provide for a short ballot, that is a system calling for the election of only those officers necessary for adequate representation and sound policy determination and leadership. The greater number of officers to be voted on, the greater the difficulty of the voter's making an intelligent choice, and the greater the likelihood of his being discouraged from voting or trying to make an intelligent choice.

Minneapolis has 49 elected officials, and at any one election a voter may be asked to fill 15 positions. The large number of elective positions is due mainly to the independent boards: School Board with seven members, Park Board with 12 directly-elected members (eight by district, four at large), and Library Board with six directly-elected members.

The elective Comptroller and Treasurer fill positions which require technical qualifications. Such positions can be filled best by appointment rather than through election, since elections are determined by factors other than a person's administrative competence. The Comptroller is a member of the Board of Estimate and Taxation, a body which has some powers of fiscal policy, particularly over



debt. In other cities, such powers of debt administration are frequently entrusted to administrative officials, such as a director of finance.

The City Treasurer has frequently questioned the advisability of choosing the Treasurer by election.

In the 1955 city elections an admitted Communist named Kelly received over 10,000 votes for the Library Board. This does not indicate 10,000 Communist voters in Minneapolis; it indicates a ballot so long that voters can't know the candidates. They consequently vote for names only, or are discouraged from voting.

Clearly, the mayor, aldermen, judges and school board members should be elected. To fill other offices an appointive system of selection is used effectively in most cities.

PRINCIPLE #1      DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED TO ENCOURAGE  
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C. To accomplish this, top executive responsibility should be placed in a single official.

Executive authority in Minneapolis is not centered in a single elective official or an official appointed by the legislative body. The Mayor's powers are very limited. He appoints the Superintendent of Police and controls the department subject to budget controls of the City Council; he appoints members of several bodies, such as the Civil Service and Planning Commissions and the Board of Public Welfare; and he serves as an ex officio member of the Board of Estimate and Taxation, Board of Public Welfare and Planning Commission, and other commissions. But he lacks power over submission and execution of the City budget (the City budget itself is not a unified document representing balanced planning of needs and resources). In most other respects he must depend upon his personal influence and membership on boards and commissions to make his influence felt.

The School, Library and Park Boards center executive responsibility for their functions in their appointive chief administrators. The City Council has no such chief administrator. Some dozen department heads report directly to the Council or its committees. Such executive coordination as occurs comes through the work of the Council's committees and particularly the Ways and Means Committee. But the members of the Council committees are elected as legislators, not as administrators or executives, and in any event it is difficult if not impossible to get expeditious decisions on matters of administrative direction from a series of committees. Actually the Research Engineer as staff for the Ways and Means Committee, and to some degree the City Clerk provide some coordination of activities but this happens by the accident of having good men in these positions rather than by design.

No single individual elected by the voters, or appointed by the people's elected representatives, has powers to coordinate the administration of the various boards and commissions and is responsible for reporting to the people.

The Research Engineer provides valuable services in this direction but lacks authority for fully effective action. Coordination also comes through committee meetings, negotiations, and frequently by balance-of-power maneuvers when one division of government is at variance with another. An instance of the latter is when the School Board is seeking bond moneys from the City Council and the Board of Estimate and Taxation.

A vital aspect of centralized executive responsibility is the need for leadership in city affairs. As P.A.S. said in 1947: "...the organizational pattern does not provide the citizens of Minneapolis with a political leader (in the policy sense)...for example, the Mayor of Minneapolis is not in a position to make strong representation to the state legislature, to the council--or even to the people--for a comprehensive program to alleviate the financial condition of the city, for his efforts may be nullified by a variety of piece-meal counterproposals by members of boards for which he has no responsibility and over which he has no control."

Failure to center responsibility makes it impossible for the citizens to correct failures of policy and administration. Neither the election of a new Mayor or of a new alderman in a particular ward can make a controlling difference in changing either policy or methods of administration. While an official may be able to exert unusual influence on government policy by his initiative, energy and personality, his lack of legal authority in the last analysis will prove an insuperable barrier to the exercise of overall leadership. Moreover, should the official happen to be one of the 13 aldermen, his 12 colleagues on the Council are unlikely to allow him to get very far out in front of them in leadership.

Limitations of responsibility and authority such as these tend to handicap effective leadership and to reduce citizen interest.

PRINCIPLE #1      DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED TO ENCOURAGE  
CITIZEN INTEREST, PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL

- D. To accomplish this, conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions should be eliminated. When two governmental agencies provide the same or similar service in a single geographical area, it is likely that money is being wasted. It also adds to the voter's confusion, deadening citizen interest and reducing governmental responsibility.

The most glaring illustration of this problem at present in Minneapolis government is in the field of planning. The function of planning for municipal functions in Minneapolis is presently divided among the City Planning Commission, the Housing and Redevelopment Authority, the City Council (and particularly its Roads and Bridges Committee and Ways and Means Committee), the Capital Long-range Improvements Committee (CLIC) and the planning sections of the Park Board, Board of Education, and City Engineer's Office.

As Citizens League Report #52 on Organization for Organization for Planning states:

"It is certainly not ideal to have two divisions of government - one under the Mayor and one under the Council - each responsible for a part of a function which is essentially indivisible. This division is contrary to sound principles of government. It adds to voter confusion over lines of responsibility. It could result in less effective control in capital expenditures. The conflict of jurisdiction does not breed efficiency. It increases direct participation by the city council in details of administration in contrast to their proper function of policy determination and legislation."

"A longer term objective of Minneapolis citizens in working for effective city planning should be to seek to merge the best features of both planning agencies (CLIC and the Planning Commission) into one department under competent leadership. But even that will not result in fully effective organization of city planning, unless the consolidation of the two planning agencies is part of a reorganization of the city government."

Other illustrations of conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions are:

The Library, Park, School and Welfare boards and the City Engineer have separate building and maintenance sections (although those of the Welfare Board and City Engineer are to be consolidated as of January 1, 1957). The City Engineer and Park Board have duplicating street maintenance and construction facilities. There are separate departments of Park police and City police. The Fire Department and City Engineer have separate equipment repair shops.

PRINCIPLE #1

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED TO ENCOURAGE CITIZEN INTEREST, PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL

- E. To accomplish this, more flexibility should be permitted under the City Charter. Unnecessary details should be eliminated therefrom. As the basic law of a city, the charter should be broad and flexible enough to permit changes in policy and administration without being constantly amended.

In the spring of 1956 Minneapolis voters adopted Charter amendment number 14 permitting the City Council to stagger the expiration dates of City licenses to avoid bottlenecks and inconvenience at certain times of the year. The City Clerk, who is the administrator responsible for administering the license renewals involved and who initiated the amendment, said: "This licensing provision was typical of the many unnecessary details in the charter which make it inflexible and handicap our administrative heads in meeting changed conditions."

The P.A.S. 1947 survey stated: "The present city charter is much too long and detailed to permit the degree of administrative discretion and flexibility that is desirable. The prescription of specific administration procedures, the assignment to important officials of routine duties that cannot be delegated, and the establishment of a rigid organizational pattern not easily adjustable to changing conditions are some of the characteristics of the present charter which provide obstacles to good administration."

As noted above the Charter contains over 100,000 words and requires an index of 60 pages. Here is a random selection of items from the index which indicates the detail and absurdities of many of the Charter's contents:

Aldermen, Absence from meetings  
Tax levy for trees to be certified with  
Punishment for polluting  
Books used in schools prescribed by  
Registration of births and deaths to be kept by  
Scuttles in roofs with stairs and ladders leading to  
Cattle running at large  
Chinese crackers, sale and keeping for sale of  
City Council authority to license menageries  
Gunpowder and dynamite -- license vendors of  
Gifts to City Engineer  
Dirt, Council to compel removal from sidewalks  
Fines, violation of Park Board ordinances  
Glue factories, Whistling and discharge of steam  
Plats, drawn in triplicate  
Profiles, Preserved in Office of City Engineer  
Smoke stacks, Construction of  
Swill, See garbage  
Victualing house, authority to license and regulate  
Witnesses, inhabitants, not incompetent as judges

The fact that the Charter has been amended only 14 times by vote of the people since 1920 might seem to indicate that it is a fairly adequate document. This is not a valid conclusion, however, because the Charter has been amended countless other times by act of the State Legislature through special acts, as noted above.

The defective character of the charter, with its many details, in many respects forces resort to special legislation and thereby tends to weaken the principle of home rule. Twenty-eight special acts for Minneapolis were passed in the last three legislative sessions.

PRINCIPLE #1            DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED TO ENCOURAGE  
CITIZEN INTEREST; PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL

- F. To accomplish this, an annual independent post-audit should be required. This provides the public and the legislative body with more assurance that the finances of the government are handled efficiently and in accordance with law and the stated policies of the legislative body.

By law the State Public Examiner is now required to post-audit the accounts of the City and the cost is a mandatory expense for the city. Recently the Public Examiner's audits have been reasonably prompt, although for some years prior the audits were not performed until long after the close of the fiscal year audited.

PRINCIPLE #2

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE A LEGISLATIVE BODY WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC AND HAS THE POWERS TO SEE THAT THE POLICY IT FORMS IS PROPERLY EXECUTED.

- A. To accomplish this the organization should centralize responsibility for legislation and provide powers commensurate with responsibility. If legislative powers are centralized instead of scattered, policy-making is more likely to take into account all governmental needs and resources. Control of the school system, however, should be exercised by a separate body because of the large size of its operation and the traditional separation of education from other city functions.

It has already been pointed out in the comments on "low visibility" of Minneapolis government that legislative power in Minneapolis is diffused among the City Council and the School, Park, Library and Estimate boards. Such diffusion of policy responsibility makes difficult at best an intelligent balancing of needs and resources. It becomes virtually impossible when further complicated by earmarking of revenues to the several functions.

The establishment of CLIC (Capital Long Range Improvements Committee) by the City Council in some respects illustrates the consequences of the charter's failure to centralize legislative and administrative authority. This body is attempting to provide the overall balancing of needs and resources in the capital improvements field which under an adequate charter would be provided to a much greater extent by charter-constituted agencies of the government.

CLIC was set up by a simple motion of the City Council and its success in large measure will depend upon the voluntary cooperation of the several independent boards and commissions, backed up by the Council's power to concur in bond issue requests.

In 1947 P.A.S. listed the many defects of Minneapolis' organization and said that "the absence of a single legislative body with comprehensive tax-levying and appropriating powers, and the autonomy and independence of boards and commissions all operate to provide the people of Minneapolis with not one but a series of city governing units...The Minneapolis City Council can set fiscal policies for the city only to the extent that agreement is volunteered by the other city boards having some jurisdiction over fiscal affairs.

The individual survey reports on the respective services have recognized and paid tribute to the records of public service of several of the boards and commissions which are now a part of the Minneapolis city government. It must be recognized, however, that the existence of this multiplicity of agencies--each largely responsible for its own financing, its own planning, its own personnel and pay policies, and its own work progress--has impeded and probably actually precluded the consideration of over-all needs and the use of the community's total resources to the best advantage."

Citizens League report No. 17 on a proposed increase of three mills in the authorized property tax levy for the Current Expense Fund states: "The League believes that effective and efficient democratic government can be obtained only by electing responsible men and women to public office, giving them the authority and the finances to do the job assigned to them, and holding them accountable at the polls for the quality of the job done.

PRINCIPLE #2

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE A LEGISLATIVE BODY WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC AND HAS THE POWERS TO SEE THAT THE POLICY IT FORMS IS PROPERLY EXECUTED.

- B. To accomplish this, some of the legislative body should be elected from the city at large.

Although it is desirable that broad geographical groupings in a city should all have representation, election of the entire legislative body by wards has the effect of reducing interest in and a feeling of responsibility for objective over-all planning of city services and finances. Attention tends to be focused on execution of personal or neighborhood favors rather than on the basic city-wide policies of government.

The City's 13 aldermen are elected by wards. However, four of the elected Park Commissioners, all seven School Board members, six Library Board members, and the two directly-elected members of the Board of Estimate and Taxation are elected at large.

In a city with a strong mayor form, the office of mayor provides city-wide representation which offsets the parochial tendencies of a city council elected entirely by wards. Minneapolis of course does not have this advantage provided by a strong mayor form.

In fact, the League's report No. 52 on Organization for City Planning states: "The city of Minneapolis does not have a clearly organized, coordinated governmental structure, set up for effective action. Independent boards sharing legislative powers with the city council and having their independent administrative organizations, and the many agencies under the city council are in turn not under the direction of a single chief administrator. Effective overall budget preparation and control and financial reporting are lacking."

PRINCIPLE #2

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE A LEGISLATIVE BODY WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC AND HAS THE POWERS TO SEE THAT THE POLICY IT FORMS IS PROPERLY EXECUTED.

- C. To accomplish this, tax levying powers should be centralized. The power of the purse is a necessary adjunct to the power of legislation. Centralization of legislative powers requires centralization of tax-levying powers.

The comments regarding Minneapolis' lack of legislative centralization (2 B above) and the comments on visibility (1 A) apply here, too.

The Board of Estimate and Taxation fixes the maximum levies for all but a few funds. The Estimate Board, the City Council, the Park, School and Library boards set the actual levies. In addition, some levies are mandatory on the city, such as the retirement funds, the airports fund, the sanitary fund and the armory fund. For 1956 there were 28 separate property tax levies.

PRINCIPLE #2

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE A LEGISLATIVE BODY WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC AND HAS THE POWERS TO SEE THAT THE POLICY IT FORMS IS PROPERLY EXECUTED.

- D. To accomplish this, legislative interference with departmental administration should be avoided, and the two functions should be separated.

Legislation and administration are two different functions, and require different talents for proper performance. When administrators usurp the legislative function they are undermining popular control. When legislators interfere with administration they are handicapping efficient administration and are in danger of introducing considerations which have nothing to do with the efficient performance of a job.

As report No. 17 states, the League believes: "That effective and efficient democratic government cannot be obtained by so limiting and dedicating the funds available that few decisions are left to the elected officials as to the nature and the quality of the services rendered."

As already noted, the Charter does not provide for centralization of administrative authority in an administrative official under the City Council. This means that major administrative decisions affecting two or more departments under its jurisdiction must be checked to the Council or its committees for determination, thus inevitably bringing the legislative officials into administration.

Commenting upon aldermanic administration in its 1947 report, P.A.S. said it "is administratively undesirable and is compatible with democratic principles only in situations where all the citizens are aware of its existence, share equally in its benefits, retain it as a matter of choice. In considering the desirability of continuing aldermanic participation in administration, however, it must be recognized that in Minneapolis the alderman constitutes an additional administrative level, which, imposed on an already complex system of council committees, boards, commissions, and elected and appointed department heads, further diffuses responsibility and inevitably produces higher operation costs."

Many existing boards and commissions should be advisory only or limited to a quasi-judicial role. Examples: A City Council committee superintends the Water Department, and all major administrative decisions for that department must be approved by the committee. The Civil Service Commission, composed of three appointed officials meeting twice a month, is set up as the administrative head of the Civil Service Department, and the City Planning Commission is set up as the administrative head of the Planning Department.

Detrimental results of this mixture of legislation and administration:

- a. The full-time non-political department heads are influenced into being weak administrators because their lack of real authority robs them of prestige, initiative and vitality. Employees, union representatives and the public tend to ignore them, taking their complaints and requests directly to the source of power, the elected or appointed administrative body. Instead of providing leadership in constantly increasing the effectiveness of his department and in suggesting more fruitful programs and policies, the department supervisor finds it expedient to conduct the department in the same safe way.

b. Important administrative decisions are group decisions, strongly affected by the lobbying of special interests, and little affected by objective standards of good administration. As a result, administrative plans are often compromised, watered down, and interminably delayed, and conversely, are sometimes hasty and ill-conceived.

c. Administrative details take up most of the time of the policy-making and/or legislative body, with corresponding neglect of important policy and legislative problems.

d. The elected or appointed body guards its Charter-given administrative authority, and finds it unnecessary to set up a modern management organization which could provide technical assistance with specialized administrative problems, such as budget analysis and control, wage and salary determination, analysis of methods and procedures, and personnel administration.

The services provided by the Office of the Research Engineer to the City Council do provide an illustration of the effectiveness of this kind of service. The Park Superintendent, School Superintendent, Librarian and other department heads of independent departments have some of this staff service, but again there is little effective inter-departmental coordination.

The problem was illustrated in a small way in trying to get a consolidated annual report issued on city services. A quotation from League Report No. 46A on this subject bears this out: "The mayor seems the logical official to have responsibility for compiling and publishing the cities consolidated annual report. He, more than any other single agency or department, represents the city to the public and has the job of overall public relations. The independence of a number of governing bodies though, raises the question about the mayor's authority to direct the various departments to furnish his office with the necessary information and to forego publication of their own individual reports."

League Report No. 39 shows the failure of anyone to give leadership in establishing a policy as to insurance. An administrative head would be trained and skilled in helping to reach important decisions on such matters. The report reads: "The committee concludes that there is no clear-cut policy set down by the City Council for determining when and to what extent insurance shall be purchased on City Council buildings and contents."

PRINCIPLE #2            DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE A LEGISLATIVE BODY  
                         WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC AND HAS THE POWERS TO SEE  
                         THAT THE POLICY IT FORMS IS PROPERLY EXECUTED.

E. To accomplish this, the ear-marking of funds should be avoided.

Ear-marking of funds in the charter ties the hands of elected representatives who should be responsible for allocating funds on the basis of relative need. It tends to make the elective officials less responsible.

The city has 28 separate funds, for each of which there is a separate property tax levy. The size of the resources for each function are not as closely related to need as they would be if the legislative body had pooled resources to allocate



as it saw fit. City streets may be full of snow or holes while parkways are being beautified by plantings. One result is currently evident: employees of the General Hospital have not been granted salary increases given to employees of other departments because the fund under which they operate is exhausted. The result is a serious effect on morale.

On the other hand, appropriating authorities endeavor to balance their resources as well as possible, in spite of artificial barriers raised by ear-marking. They transfer monies between funds when possible. For example, in 1955 the General Hospital Fund benefited from transfers totaling about \$750,000 from the Housing, Current Expense and Public Welfare funds.

To the extent that such transfers occur, ear-marking and limits on fractionalized property tax levies serve to mislead the public, and breed a disrespect for the letter of the law among the officials who in effect are compelled to make such transfers.

#### PRINCIPLE #3

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS WITH EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.

- A. To accomplish this the organization should centralize and clearly establish administrative responsibility and authority.

The purpose is to bring about coordinated and effective planning and execution of administrative programs and less duplication.

Administrative responsibility and authority in Minneapolis are dispersed among the administrators chosen by the School, Park, Library and Estimate and Public Welfare boards and the ten or so chosen by the City Council, except as the latter itself, in violation of good principles of government, tends to act in coordinating the administration of its departments. This is further complicated by the direct election of the Comptroller and Treasurer, by the limitation of powers of the Mayor, and by the administrative powers of such bodies as the Civil Service Commission and the Planning Commission.

The relationship between centralized administrative organization and effective planning and execution of administrative programs was pointed out by the Citizens League's report on city planning in January 1956.

"Planning should be a day to day process, woven into the functioning of the government. Policies and administrative decisions should be made in reference to long range plans, and the planning agency should be active in assisting in coordinating the separate plans that are made by the various agencies. Planning, and its most concrete governmental expression, the long range capital improvements program, should not be a sporadic affair. Cities have recognized this by making the capital budget an integral part of the total city budget along with the operating budget.

To get this close integration with day to day operations, we believe it is necessary to have a government which itself is integrated for action. If the 'whole look' of the planning agency is to be effective it has to be made available

to the action agencies which can command a 'whole' approach to the governmental problem. This means insofar as possible a single administrative person responsible for proposing the 'whole look' and carrying it out as adopted through his responsibility for the total administrative organization.

The task of the planning agency is to assist those who must make decisions and those who must act on them. This assistance is in the form of proposing plans and helping to coordinate the plans of others. Unless the decisions can be made taking into account all aspects of the government, and unless the execution of those decisions can be effectively coordinated and directed, the full benefit of the planning will not be had. The present non-integrated structure in Minneapolis is not conducive to making overall, balanced policies, nor to effective coordination of their execution."

While the planning referred to in the above quote was basically the planning done by a planning commission, and therefore mainly physical planning, the point has application to planning of operational programs, too.

The scattering of administrative authority and responsibility makes it difficult to get effective comparison and balancing of current needs for the various services. Some progress has been made in recent years toward building up the Office of Research Engineer as a more effective budget adviser for the City Council. Also, the City Clerk's office has effected centralization of certain services formerly scattered. However, relatively little has been done to establish fully effective centralized staff units serving the entire government, which are vital for modern management, such as an administrative analysis section, forms standardization unit, an overall building maintenance section, a central information and complaint desk, an engineering planning and design section, a street maintenance and construction section. Therefore individual departments either duplicate these functions or don't have them.

Another consequence is that departments do not have uniform policies on common problems. Compare Stockman Helper rate for Welfare Board with City Council or Board of Education. Compare college graduate Laboratory Technician under Welfare Board with City Council and Laboratory Helper who does light manual semi-skilled work.

### PRINCIPLE #3

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS WITH EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.

- B. To accomplish this, we should simplify governmental machinery, group like services together, avoid duplication, establish clear lines of authority and responsibility, improve internal control and general coordination.

The maintenance of separate building and maintenance sections, duplicate street maintenance and construction facilities, and separate police forces was noted in (1 D) above.

In addition, because of lack of overall coordination which would be provided by a single chief administrator, some staff functions are duplicated. Most large departments, such as Park Board, Board of Education, and Welfare Board, have their own accounting and tabulating departments, while some small departments such as the Library, receive no professional accounting advice. There is no centralized duplicating service.

Confusion of lines of authority was recently illustrated in the planning field, when the City Council set up the Capital Long Range Improvements Committee (CLIC). There still exists some doubt as to the planning jurisdiction of CLIC and the City Planning Commission, a charter-established agency.

PRINCIPLE #3      DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS WITH EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.

- C. To accomplish this, the procedures for financial planning and control should be improved.

Provide the maximum information about services, performance and finances to enable the legislative body to plan wisely in spending the tax dollar. Provide constant reporting and controls on the spending of money to be sure it is spent as planned and can be adjusted to changing conditions.

Lacking a centralized administrative organization responsible to a single legislative body, Minneapolis government does not now provide the type of financial planning and control here called for. The Board of Estimate and Taxation is a central budget-compiling agency (and even the budget it compiles is not complete so far as the Board of Education and bond needs are concerned). It does not provide the type of budgetary analysis needed for financial information in a comprehensive, useful budget. Even if the Board had the staff to analyse budgets and provide information, it would not be able to use it as effectively as a central budget agency should, since it has no operational authority or responsibility in regard to city departments. The office of the Research Engineer is, however, doing some work of this sort.

PRINCIPLE #3      DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS WITH EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY

- D. To accomplish this, the top administrative head must have the effective tools of management. This can be assured by placing under him the staff functions of personnel administration, financial management, planning, legal advice and systems and procedures analysis.

Here also, lacking a central administrative head, Minneapolis government does not meet this requirement under the present charter. At the present time the staff agencies of accounting, treasury, personnel and planning are set up as separate departments and are not responsible to a single full-time administrator who could direct and coordinate their activities. The responsibility for accounting and budgetary control is delegated to an elected City Comptroller

heading an independent department, subject to general guidance of the City Council. The Civil Service Commission with the important personnel functions of recruitment and job classification is administratively independent.

As noted in 3(c), prescription of budget forms and classifications is the responsibility of the independent Board of Estimate and Taxation.

The independence of these staff departments has these results:

1. In working with the large number of operating departments the staff agencies have no top administrator to guide their activities into desirable channels, and to help enforce decisions based on a generalized point of view instead of one of narrow expediency often emphasized by operating departments. We have a staff without a chief of staff.

2. Operating departments neglect staff functions, don't hire any staff personnel, and consequently do little personnel planning, improving of accounting systems, etc.

League Report No. 20 points out:

"There are many approaches to better government. Some of these are highly controversial, but there are ways to better government which are not controversial. There are methods of getting more for our money which no one will protest which do not require political action. There are in particular two such programs that offer real opportunity for bringing better government. These are: A management improvement program and a work simplification training program. These are complementary. Each will be successful only when the other is active and effective."

"A management improvement program is essentially this: The assignment of competent personnel full time to the business of making progress and improvement. It is the continuing study and search of policy, program, conditions, processes, and procedures to see that organizational objectives are accomplished as efficiently as possible. At present, there is no such program in the city administration."

"A work simplification training program is established for the purpose of permitting, encouraging, and developing the organized application of common sense by all employees to find easier and better ways of doing work."

League Report No. 54 suggested in February 1956 the installation of an employee suggestion system in Minneapolis city government. Other cities have shown net savings of \$50,000 or more per year but little interest has been shown thus far in such a program here.

## SUMMARY EVALUATION OF MINNEAPOLIS' GOVERNMENT UNDER PRESENT CHARTER

It is apparent from the foregoing comparison with principles of charter improvement that Minneapolis' form of government under its present charter falls far short of the needs of a forward-looking metropolitan city.

. . . Authority is so divided that over-all planning and maximum efficiency of operations are impossible. Powers are not commensurate with responsibilities in many cases.

. . . Failure to center responsibility makes it impossible for the citizens to correct failure of policy and administration. Neither the election of a new mayor or of a new alderman in a particular ward can make a controlling difference in changing either policy or methods of administration. It is thus not surprising that the citizens feel frustrated and lack interest in local government.

. . . Even the election of good people to office does not produce the desired results. This is because of the frustration which results from the present divisions of responsibility, limitations upon the exercise of judgment, and a form of government which makes leadership ineffective.

This report is concerned with governmental structure fixed in the charter rather than with the structure which can be changed by council resolution or ordinance or administrative order. It in no way implies criticism of the qualifications or work of the men and women now or previously in office. In general, Minneapolis has had exceptionally devoted public servants. Yet, while recognizing the qualifications of Minneapolis personnel, they have been working under handicaps which result from an unplanned, unresponsive, ineffective structure of government. As a result Minneapolis finds it more difficult to keep pace with other competitive cities. In this second century of Minneapolis history, we need an organizational framework of government built soundly on experience and specifically designed to meet the needs of a growing and progressive community.

### C. PROBLEMS OF PARTIAL CHARTER CHANGE

Some organizational improvements can be made without Charter change. Many improvements, such as the establishment of a central switchboard for telephone calls, have already been made. Others could and will be made. However, because the present Charter does not clearly establish responsibility and authority, plus full coordination of activities, incentive for and guidance toward improvements is less than might be expected under the incentives resulting from better organizational structure and clearer allocation of responsibility and authority.

This report is not directed primarily to changes which can be made without charter amendment. As noted previously, our Charter was never planned specifically to meet the needs of a modern city. It grew patch by patch, by legislation or amendment to meet particular needs as they arose and became insistent.

The extent of amendments to the Minneapolis Charter has long been debated. Should there be one comprehensive amendment effecting a complete and integrated reorganization of Minneapolis government or should the need for change be met in stages by amendment first of one section of the Charter and then others at successive elections? The failure to gain voter approval of the 1948 Charter amendment is cited as a compelling reason for making changes in stages. On the other hand no amendments affecting the basic structure of city government have been submitted since 1948. Of five amendments proposed by the Citizens League for a vote in 1953, the Charter Commission submitted only two and neither of these dealt with structure.

Minor charter amendments have been voted in recent years by the people, such as the reduction in the number of aldermen, change in election days, and change in licensing dates, etc. However, these are changes of detail rather than of structure.

When we move to a consideration of fundamental changes in the allocation of authority and responsibility we find that the elements of local government are so closely inter-related that it is difficult to effect changes in one division of government without upsetting the balance of authority and responsibility allocated to other divisions. For instance, it would not be practical to abolish the Board of Estimate and Taxation without allocating present Board authority elsewhere, possibly in the City Council, but this would upset the present independence from the Council of the Park Board, Library Board, etc. and it would not assure the check on Council actions originally sought in the establishment of the Board of Estimate.

Only a fundamental revision of the basic structure of the Charter can establish a proper framework of government under which all divisions of government would operate under a planned and integrated allocation of responsibility and authority. Thus, it would not be advisable to center responsibility for overall administration of City departments in either the Mayor or the City Council unless at the same time Charter changes establish more direct responsibility and accountability to the people.

Also, to the extent that major divisions of the operating organization are excluded from reallocation of authority and responsibility the benefits of the reorganization are decreased. Thus, if a change is to be made in responsibility for city administration, exclusion of consolidation of like functions, say of the Park Board and the City for street maintenance and police, would reduce the values provided by the change.

Once a sound and well-integrated organizational structure is created it will thereafter be more feasible to effect changes affecting only one or a few divisions of government. Until the entire structure is organized for responsive representation of the people, moves for partial change, even on the basis of an overall plan, would tend to create confusion rather than clarification of responsibility.

Thus, we find that partial or gradual changes, division by division, would create as many new problems as they would solve, and would involve considerable waste of community effort in going back to the people with amendment after amendment which might better have been presented as an integrated whole.

Partial amendment, in short, involves the following complications:

1. Because the basic form and structure of the present government is faulty, it would be extremely difficult to devise partial changes which would result in harmonious, responsive and efficient overall operation.

2. The present charter is too long and detailed. Additional patches would add confusion.

3. Any fundamental change in one part of the charter affects other parts and would require other changes in order to end up with a well-coordinated governmental organization.

#### D. CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO NEED FOR CHARTER AMENDMENT:

1. The development of the Minneapolis Charter by special acts of the Minnesota Legislature and by piece-meal changes effected by popular vote has resulted in a compilation which was not planned for maximum efficiency, service and responsiveness to the local government needs of the people in mid-twentieth century.

2. Partial change of the Charter, while theoretically possible, presents serious complications and would create problems of integration which make it difficult by that procedure to arrive at a balanced overall structure of government designed to meet present and future needs.

3. An overwhelming body of evidence supports the need for a complete revision of the organizational structure of Minneapolis City government.

4. By working for and adopting a fundamental revision of the Minneapolis Charter, the citizens of Minneapolis can assure to themselves the advantages which can come from a local government designed to make possible wise planning of services and finances, well-considered laws and efficient and responsible administration. Chief among these advantages will be:

- a. More effective leadership in discovering and assessing community problems and mobilizing the resources of the government and the people in attacking them.
- b. Sounder budgeting of city expenditures and revenues.
- c. More city services provided with less delay at lower unit cost.
- d. More equitable and far-sighted ordinances.
- e. A more widespread citizen interest and pride in Minneapolis government and in Minneapolis as a place in which to live, work and do business.



## PART II

### VARIOUS WAYS MINNEAPOLIS' CHARTER CAN BE AMENDED

Under the Minnesota Constitution and State statutes and court decisions Minneapolis' charter can be amended in two ways: by legislative action and by charter amendments adopted by 60% of the voters.

#### 1. State legislation

By one or more special acts the State Legislature could provide a new governmental structure for Minneapolis, without a vote of the people. However, such a prospect is neither likely nor desirable. The people of Minneapolis, under the principle of home rule, should themselves determine the form of government they want and then adopt it by popular vote. It is not likely that the Legislature will exercise the initiative of formulating a new charter for Minneapolis, or impose a new charter on the people either with or without their approval by ballot.

#### 2. Charter amendment passed by the voters

Charter amendments in Minnesota are initiated in two ways: by a majority of the City Charter Commission or by petition of 5% of the legal voters of the City.

The City Charter Commission, a group of 15 people appointed every four years by the District Court judges, is authorized to draw up whatever amendments it considers to be in the best interests of the City, and to submit them through the City Council to a vote of the people at either a special or a general election. Adoption of an amendment requires a favorable vote of 60% of those voting on the issue at a special election, or 60% of those voting in a general election. Thus it is not easy to pass an amendment at a special election and it is much more difficult at a general election because the ballots of those who do not vote on the question are counted as votes against it. Most amendments are initiated by the City Charter Commission and usually the election is called a "special" election even though a general election is occurring at the same time, in order to avoid having to get a 60% favorable vote of all those voting.

If the Charter Commission refuses to initiate a charter amendment, or if the proponents prefer to proceed by petition, charter amendments must be submitted to the people if petitions of 5% of the legal voters in the City favoring the amendment are presented to the Charter Commission. In the case of Minneapolis this would necessitate 15,000 to 20,000 signatures.

There are advantages and disadvantages to proceeding by petition and action of the Charter Commission.

a. The process of getting about 15,000 signatures on the petition would have an educational value which might pave the way for a popular campaign and favorable vote.

b. Since a citizens' committee would be less subject to political pressures than the Charter Commission, it is possible that the committee also could produce a charter less weakened by political compromises.

On the other hand, the petition method, by proceeding without the blessing of official bodies, such as the City Council, might increase the difficulty of getting the cooperation of elective and appointive officials who are most familiar with operations under the present charter and whose advice would be helpful in preparing a new charter. Also, once a petition is initiated, there can be no changes in the charter without renewing all the signatures.

Perhaps a combination of petitions and favorable action by the Charter Commission can be developed.

## PART II

### WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS BEST SUITED TO

#### MINNEAPOLIS' NEEDS?

Having now analyzed Minneapolis' present form of government and found it seriously lacking in many respects, we may consider this question: What form of government is best suited to Minneapolis' needs?

#### A. FOUR MAJOR FORMS OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

American experience has produced four major forms of city government: (1) commission, (2) weak mayor-council, (3) strong mayor-council, with or without a chief administrative officer (CAO) appointed by the mayor, and (4) council-manager.

Table 2 shows the number of cities with 1950 population of 250,000 to 1,000,000 broken down by mayor-council, commission and council-manager forms. Weak mayor and strong mayor-council cities are grouped together because available information does not always permit distinguishing clearly whether a city has a weak or strong mayor system.

Following is a brief description of these major forms:

##### 1. Commission (Examples: St. Paul, Duluth until 1956, Jersey City)

Both legislative and executive authority are concentrated in an elected commission of three to seven members (usually five). One commissioner holds the title of mayor and presides over commission deliberations. All important acts, including major appointments, are performed by collective authority. One of the commissioners is assigned by popular election or by vote of the commission itself to head each of the departments into which the city's administration is divided. The commission, acting as a body, is supposed, theoretically at least to bring about harmony and coherence in the conduct of its members as department heads.

##### 2. Weak mayor-council (Examples: Minneapolis and Chicago).

This type has been adequately described in the Part I analysis of Minneapolis' present form. The elected mayor's powers are limited so that he is not a chief executive. The strength of the council is vitally affected among other things by the number of independently-elected officials and independent boards and commissions that exist.

##### 3. Strong mayor-council

a. Without chief administrative officer (CAO) appointed by mayor (Examples: Cleveland and Detroit).

Responsibility for administration is largely centered in the elected mayor with few, if any, independently elected administrative officers. While the council exercises legislative powers (independent boards are few or non-existent), the mayor has the power to propose budgets and programs and veto ordinances. Basically this system provides for separation of powers and checks and balances.

b. With CAO - commonly known as mayor-administrator form. (Examples: New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, New Orleans, Newark, Duluth).

This is the strong mayor-council form with this difference: the charter provides for the mayor's appointment of an administrator (frequently called chief administrative officer-- CAO) to act for him in directing and coordinating the work of the administrative departments.

This is an improved version of the strong mayor-council form. It overcomes two major criticisms of the strong-mayor plan without CAO: (1) that the top administrator (the mayor) is elected for reasons that have little relation to his ability to direct a large-scale administrative organization, (2) that even if he were a capable administrator, his other duties leave him too little time to devote to administrative problems.

In the remainder of this report our consideration of the strong mayor form of government will be confined to the type with chief administrative officer, since it represents a later phase of development and appears to have increasing acceptance among cities with the strong mayor form. It will be referred to hereafter as the mayor-administrator form.

#### 4. Council-manager (Examples: Cincinnati, Kansas City, Dallas, St. Louis Park)

The council is a small body, usually elected at large. The mayor is a council member, either elected as mayor or chosen by his colleagues to serve in that position. The council appoints and removes at its pleasure a manager. Subject to the council, he is responsible for administration, including appointments and removal of all his principal subordinates. The number of officers elected by the people or appointed by the council, and so independent of the manager, is usually much restricted.

### B. HOW DO THE VARIOUS FORMS MEASURE UP TO PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CHARTER?

#### 1. Weak mayor-council

We have already evaluated the weak mayor-council form in terms of principles of municipal organization and found it seriously wanting.

#### 2. Commission form also defective

The commission form is clearly disqualified for these reasons:

Top executive responsibility is not placed in a single official. There is no chief executive. Top executive responsibility is shared by all the elected commissioners.

It is impossible to avoid legislative interference with departmental administration and provide a separation of the two functions. The commissioners are both legislative officials and top administrators.

Table 3, showing the changes in form of government from 1934 to 1955 among larger cities, indicates dissatisfaction with this form.

### 3. Mayor-administrator and council and council-manager forms offer many advantages over other two forms

The chief difference between the mayor-administrator and council and council-manager forms on one hand and the weak-mayor-council and commission forms on the other is that the former separate legislative and administrative functions and centralize legislative responsibility in one body and administrative responsibility in one person. Thus, these two forms meet these key principals of good organization cited in Part I:

- . High degree of visibility
- . Election of only those officers necessary for adequate representation and sound policy determination and leadership.
- . Centralizing of responsibility for legislation in the council.
- . Placing of top executive responsibility in a single official.

Either of these two forms therefore provides definite advantages over the present organization of Minneapolis government. Either form would encourage more citizen interest and provide better assurance of leadership, a legislative body with more responsibility and accountability, and an administrative organization designed to promote efficiency and economy.

Citizen interest under either form would be stimulated because the voters would know who is responsible for what. They would have a better opportunity to know the record of decisions, accomplishments and costs. Reduction of the number of elective officials would reduce the voter's present difficulties of making an intelligent, meaningful choice, and this would in itself increase citizen interest.

Leadership in government would be encouraged by greater centralization of powers and responsibilities. Qualified individuals would find greater satisfactions in government service.

The City Council would have broader authority and responsibility for legislation and for an effective check on the qualities of administration without finding it necessary to spend so much time in the details of administration as has developed under the present Minneapolis charter.

Administration would be under the unified direction of a single executive and would be performed by professional administrators responsible to elected government officials. Efficiency and economy would be promoted by centralized budgeting, auditing and reporting covering the activities of the various city departments.

### C. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF THE MAYOR-ADMINISTRATOR AND COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL-MANAGER FORMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT

The similarities between the two forms are more significant than their differences. This is clearly indicated by the observations noted above under

which both forms meet the fundamental tests of good government. Even where differences or comparative advantages or disadvantages do exist, there are also possibilities for reducing the disadvantages and for bringing the positive factors recommending either form up to the standards of the other. Thus either form, when written to provide answers to possible objections, would represent a distinct advance over the present charter. Either form could be constructed to make effective provisions for the needs of Minneapolis government.

1. Comparison of the basic characteristics of the council-manager and mayor-administrator and council forms of city government

It is important to bear in mind that this comparison is made up of generalizations which cannot provide a fully accurate description and cannot begin to cover all the variations which are in practice or may be possible.

Council-manager

The chief administrator -- the manager -- is appointed by the city council.

- Although legislation is centered in the council and administration in the manager, the latter is directly responsible to the council, so there is no separation of powers as in the state and federal governments.

A small council (7 or 9) is the general rule, with all or a majority elected at large, in some instances by proportional representation.

- Election of a majority at large helps assure decisions based on the best interests of the city as a whole.

The mayor may be elected by the voters (Kansas City) or he may be chosen from and by the council.

- He is a member of the council and presides over its meetings. He has no veto power.

Question of who shall exercise policy leadership must be worked out among the mayor, the council and the manager.

- Mayors in a council-manager city can provide strong leadership, as shown in Cincinnati, Kansas City.

Mayor-administrator and council

The chief administrator -- the CAO -- is appointed by the mayor.

- The mayor has direct responsibility for administration which is exercised through the CAO. The council is primarily responsible for legislation and keeps a check on administration.

Councils tend to be somewhat larger (9 to 17). Election at large of part of the council is favored but not stressed to the same degree.

- Fact that mayor represents whole city offsets ward interests of ward-elected councilmen.

The mayor is elected by the voters.

- He usually has the veto power.

Policy leadership centers in the mayor.

- Fact that he is elected and has administrative responsibility leads voters to look to the mayor to propose and work for programs.

- Broad administrative powers of the manager encourage his taking the initiative in proposing policies and programs.

-CAO helps develop, propose and carry out programs.

Manager is appointed by the council, in accordance with the provisions of the charter, on the basis of his ability as an administrator.

CAO is appointed by mayor in accordance with provisions of charter, on basis of his ability as an administrator.

- His tenure will depend upon continued support of a majority of the council.

- His tenure will depend upon the continued support of the mayor.

## 2. Comparative views of municipal government authorities:

### a. Council-manager:

Excerpts from American City Government, Anderson & Weidner, 1950:

"The complete unification of the powers of the city in the hands of single-chambered council serves to restore the council to its original position.... of dignity as the actual and responsible governing body of the city. In no other way did it seem possible to attract into the council the type of men needed there, to have all projects considered on their relative merits, or to preserve the representative and deliberative functions of the government....the fact that the chief administrator is always subject to council control is one of the most valuable features of the plan. It is practically impossible to have in a council-manager city the recurrent contests between the council and the chief executive that are to be met in some strong-mayor cities.....And because it has always such complete control over the manager, the council usually learns that it is better to give him and his administration a fairly free hand than to bind them down with a burdensome set of complicated regulations. The result is a smoothness and a flexibility in administration not previously attained in American cities."

....."The two advantages thus far described may be summarized as the unification of powers with administrative specialization. But the council-manager plan goes even further than this. It not only permits administrative specialization while retaining complete unity of control and direction in the hands of the political branch, but to the council that honestly tries to conform to the spirit of the plan it gives advantages not possessed by city councils under any other form of city government in existence in the United States. It gives the council the right to choose as city manager the most able and experienced administrator to be found in the country at the salary it can afford to pay..."

....."Indeed to the council that desires to give the best services possible to the people, the council manager plan gives the opportunity to command a better trained, more unified, and more responsive administrative organization than is possible under the commission plan, the strong-mayor plan, or any older plan of organization in American cities."

John E. Bebout, Assistant Director, National Municipal League:

"Cincinnati, with council-manager government, is the only city over 500,000 that does not have some variation of the mayor-council plan. It is certainly not without significance, however, that the council-manager plan is the most popular in the next lower population group 250,000 to 500,000 -- as well as in the 50,000 to 100,000 and 25,000 to 50,000 population groups."

....."But the deadlocks, the buck-passing, and the evasions of responsibility that are common occurrences in governments organized on the basis of the separation of powers are too well known to need recounting here."

....."It is clear that the choice of means for improving management must depend heavily upon the kind of city council it is deemed desirable and possible to have."

....."Of course policy leadership is necessary in large cities...Fortunately, out of the richness of American municipal experience, we have learned that there is more than one way of providing it. There are, for example, some pretty big council-manager cities that have not suffered for lack of policy leadership---Cincinnati---Kansas City where the mayor is elected separately from his colleagues on the council and has proved to be a political leader in the best sense of the word."

....."council-manager government is essentially functional. It is the simplest available structural arrangement for obtaining representative decisions on policy and competent execution of those decisions."

....."But, if a "strong" mayor fails to provide proper leadership, there is generally no one who can fill the breach. Members of the council are in no position, legally or politically, to compensate for his deficiencies."

....."The council-manager plan is today a going operation of some 40-odd years' standing...The plan continues to gain ground on the basis of practice... This practice, more naturally and efficiently than that of any other plan, reflects that 'unity of the Government of the City of New York accepted as fundamental to a sound system of government."

....."America's distinctive contribution to municipal government, government based upon the marriage of legislative supremacy with professional competence, shall not be sold down the river."

....."In the long run no government will remain permanently far above the level of the capacity of a fairly good cross section of the citizens to work together through political and civic agencies for sound, common objectives."

b. Mayor-administrator and council:

Excerpts from American City Government, Anderson and Weidner, 1950:

....."The strong-mayor plan is the culmination of a long effort to place in one man responsibility for administration of city affairs. It clings to traditional American separation of executive from legislative department and



is in some respects a copy of the form of national government."

....."Policy leadership is becoming more important as cities come to perform even more functions. It is of greater weight in larger cities...The strong-mayor plan facilitates this leadership..."

....."There are important considerations that lead to the conclusion that the strong-mayor form is a good plan of organization for cities of more than a million inhabitants and perhaps for all those over 500,000 while the plan is probably not the best available for those of less than 250,000 inhabitants."

....."Given the fact that the Mayor is and must be a political official primarily, much that has been written in criticism of the strong-mayor plan is rather beside the point...If the mayor tries to be both the policy leader and the chief professional administrator, confusion might result, but if he appoints a deputy mayor or chief fiscal officer who is professionally competent, the mayor can devote himself to the larger issues confronting the city without much danger that able administration will not be forthcoming. There is no a priori reason why the mayor cannot choose just as competent a man as his deputy or fiscal officer as the council chooses for manager under a council-manager system."

....."In a small city it is the council that makes almost all policy decisions, and it probably makes them during an occasional evening meeting. In a very large city the council, chief executive, and nearly all department heads must make important policy decisions no matter what the form of government. This is one reason why we believe that the council-manager plan has much to recommend it in the case of small cities, and the strong-mayor-council form much to recommend it in the case of very large cities."

Excerpts from "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities" by Wallace S. Sayre in Public Administration Review, Autumn, 1954:

....."A new managerial idea is taking hold in the large cities of the United States...By marrying the manager idea with the idea of the elected chief executive, the general manager plan preserves the office of mayor as the center of political leadership and responsibility. In large cities this center is widely regarded as indispensable to effective government."

....."The general manager plan may be regarded either as a competitor of the council-manager idea or as a more mature form of the manager idea reflecting the judgment in the larger cities that the council-manager plan represents an unnecessary surrender of the values of leadership and accountability found in the institution of the elected chief executive."

....."Eight large cities (Boston, Los Angeles, Louisville, Newark, New Orleans, New York City, Philadelphia and San Francisco) have now established some kind of general managerial assistance for the mayor. In two others (Chicago and Detroit) proposals for such general managerial arrangements have been made."

....."Why has this happened?....(1) the council-manager form "had proved to be unacceptable in the large city environments, but the values of the managerial ideas were still sought in some more attractive structural form: (2) A mayor chief executive is a center of "public leadership" and "responsibility", which if preferable to the "legislative supremacy" represented by the council-manager

plan"; (3) the mayor-administrator plan "fits easily and comfortably into the American political system"--(elected chief executive, mayoralty as focus of party battle, integration, professional management)

....."In every instance, the manager is appointed by the mayor. Only in Los Angeles is council approval required."

....."Powers of the Manager: The powers of the manager may be described in three categories: (1) the power to appoint and remove heads of city agencies; (2) the power to supervise city administrative operations, (3) the power to provide general advice and assistance to the mayor..."

....."The emergence of the mayor manager plan has breached the monopolistic claim of the council manager plan to the managerial virtues by presenting the new and strong competition of an alternative manager plan."

### 3. Experiences of other cities

Various tabulations on comparative forms of city government, particularly in relation to the council-manager and mayor-administrator and council forms were compiled by the Citizens League Sub Committee on Comparative Forms of City Government. Facts and observations drawn from these tabulations are presented below, but with the suggestion that reference also be made directly to the tabulations for greater detail. Variations between forms in actual use are very wide, so too much weight should not be placed on the tabulated results or generalizations derived from them.

a. General A tabulation from the Municipal Year Books shows that for U.S. Cities with 1950 population of 250,000 to 1,000,000 the mayor-council form gained two cities (17 to 19), the council-manager form gained two (8 to 10), but the commission form lost four (10 to 6) between 1934 and 1955. San Antonio and Toledo adopted the council-manager form. Houston, New Orleans and Newark adopted the mayor-council form from comparatively weak forms (as in Minneapolis) to stronger forms such as the mayor-administrator form.

In another table based on data relating to governments with 1950 population over 250,000, the 1956 figures show:

. Cincinnati is the only city with 1950 population over 500,000 which has the council-manager form. However, for cities with populations from 250,000 to 500,000, nine out of 23 now have council-manager charters.

. The mayor is elected by the people in all cities except for 7 of the 10 council-manager cities where the mayor is elected by the council from its own membership. In the other three council-manager cities the mayor is elected by the people.

. Council size varies between three in Birmingham and 50 in Chicago. The most common size is nine, but the larger cities tend to have larger councils. (Most changes in council size during the past ten years have been to a smaller council.)

Of the 41 cities listed, 30 elect one or more council members at large. The number elected at large varies between one and 11.

17 of the 41 cities elect no city officials other than the mayor and the members of the council. 11 elect the controller, seven elect the treasurer. (The trend is to elect only the mayor and the council).

b. Council-manager, mayor-administrator and council forms compared

Another table compares two council-manager cities with four-mayor administrator cities. The two council-manager cities, Cincinnati and Kansas City, adopted their charters in 1926. Philadelphia, New Orleans and Newark adopted mayor-administrator charters in 1952 and 1954, and San Francisco has had this form since 1932.

The manager is chosen by the city council in the council-manager cities and the CAO is chosen by the mayor in the mayor-administrator cities, with the additional consent of the council in the case of Newark.

The manager's term is indefinite in the two manager cities, and in San Francisco and New Orleans. In Philadelphia and Newark the term is four years, corresponding to the Mayor's.

Managers may be removed at the discretion of the council. In New Orleans the mayor may remove the administrator, and the council may remove him by majority vote. In Newark the mayor may remove him after notice and chance to be heard, but the council by a 2/3 vote may disapprove the removal. In Philadelphia the mayor must prefer charges; the administrator may appeal to the civil service commission which may compensate but not restore him. In San Francisco the mayor may not remove the administrator, but the latter is subject to recall in an election, or the board of supervisors (council) may remove him by a two-thirds vote.

The two managers are required to be selected solely on the basis of their executive and administrative qualifications. Similar charter provisions exist in the mayor-administrator cities, except that Newark has no charter qualifications:

The two managers have broad administrative powers: to act as chief supervisors of administrative affairs, to appoint and remove major department heads, to prepare and submit budget estimates, and to make recommendations to the council. Administrative powers of the administrators in the four cities vary. In New Orleans the CAO may appoint and remove heads of all departments except law and civil service. In Philadelphia this power extends to all but finance, law and personnel heads, and in San Francisco it extends to departments specified by name in the charter and constituting about half the city agencies. In Newark the CAO has no power to appoint or remove heads of agencies.

In San Francisco the CAO's power to supervise is confined to the departments specifically assigned him by the charter. The Philadelphia CAO's supervisory power is largely confined to departments whose heads he appoints. The New Orleans CAO has general supervisory authority over all but a few departments and has certain general management functions, such as administrative analysis, and budget preparation. In Newark, the CAO supervises administration of all departments except law and finance.

In Philadelphia the CAO is general management advisor to the mayor. In the other mayor-administrator cities they have no such explicit responsibilities in management matters, but in Newark and New Orleans the CAO's assist in preparing the mayor's budget.

The council chooses the mayor in Cincinnati for two years, but in Kansas City and in all the mayor-administrator cities he is elected by the people for a four-year term. He has no veto power in the council-manager cities, but has this power in the other four cities, subject to overriding by a 2/3 vote of the council.

Council size varies from seven in New Orleans to 17 in Philadelphia. All six elect at least part of the council members at large, with both Cincinnati and San Francisco electing all council members at large. Five of the six cities elect council members for four years on a non-staggered basis, Cincinnati, for two years on a non-staggered basis.

#### D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented above shows that the necessities of city government have resulted in a shift away from the commission and the weak mayor-council forms of government to either the council-manager or the mayor-administrator and council variation of the strong-mayor-council form.

Both practical experience and the views of authorities on city government provide the conclusion that either of these newer forms, when well drawn, would provide a form of government well suited to the needs for change which are evident in Minneapolis. Both would meet the objectives sought in greater citizen interest, attraction of qualified leaders and city employees, a responsible legislative body and an administrative organization which can act with efficiency and economy.

Decision between the two will depend upon value judgments and weighing of such points as the following:

- . political leadership
- . professional administrative standards
- . efficiency and economy
- . attraction and retention of capable, career-minded employees
- . checks and balances
- . separation of powers
- . citizen interest and participation
- . degree of emphasis between representation of city as a whole or by areas
- . suitability for a city of the size and nature of Minneapolis
- . ease of transition from present weak-mayor-council government
- . likelihood of voter approval

In appraising these factors in relation to the two forms of government it is important to keep in mind that either form can be drawn to correct the balance in favor of the other. Thus, if it should seem that the mayor-administrator and council form provides more vigorous leadership than a council-manager government under which the council elects the mayor, a provision that the mayor be elected by the people and that he serve as president of the council could do much to bring more leadership into the council-manager form. On the other hand if it should seem that the mayor-administrator and council form might not be as effective in establishing high administrative standards, that could be corrected by the specification of standards for appointment of the administrator and safeguards against arbitrary dismissal. In like manner other adjustments can be made to meet desired objectives.

Charters for either form of city government can be written to provide efficient administration, leadership, citizen interest and legislative responsibility, and adjustments can be made in relation to local history, objectives and needs.

## E. RECOMMENDATIONS

This is a preliminary report. No final conclusions have been reached as to which of the two modern forms of city government should be recommended for approval by the voters of Minneapolis. All members of this committee agree that a real need exists and that one of these new forms should be decided upon as a basis for a preliminary draft of a proposed new charter for Minneapolis.

The committee has therefore concluded that before any decision is reached, the guidance and counsel of representative citizens should be sought without any general publicity. The question of a new charter for Minneapolis is so fundamental that it is important to have broad participation in the deliberations leading up to the initial draft so that understanding and support will develop from the start of a move for a new charter. The time for publicity will come later, after general agreement has been reached on the form which appears to be most suitable and acceptable for Minneapolis.

It is therefore proposed that copies of this preliminary report of Proposals for Reorganization of Minneapolis City Government be made available for the consideration of representative citizens and that members of this committee, of the League staff, of the Board of Directors and other interested members should form a committee for the purpose of distributing copies of this report to representative citizens and to interview those citizens regarding their conclusions and recommendations after study of the report. It is suggested that a questionnaire be drafted to enable the interviewers to find answers to the key questions regarding suitability and acceptability of these two forms of government and to the general question of the best way to promote citizen understanding and support once a decision on form of government has been reached.

STATEMENT OF SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES OF CHARTER IMPROVEMENT

~~Adopted by the Forms and Structure of Government Committee~~  
~~and approved by the Board of Directors, January 11, 1956~~

PREFACE

Government in our democratic society is a means, not an end in itself.

The nature of the means has an important influence on the attainment of the end. Government serves best as:

1. It is responsive to the desires of the people
2. It performs the services desired by the people in an economical and efficient manner.

Government is made of men and laws. The men in government have a good deal of influence on the type of laws within which the government functions and the manner in which the laws are carried out. However, they do not have the final say upon the basic laws. In local government the basic laws are determined by the State Constitution and State Statutes and, where "home rule" exists, by the local voters through their power to adopt and revise their "home rule" charter.

The basic laws, or charter, set the ground rules as to personnel, powers, organization and procedures. They have a direct effect upon the calibre of men who run for office, who are chosen to run the government, and the type and quality of job which the men are able to do.

Following are suggested objectives of charter improvement. Proposed charter changes would be regarded as desirable or undesirable, from the viewpoint of charter improvement, when tested by these objectives.

The committee believes that many of the objectives are interrelated, so that any particular objective standing alone might not necessarily be supported by the committee.

I. TO PROVIDE GREATER CITIZEN INTEREST, PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL.

1. IMPROVE VISIBILITY. Government can be held responsible more easily when powers are located where all can see them, when the relationships between governmental officials and groups are clear and governmental machinery is simple.
2. ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY CHARTER DETAILS. As the basic law of a city, the charter should be broad and flexible enough to permit changes in policy and administration without being constantly amended.

3. PROVIDE FOR THE ELECTION OF ONLY THOSE OFFICERS NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION AND SOUND POLICY DETERMINATION AND LEADERSHIP. The greater the number of officers to be voted on, the greater the difficulty of the voter's making an intelligent choice, and the greater the likelihood of his being discouraged from voting or trying to make an intelligent choice.
4. ELIMINATE CONFLICTING OR OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS. When two governmental agencies provide the same or similar service in a single geographical area, it is likely that money is being wasted. It also adds to the voter's confusion, deadening citizen interest and reducing governmental responsibility.
5. PLACE TOP EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN AN ELECTED OFFICIAL OR ONE CHOSEN BY AND RESPONSIBLE TO THE LEGISLATIVE BODY. Administrators, whose qualifications for their jobs are technical and cannot be easily known by the voter in an election campaign, should not be elected, but should be appointed by elected officials to whom they are directly responsible.
6. REQUIRE AN ANNUAL INDEPENDENT POST-AUDIT. This provides the public and the legislative body with more assurance that the finances of the government are handled efficiently and in accordance with law and the stated policies of the legislative body.

II. TO PROVIDE A LEGISLATIVE BODY WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC AND IS ABLE TO SEE THAT THE POLICY IT FORMS IS PROPERLY EXECUTED.

1. CENTRALIZE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEGISLATION AND GIVE POWERS COMMENSURATE WITH RESPONSIBILITY. If legislative powers are centralized instead of scattered, policy-making is more likely to take into account all governmental needs and resources. Control of the school system, however, should be exercised by a separate body because of the large size of its operation and the traditional separation of education from other city functions.
2. CENTRALIZE TAX-LEVYING POWERS. The power of the purse is a necessary adjunct to the power of legislation. Centralization of legislative powers requires centralization of tax-levying powers.
3. AVOID LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE WITH DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION.
4. AVOID EAR-MARKING OF FUNDS. Ear-marking of funds in the charter ties the hands of elected representatives who should be responsible for allocating funds on the basis of relative need. It tends to make the elective officials less responsible.
5. PROVIDE AN EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH SO ORGANIZED AS TO MAKE THE DUTIES AND PERFORMANCE OF EACH DEPARTMENT EASY TO VIEW AND APPRAISE. Only if this is done can the legislative body know how its laws are being administered.

III. TO PROVIDE AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS WITH EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.



1. CENTRALIZE AND CLEARLY ESTABLISH ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY AND GIVE POWERS COMMENSURATE WITH RESPONSIBILITY. The purpose is to bring about coordinated and effective planning and execution of administrative programs and less duplication.
2. SIMPLIFY GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY. Group like services together, avoid duplication, establish clear lines of authority and responsibility, improve internal control and general coordination.
3. IMPROVE PROCEDURES FOR FINANCIAL PLANNING AND CONTROL Provide the maximum information about services, performance and finances to enable the legislative body to plan wisely in spending the tax dollar. Provide constant reporting and controls on the spending of money to be sure it is spent as planned and can be adjusted to changing conditions.
4. GIVE THE TOP ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD EFFECTIVE TOOLS OF MANAGEMENT by placing under him the staff functions of personnel administration, financial management, legal advice and systems and procedures analysis.
5. PROVIDE DEPARTMENT HEADS WITH ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE for controlling their departments.
6. CENTRALIZE WHEREVER PRACTICABLE THE "HOUSEKEEPING" FUNCTIONS such as building operation and maintenance, messenger service, stenographic and duplicating services, machine accounting, equipment service, and records management.

# THE GROWTH AND ORGANIZATION OF MINNEAPOLIS GOVERNMENTS

Prepared by Citizens League of Minneapolis  
and Hennepin County - Oct 1956




Table 2

Forms of Government among U. S. Cities  
with Population of 250,000 - 1,000,000 \*  
1956

<u>City</u>	<u>1950 population (000 omitted)</u>	<u>Form</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>1950 population (000 omitted)</u>	<u>Form</u>
Baltimore	950	MC	Memphis	396	Com
Cleveland	915	MC	Oakland	385	Mgr
St. Louis	857	MC	Columbus	376	MC
Boston	801	MC	Portland	374	Com
San Francisco	775	MC	Louisville	369	MC
Pittsburgh	677	MC	Rochester, N. Y.	332	Mgr
Milwaukee	637	MC	Atlanta	331	MC
Houston	596	MC	Birmingham	326	Com
Buffalo	580	MC	St. Paul	311	Com
New Orleans	570	MC	Toledo	304	Mgr
Minneapolis	521	MC	Jersey City	299	Com
Cincinnati	504	Mgr	Fort Worth	279	Mgr
Seattle	468	MC	Akron	275	MC
Kansas City, Mo.	457	Mgr	Long Beach	251	Mgr
Newark	439	MC	Omaha	251	Com
San Diego	435	Mgr			
Dallas	434	Mgr			
Indianapolis	427	MC			
Denver	416	MC			
San Antonio	408	Mgr			

\* MC - mayor-council  
Mgr - council-manager  
Com - commission

Table 3

Changes in Form of Government from 1934 to 1956,  
U. S. Cities with Population of 250,000 - 1,000,000

<u>Form</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>change</u>
Mayor-council	17	19	/ 2
Commission	10	6	- 4
Council-manager	8	10	/ 2
	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	

Source: MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK. 1935 and 1956.