

CITIZENS LEAGUE REPORT

Burglary now increasingly erodes the quality of life of Minnesota residents. This need not—and must not—be allowed to continue unchecked! With steps to increase the security on goods, improve law enforcement, prosecute offenders, and squeeze the market for stolen goods, we can deter many burglars. In the process, this will reduce one major point from which young men enter crime.

...PRESSING BURGLARY

C I T I Z E N S L E A G U E R E P O R T

S U P P R E S S I N G B U R G L A R Y

Prepared by
Citizens League Committee on
Incentives To Reduce Burglary
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Approved by
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M A J O R I D E A S

* Burglary increasingly erodes the quality of life of everyone.

- Since the end of World War II the burglary rate on a per-family basis has gone from less than one in 200 to one in 25.
- The psychological effects of burglary are far more costly than the loss of goods and damage to property.
- It is impossible to put a price tag on the loss when a housewife walks in unsuspectingly on a burglar, when elderly residents live in fear in their own homes, when a particularly valuable keepsake is taken, or when home owners begin moving out of high-crime areas.
- Perhaps the greatest harm from burglary is that youngsters are provided with a relatively low-risk and seemingly high-reward point of entry into crime.
- Burglary appears to precede drug addiction and the commission of more serious crimes.
- Minneapolis and St. Paul juveniles under 10 years of age accounted for two-thirds as many burglary arrests in 1975 as individuals 30 and over.

* Present procedures do not deter burglary.

- Poor security procedures invite burglary. Many burglaries, particularly those committed by the very young, occur through unlocked or minimally secured entrances.
- Police investigation of burglaries often devote more resources to public relations with the victims than to solving the crime.
- A ready market for stolen goods provides a necessary ingredient needed to sustain a high and growing burglary rate.
- The criminal fence is now able to market stolen goods with relative impunity.
- The juvenile burglar may not find the current sanctions against the crime at all intimidating.
- For the adult burglar, the system of punishment appears far less certain than it actually is.

* The public system flounders.

- The rapid growth in damage from burglary is of some direct concern to almost everyone, but is the fixed responsibility of no one.
- Only the criminal has the job of worrying about how the entire system works.
- No one has the job of advocating the broad public interest throughout criminal justice.

. I N O U R R E P O R T

- * Minnesota residents must be provided better security against the state's mounting damage from burglary.

- New homes should meet minimum security standards.

- Property owners should be encouraged to upgrade their security on existing housing.

- The Minnesota Crime Watch program should be continued.

- * Law enforcement and corrections procedures must be made to more effectively deter the thief.

- Police resources should be redeployed to increase the productivity of patrol officers and detectives, and enrich their respective roles in fighting crime.

- The patrol officer should conduct routine investigations, and the detective should be assigned more important targets for investigation.

- Juveniles must be given a good reason to believe that the commission of burglary is likely to result in a fair, logical consequence that is certain and progressively more severe.

- Adults must also know more certainly what the likely consequences of burglary are going to be.

- * The market for stolen goods must be discouraged.

- The fencing of the goods should be made more risky and less profitable.

- The legal proof required in a case of possession of stolen goods should be simplified.

- The recovery of stolen goods must be made easier.

- The new Metropolitan Area Prosecutor should provide leadership and coordination in attacking fencing, corruption and other more serious and organized crimes.

- * Outside pressures must be established to provide an ongoing, coordinated effort against burglary and other serious crimes.

- A Private Crime Commission should be established as an investigatory and educational group to promote the public interest in criminal justice proceedings.

- A Minnesota Academy of Criminal Justice should be established to encourage greater communication and cooperation among personnel from all criminal justice agencies and academies in criminology.

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OUR FINDINGS

- I. BURGLARY* IS AN INCREASINGLY COMMON, EXPENSIVE, DISRUPTIVE AND CORRUPTIVE ACTIVITY WITH DIRECT AND INDIRECT NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL RESIDENTS OF THE REGION AND THE STATE.

Reported Burglaries in Minnesota nearly quadrupled in the last 15 years -- from 11,732 in 1960 to 46,218 in 1975. Since the end of World War II the rate of burglary has doubled every ten years -- from 1.3 per thousand population in 1945, to 11.8 per thousand in 1975. (See chart, page 2.)

Within the metropolitan area alone, there was a total of 31,619 reported burglaries in 1975, involving more than \$10 million worth of stolen goods. However, these reported statistics are only the readily visible tip of a much larger iceberg.

Numerous crime victimization studies conducted over the past ten years show that many burglaries do not end up in police crime statistics. First, not all such crimes are reported to the police, and, second, the police do not always record all of the crime reported to them. In a review of four victimization studies it was shown that between 32% and 48% of the victims not reporting crimes indicated they had not reported the offenses against them to the police because they did not feel the police would be effective. Other commonly cited factors were: 1) The offense was not serious enough to report; 2) the victim did not feel that reporting the offense would be appropriate (generally, in this case, the victim suspected that the offender might be a friend or relative); 3) police help was not wanted; 4) negative attitude towards police; and 5) fear of retribution.

In addition to causing the direct dollar loss in property taken from burglary, this crime is also responsible for other substantial expenditures in such areas as: law enforcement agencies and professional private security services, insurance sales and administration, and the property owner's own security procedures.


- A. The psychological effects of burglary on individuals and communities can be severe. It is impossible to put a price tag on loss from burglary when a suburban housewife walks in unsuspectingly on a burglar in her home, when elderly residents live in fear in their homes, when a particularly valuable keepsake is taken, or when home owners begin moving out of high-crime areas.

1. A concern that one may be burglarized is common to residents throughout the region and the state. While the major crimes against people are far more dangerous than burglary, one is ten times more likely to be burglarized than to experience any of the major crimes against people. While the average Minnesotan has only one chance in 35,000 of being murdered during the year, and an estimated one chance in 250 of experiencing rape, robbery or aggravated assault. . .he or she has one chance in 25 of having his or her home burglarized. A July, 1976, Minnesota Poll shows that 18% of the state's residents indicate they have been burglary victims at some time.

*Burglary is the unauthorized act of entering or remaining in a building or structure area closed to the general public, with the intent to commit a theft or other crime.

Reported
Burglaries

-2-



While burglary is more likely to occur in some areas or situations than in others, it has become a common problem to people from central cities, suburbs, outstate towns, and even the most rural portions of the state.

2. The increasing likelihood of becoming a burglary victim can push individuals into a defensive life style. On the one hand, it is most important that individuals take appropriate steps to decrease their vulnerability to burglary. On the other hand, the cost of greater protection can be very high when life style changes are involved. For example, an individual and his community both lose when a person takes a car rather than a bicycle on a short trip, simply because he or she fears the bike may be stolen. Even more serious is when a family either leaves a central city neighborhood, or does not move into it in the first place, because of what they see as a "crime problem".

Our committee did not spend much time looking at residential security systems. However, law enforcement personnel, burglars, and insurance industry people all indicated limitations of what one can do cost effectively to deter burglars. Concern was expressed against the dangers of a "fortress mentality" that emphasizes barriers between an individual and the surrounding community. This is particularly detrimental when one considers that, even in the protection against burglary, observant, concerned neighbors may be a resident's best source of security.

3. Persons considering themselves to be conscientious and law-abiding individuals are attracted to purchase goods they suspect to be stolen, to a degree that may exceed the dollar value of the bargain itself. We were told of a number of instances where distressed goods have been pushed as stolen items to improve their marketability. In one instance, we were told, organized crime on the east coast set up a factory to make fake Omega watches to be sold as "hot" merchandise throughout the country.

In another case, several years back, a clothier near the University was reported to have incurred considerable negative sentiment from the community when it was found he was really selling distressed merchandise rather than stolen items.

Police officers appearing before our committee told us they suspect that many people know when they are buying stolen goods. Stolen goods generally carry no guarantee, have no labels, have no serial numbers, and are sold below half price. *For some reason, people do not seem to associate the purchase of a stolen article with the burglary, hijacking or shoplifting that was done to secure the article in the first place. Nor do they seem to realize they are breaking the law when they buy goods known to be stolen.*

4. Particularly high burglary rates in some neighborhoods undercut residents' feelings of personal security, their ability to secure adequate insurance, their confidence in law enforcement, as well as causing a direct property loss to the individual victim. A 1973 study of crime victims done for the Metropolitan Council showed that there were 420 burglaries committed per 1,000 population in the Minneapolis Model Cities neighborhood, as compared to 29 burglaries per 1,000 residents in the suburban community of Richfield. Put another way, an individual living in the Model Cities neighborhood was 14 times more likely to have his property burglarized than was a resident of Richfield.

Victimization studies also point out that reported crime statistics do not necessarily reflect the relative amount of crime occurring in different jurisdictions. For example, it was found that the Richfield Police were likely to incorporate 75% of all complaints made to them into FBI statistics, whereas the Minneapolis Police would incorporate only 25% of the same complaints into their statistics going to the FBI. Our committee learned that this does not necessarily reflect any conspiracy or cover-up. It merely represents a possible latitude in classifying offenses, and the different procedures used by two police departments in classifying and recording various offenses. (See Appendix on burglary statistics.)

A separate victimization study done for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) included Minneapolis among 13 major cities where case studies were done. The rate of reporting residential burglaries ran from 46% to 58%, with 52% reporting in Minneapolis. The data, which was collected in 1973, showed the entire city of Minneapolis as having 177 burglaries per 1,000 households -- which was the highest rate reported.

The data from the city-wide victimization sample, as well as from Model Cities and Richfield, confirmed the seriousness of the burglary rate in the city in general and in particular the low-income, inner city neighborhood with concentrations of unattached, transient young people. The young burglar can move freely and inconspicuously against victims in a neighborhood where strangers do not stand out and their actions are less likely to be noticed.

The problem of crime in the central city feeds upon itself, inducing home owners out of the neighborhood, leaving a void that attracts an even more non-property-owning, low-income, transient population.

The apprehension caused by a high crime rate is likely to be greater than the relative magnitude of the crime rate itself. It is a serious matter when a resident realizes how little a police officer can do to protect his property, and that criminal acts are eroding the value and quality of one's neighborhood.


- B. Perhaps the greatest harm from burglary is incurred as youngsters are provided with a relatively low-risk and seemingly high-reward point of entry into crime. In 1975, 78% of all persons arrested for burglary in Minneapolis and 69.1% in St. Paul were juveniles (under 18 years of age). Of these juveniles from Minneapolis and St. Paul, 65% were white and 96% were male.

The procedure of simply notifying parents so the family can take corrective action--rather than making a formal arrest--appears to be a common practice in many suburban and outstate communities. Despite this occurrence, state-wide 65% of all individuals arrested for burglary were juveniles in 1975. (See chart, page 5.)

1. Particularly alarming is the very early age of entry by youths into burglary. Last year there were 40 burglary arrests of children 10 years of age and younger in Minneapolis, and 11 in St. Paul. This compares with only 4 persons 45 years or over in Minneapolis, and 10 persons in St. Paul. The total number of arrests for burglary of individuals over 29 in Minneapolis was 45, and 35 in St. Paul. Put another way, in the central cities

1975 MINNESOTA BURGLARY ARRESTS, BY AGE

Burglary
Arrests



juveniles under 10 accounted for two-thirds as many burglary arrests as individuals 30 and over.

It is unclear as to how accurately burglary arrests reflect the distribution of total burglars and burglaries. Simple logic suggests that, with experience, the burglar should become less likely to get caught. However, at least one study noted recently that patterns of reported burglaries in their sample closely matched the patterns used by the arrested burglars. Put another way, the percentage of burglaries reported with characteristics linked to juvenile involvement closely matched the percentage of juvenile arrests -- suggesting that "the real world burglar population is as young as the police records. . . indicate".*

2. Burglary appears to precede drug addiction and the commission of more serious crimes. In reviewing their personal experiences with our committee, several former offenders noted that they had first gotten into burglary, and then later began using drugs and committing more serious crimes. One former burglar-addict noted that this was not only his personal experience, but also that of most of the people he knew who were into crime. This, we understand, is consistent with the findings of some national studies on the relationship between drug addiction and crime.
3. Poor security procedures invite burglary. Of the 46,217 reported Minnesota burglaries in 1975, a forceable entry was made in 65½% of the cases, no force was used in 28% of the cases as the area was not locked or otherwise secured, and 6½% of the cases involved an unsuccessful attempt at entry. That there were 3,133 reported unsuccessful attempts is an indication that good security does prevent some burglary. If one concludes that unsuccessful burglary attempts are not as likely to be reported as when entry is secured, the value of good security is made even more clear.

Statewide surveys show that 15% of the public do not even lock their doors when they are away on vacation. St. Paul police have found that 25% of the burglaries they investigate occur through an open garage door.

Even when doors are locked, most homes do not have such basic security devices as a dead-bolt lock or pins to prevent the raising of a partly opened window. The state's building code does not contain any security standards for single-family residents, and local municipalities are not allowed to provide their own additional requirements for security. The state does, however, require dead-bolt locks for new apartments and hotel rooms.

Minnesota has a state bicycle licensing program which will go into effect during 1977. However, participation in the program will be voluntary unless it is required by one's local municipality.

- C. The ready market for stolen goods is a necessary ingredient needed to sustain the high and growing burglary rate. It was repeatedly brought to the attention of our committee that even the beginning juvenile soon moves beyond the point where he can personally use the goods he may take. In almost all cases, at least some of the goods burglarized are exchanged for cash. An understanding of this process of exchanging goods for cash is an important element in the burglary process.

1. The marketing of stolen goods is a major business activity in the Twin Cities area. In 1974, there was reportedly some \$30 million worth of property stolen as part of "Part I" (Major) offenses. Not included in this figure were the losses from "Part II" (Minor) offenses, such as shoplifting less than \$100 in wholesale value or the substantial portion of property crimes which go unreported.
2. The volume of stolen goods in the region appears to equal that of the very large suburban shopping center department stores . . . yet is far more profitable. This assumes that the total amount of stolen goods in the metropolitan area runs from 1½ - 2 times the amount reported as part of the major crime offense statistics. While the volume is likely to equal very large department stores, one can speculate that the profit rate on these sales is, in fact, much higher, due to the very low acquisition costs incurred by the criminal fence -- generally no more than 25% of the retail price.
3. The marketing of stolen goods appears to vary widely in form and scale. Three categories of fences were described to our committee by Bruce Jones, formerly with the Minnesota Attorney General's office, and now with the Dade County, Florida, Organized Crime Unit:

The casual fence was described as a person who primarily steals as a thief or burglar, and relies heavily upon another person to dispose of his contraband. However, he may occasionally sell his own contraband out of necessity when he cannot contact a fence.

The medium fence is an offender who frequently disposes of a variety of merchandise from a number of criminal sources, but may also be a part-time thief himself, or have other employment.

The master fence is a highly sophisticated individual with legitimate business outlet connections, trucking and warehousing resources, and numerous, varied criminal sources of supply. This offender may commonly have other specialized fencing connections covering a broad geographic area, and may place orders for theft or burglary. Mr. Jones explained that the master fence primarily does business by telephone, due to the high volume of transactions he handles.

4. The professional burglar particularly is in need of the services of the master fence. For example, when Robert Barnes, the well-known burglar-author, appeared before our committee, he explained the importance of the fence to his operation.

Mr. Barnes said he had used a number of different fences while operating in the Twin Cities area during the spring and summer of 1975. He generally used fences with a direct retail outlet, since he was able to bargain a better price from them. However, most fences work with other fences to dispose of the goods they are not equipped to handle personally.

Mr. Barnes indicated that one of his major fences was a salvage dealer who would help him set up the burglary, and then melt down the silver that was taken. There are several clothing and appliance stores in the Twin Cities specializing in stolen goods. He said these are generally fly-by-night operations that are here today and gone tomorrow. He did not feel there is much stolen goods sold over the counter in the Twin Cities, as compared to Chicago or New York.

D. Burglary provides an important link between numerous illegal activities.

Several resource persons discussed "major subjects" or individuals who were involved in multiple-category crimes taking place in multiple political jurisdictions. As Paul Tschida, Superintendent of the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, explained, the same names keep cropping up in a wide range of criminal activities. The same individual is likely to be involved in prostitution, drugs, fencing and other illegal activities. He noted that these criminals tend to know each other, and work together on an ad hoc basis -- even though there appears to be no central ethnic-oriented coordinating organization.

1. Burglary is used as a source to buy narcotics. We were told by one burglar-addict that he found that anyone who sells drugs can steer you to a fence. It appears that burglary provides one of the easier sources of money to a great many to maintain a chemical dependency. All drugs are expensive, and regular users are likely to require supplemental income from illicit sources to meet their drug demands. For example, some federal narcotics officials estimate there are as many as 10,000 heroin users in this metropolitan area.

"Fences" may find it helpful to pay their suppliers in narcotics, while "pushers" need a market for the goods their clients steal. Numerous resource persons indicated that it is common knowledge that a number of Twin Cities fences are willing to pay their burglar-suppliers in narcotics. As one detective explained, when a fence pays off in narcotics, he minimizes the chance of the burglar's being arrested on a narcotics "buy-charge".

2. Bar owners and prostitutes were reported by one of our burglar-witnesses to be among those who set up victims to be burglarized. Robert Barnes indicated that almost all of the 280 burglaries he committed in the Twin Cities in 1975 were, at least in part, set up by someone else. Typically, a set-up man provided Barnes such information as to what material is available to be stolen, when the victim is not likely to be home, the victim's net worth, his income, telephone number, and employment. Some set-up men even have such information as the location and combination of the victim's home safe. Barnes said the set-up man's cut for a job normally runs from 10-50% . . . depending on the value of the information given. In addition to using several bar owners, and several prostitutes, Barnes indicated his setup in the Twin Cities included a jeweler, an individual in a machine company, a property insurance salesman, and two elderly individuals who operate exclusively as full-time set-up men. On the street, set-up men are often referred to as 10% men. . .as that amount of payment appears common.

E. The political process can be a valuable tool to the commission of a burglary-related crime. One of the most perplexing problems for our committee is the recurring allegations and innuendos that campaign financing and the political process may be compromised by people involved in criminal activities.

1. Major fences use alleged political contacts to promote their "street image". In discussing the recent conviction of a major clothing fence, resource persons and press clippings indicated that in the wire tap tapes the fences involved were constantly referring to their connections in government. The nature and extent of such connections are unclear to our committee. What is clear is that it is to the advantage of a criminal figure to appear to have political connections.

In this light, one of our resource persons indicated that known fences invariably can be found at major municipal fund-raisers. He noted these individuals tend to support nearly all elected officials, and that this can contribute to the fences' respectability and influence.

2. Licensed activities and establishments can play an important role in the movement of stolen goods. For example, law enforcement officers consistently told us that some marketing of stolen goods takes place in nearly every Minneapolis and St. Paul bar. . .with or without the management's knowledge or participation. Detective Harvey Everson of the Minneapolis Police Department's Licensing Division observed that he knows of only a half dozen bars in Minneapolis where the managers themselves seem to be involved in fencing. A similar situation was reported for St. Paul by police officers in their intelligence unit.

Robert Barnes pointed out that several Twin Cities bars serve as major contact points for various parties involved in the movement of stolen goods. Generally, only the arrangements are made in the bars, the actual movement of goods takes place off the premises.

Robert Afton of the Minneapolis City Attorney's office noted that they were able to get one grocery license suspended for selling stolen cigarettes.

Other licensed establishments cited by resource persons as having involvement in fencing include: saunas, as a drop point for stolen goods late at night; a refuse operator, second-hand dealer, who operated as a fence; and restaurants and off-sale liquor stores that use customer contacts to buy and sell stolen goods.

3. A St. Paul liquor store fencing operation provides an example of the tie between fencing, licensing, and the political process. In this case, apparently a substantial amount of stolen goods had moved through the store over several years by the owner's son, who was the principal manager.

In 1974 the City Council had suspended the store's liquor license for 60 days, following the son-manager's conviction in court of possession of stolen goods. On January 28, 1976, the City Council ordered the store to close and sell its liquor license within 30 days, following the son-manager's guilty plea to trafficking in federal food stamps through the store.

In discussing the case with our committee, City Council President David Hozza noted several things that distressed him about the process. First, he had strongly felt that the City Council should have revoked the license outright, without giving the owners the privilege of selling the license for a substantial sum. He noted that on the very same day this case was decided, another license was revoked outright simply because the recorded sales price was well below the going market rate -- suggesting that there must have been money passed under the table from buyer to seller as part of the transaction.

Next, Mr. Hozza expressed his concern that the Council may have been influenced by the fact that the attorney representing the store owners was a former St. Paul mayor, who has contributed to the campaigns of all current members of the City Council, including Mr. Hozza's. Finally, Mr. Hozza expressed concern that the City Council is not very well equipped to handle quasi-judicial-type proceedings such as license hearings.

4. Burglars and fences appear to use informant information to build helpful relationships within law enforcement agencies and the adjudication system. This was pointed up clearly by Robert Barnes as he explained that he expects to receive no punishment for his large-scale burglary activities in the Twin Cities during 1975. This is because he cooperated closely with police in making cases against other criminals -- including fences.

Law enforcement officers indicated that it is a fairly common practice for a major criminal figure to work with a specific law enforcement officer to build favors, and use the law enforcement system as a tool against colleagues.

- F. Burglary investigations tend to be unproductive, and accordingly can create morale problems for law enforcement agencies.

Since most burglaries go undetected while in progress, an investigating officer has much less evidence on which to build a case than is true with most other crimes. After the burglar has successfully left the scene of the crime, his chances of apprehension are slight.

1. Discussions with resource persons within and without police departments clearly establish that police investigations here are, at best, only of limited value in solving burglaries. As one burglary detective explained, out of approximately 1,200 cases assigned to each detective in his department, the individual detective is very fortunate to be able to develop as many as 10 cases per year with sufficient evidence to take to the county attorney for prosecution. He suggested that, if it were not for the uniformed street officer and arrests made at the scene, the police department might as well close shop regarding burglaries.
2. A new Rand Corporation study suggested that: "The effectiveness of criminal investigations would not be duly lessened if approximately half the investigating effort were eliminated or shifted to more productive uses." The studies surveying 156 major law enforcement agencies found that "fingerprint dusting, mug shot showing or questioning witnesses are often done without any hope of developing leads, but simply for public relations," to satisfy victims' expectations.
3. The futility of most burglary investigations can foster morale problems and suggests that burglary investigations may not be the best utilization of police talent. One officer appearing before our committee suggested the burglary division in his department is used as a place to send the least effective officers.

II. MOTIVATION TO BURGLARIZE APPEARS TO HAVE BOTH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS.

Historically, crime has tended to be approached as either a moral or social problem. Reviewing the testimony and background material we have received, it is clear that people burglarize for a number of reasons: social, psychological, and economic. However, the relative influence may differ from individual to individual, and over time for a given burglar. Some may burglarize simply because their victims make it so easy to do.

Nearly all of our resource persons who discussed the motives for burglary placed heavy emphasis on both psychological factors and economic rewards. Even though the burglars cited the financial rewards as being increasingly important over time, they all maintained that the excitement and thrill from a burglary remained an important factor to them.

A. Committing a burglary is often a group activity strongly affected by peer relationships. This may be particularly true for juveniles, who, as we have seen, appear to commit most burglaries. The nature of the peer relationships undoubtedly varies widely, serving different needs for different individuals.

1. For some, burglary has provided a means by which to join a group. For example, one resource person appearing before our committee explained that his older sister's boyfriends were into burglary. . .and he began to help them for the opportunity to be part of the group. After he got good at burglary, he began to take on jobs on his own for financial reasons. Another burglar noted that, in his neighborhood, committing burglary is one way to gain prestige. Accordingly, establishing a peer image was a big factor in his initial burglaries.
2. Group involvement may add to the excitement of crime. One individual told our committee how he had started burglarizing by himself, but later began to work with a group when he found it was more exciting if he worked with others. One police officer described the near euphoria of a group of criminals he observed at a police stake-out as the gang returned from committing a crime. Sharing the experience and being enabled to relive it verbally with each other obviously was important to the group.
3. Team burglaries may also simplify the job, and lower the risks to the individuals involved. Some burglars indicated they would not consider doing a job by themselves, because they feel there is a higher risk of getting caught. It was suggested that it is important to have someone outside the dwelling to be able to alert those inside when danger approaches.

B. Adventure and excitement appear to be particularly important to the youthful burglar. For some young burglars the activity may represent -- more than anything else -- something to do in answer to boredom. It may entail the response to a dare, or an evening running with the gang.

1. Burglary rates tend to rise over Christmas vacation and during the summer, when school is out. It appears that teen-age boys are less likely to get involved in burglary when they are successfully involved in their school, with their family, with a girlfriend, or whatever.
2. Increasingly, over time, a given burglar is likely to be motivated by the economic rewards of burglary. Despite the psychological factors, there appears to be general agreement that if it were not for the economic rewards, there would be very little burglary. First, the beginning burglar may take things that he may directly use himself. However, he soon begins to run out of things he can use directly, and converts the stolen items into cash. At first this is likely to be done with a direct sell to friends or acquaintances who buy the item for their own use. Later, a more certain disposal arrangement is likely to be established with a criminal fence.

C. The professional burglar is likely to steal as a life style choice, while the less-able, semi-professional adult burglar is more likely to steal out of a sense of necessity. From the outset, our committee was confronted with seemingly conflicting views which described burglary as being either an exceedingly lucrative endeavor, or as a marginally profitable activity -- engaged in by individuals who are too young or otherwise incapable of finding more rewarding alternatives.

1. The individual who gets started into criminal activity with burglary appears likely to move on -- entirely or in part -- to other criminal activities that may be more rewarding. However, we also heard testimony that the type of crime an individual engages in may be more the product of personal preference or style than one of risk-reward analysis. As we will show later, the risk-reward potential for most adult burglars is very grim, if they are very active for very many months.
2. Unemployment and underemployment may be an important causal factor of burglary for some individuals. When he appeared before our committee, Stan Kano, the staff director for H.I.R.E. (Helping Industry Recruit Ex-offenders), stressed the importance of the fact that statewide there is a 60% unemployment rate with individual offenders at the time they are arrested. Mr. Kano noted that in reviewing the case histories of their 1,200 clients at H.I.R.E. they found that 25% were unemployed for more than a year before their arrests. An additional 50% were unemployed for six months to a year. Despite this, only 2% of the group had been on welfare.
3. Burglary may be a financially rewarding endeavor for a limited number of well-organized, calculating professional burglars. This is the impression received by our committee from our discussion with Robert Barnes and police officers. However, even Mr. Barnes' experience shows that the highly talented, professional burglar is likely to spend a large percentage of his time in jail. An individual who uses the same degree of talent, development of skills, and planning used by the more successful professional burglar is likely to succeed in any number of other endeavors as well.
4. The fencing of stolen goods appears to be more economically motivated and rewarding than burglary. There is little reason to believe that the criminal fence receives the level of psychological reinforcement from his crime as does the thief. The direct and indirect danger (sense of adventure) is less. The activities are more of an administrative nature, with less physical activity of a criminal nature. The activities of the fence more rationally reflect a risk-reward analysis than those of the burglar.

Put another way, the role of the fence is that of a business person. Some may be primarily robbers or thieves who retail their own goods in much the same way a farmer may sell his goods at a farmers' market. Others are commodity brokers who facilitate a smooth flow of stolen goods from producers-thieves to a retailer or customer. Still others are primarily retailers. However, in each case the basic objective remains the same -- making a profit in acquiring and selling goods.

5. The criminal fence currently has very little risk of being arrested or sued for damages. It is extremely hard to prove the possession of stolen goods once they have been relocated away from the scene of the theft. Most possession convictions are actually cases where the thief is caught with the goods in transit away from the place where the items were taken. . .but there is insufficient evidence to prove guilt of the original theft.

In order to prove a felony conviction of receiving stolen goods, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant "knew" the goods were stolen or that he had "reason to believe" the goods were stolen, and that he had at least one previous possession conviction during the past year. The first conviction for possession, where it is only proved that the defendant "had reason to believe" the goods were stolen, is a misdemeanor.

Manufacturers' serial numbers generally cannot be used to trace goods, since they tend not to be recorded by owners and a given serial number may have been used many times by the same manufacturer on the same product.

Minnesota law does provide that any person who has been injured by a known possessor of stolen goods may sue for three times the actual damages plus litigation costs. However, this provision appears not to be well known and has not yet been used in court.

III. THERE ARE VERY FEW INCENTIVES WORKING ON THE VARIOUS PARTIES INVOLVED TO DISCOURAGE BURGLARY.

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of burglary here in the Twin Cities, and elsewhere, is not that it is a large, rapidly growing phenomenon. . .but that there are few, if any, effective incentives operating in this system to cause things to stabilize and improve.

- A. The juvenile burglar appears unlikely to be caught, less likely to be prosecuted, and often unconcerned with the "treatment" which is prescribed by the court upon conviction. Literally everyone appearing before our committee--from burglar, to police officer, to attorney, to judge, to corrections officer--described the current system for dealing with arrested juvenile burglars as being a failure. There was disagreement only in the reasons for the failures, and on prescriptions for correcting the system.

In adjudicating criminals, society appears to have three somewhat divergent themes: punishment to set an example and act as a deterrent, treatment of the offender's problems, and confinement as a means of sheltering society for a limited time from additional criminal acts by an individual.

1. In Minnesota, the greatest emphasis in dealing with juvenile offenders is on treatment, rather than on punishment or confinement. However, the treatment programs employed in this approach appear to have little deterrent effect on *some* Twin Cities youngsters.

When Captain Donald Arneson of the Minneapolis Police Department's Juvenile division appeared before our committee, he noted that: "When we arrest a juvenile for burglary, there is a 30% chance he is currently on parole. There is a 60% chance that he has had prior contacts with police. The juvenile offender tends to work his way up with increasingly more serious offenses over time."

A prosecuting attorney told our committee that one juvenile he is familiar with has been arrested 34 times by the police to date, but he has not spent any time in an institution. He cited another juvenile who had 19 burglary charges against him on one arraignment.

A defense attorney reported that a client of his refused to appeal a conviction by a referee to the judge, even though the youth was clearly innocent of the specific charge. Upon receiving a suspended sentence, the youth chided the attorney for wanting to appeal the conviction. . . after all, it was explained, he was certain that the "treatment" prescribed by the court would be less bother than having to come back into the court for the appeal.

2. The Hennepin and Ramsey County juvenile judges feel that they have no reasonable options available to them for dealing with many difficult juveniles. In talking with our committee, Judge Lindsay Arthur from Hennepin County, and Judge Archie Gingold from Ramsey County, both expressed frustrations in not having better "treatment" resources to deal with the juvenile offender.

Judge Arthur indicated that we cannot blame juveniles for laughing at the system. "The State of Minnesota has taken away the trump card from the judicial system in working with juveniles. Today, without a secure juvenile facility, juveniles know that they can walk away from any juvenile facility they are sent to. The court system doesn't have any serious threat or resort if the child will not cooperate with the treatment program."

In countering this argument, people in corrections emphasize that they feel certifying an individual as an adult is a proper procedure for dealing with juveniles that require a secure detention facility. They note that any juvenile can be certified as an adult, adjudicated with the protections of the adult system, and then sent to a secure facility. However, within the last five or six years, juveniles have rarely been certified as adults.

Mr. Orville Pung of the Minnesota Corrections Department explained that a secure juvenile facility concentrates some of the most violent and unmanageable individuals in the system together. He suggested that the exposure of a juvenile to these other hard-core juveniles is far more dangerous and corruptive than mixing them with the slightly older population at St. Cloud penitentiary. More important, he suggested that by bringing the juvenile into a larger adult facility, there can be far more opportunity to provide a program that will be helpful in treating the juvenile.

B. Slack in the current criminal justice system may lead the beginning offender to believe incorrectly that burglary is a paying proposition. Of approximately 77,000 burglaries committed in 1975 in Minnesota, 46,280 were reported to local law enforcement agencies and entered as crime statistics; 5,903 led to an arrest of an individual or individuals suspected of committing the crime, and of these, 3,957 came under the jurisdiction of the juvenile system, 988 were tried in adult court, from which 264 were sentenced to confinement, 124 were given a split sentence (normally involving serving some time in a county facility), 11 were fined, 4 were given a work release. (See the flow chart on pages 16 and 17.)

1. For the adult burglar, there appears to be a less than 1% chance that he will go all the way through the system and serve time for a given burglary. . . for the juvenile, the confinement consequence for burglary is far less likely. Given these statistics, it first appears that the crime of burglary is likely to be a good deal for the burglar. However, we will see that this is not necessarily the case. . . particularly for the adult with a record of convictions.
2. On the average, the adult burglar is likely to earn only a marginal living from his burglary activities, while spending a considerable amount of time in prison, if he is very active very long. In the tables on pages 18 and 19 we have tried to lay out the likely economics of burglary for adults by rate of burglary activity, and by the total number of offenses committed as an adult. In the two tables it was necessary to make a number of assumptions that we were not able to statistically verify. However, where this was done, we did have the assumptions reviewed by the burglars and criminal justice professionals involved with the area covered by the specific assumption.


When in doubt, we weighted the assumptions on the side of the adult burglar in terms of average profitability and likelihood of not receiving punishment. Despite this, the projected prognosis for the active adult burglar doing a high volume is grim. For the beginner, without a criminal record, the odds are somewhat better.

It appears that the average adult burglar committing ten or more burglaries per week will spend more than 85% of his time in confinement, and have an average net annual income -- deflated for the confinement time -- of less than \$6,000 per year. At the same time, criminal fences are likely to make better than five times the rate of profit from the same burglaries, because they have almost no exposure under present conditions to serving time for their role in the process.


An individual who sets up or plans a burglary for a 10% cut in an estimated 60% of this same average burglar's jobs would be likely to earn at two-thirds the burglar's rate. . . again because there is almost no chance of the set-up man's serving time for his participation in the crime.

In the table exploring the economics of burglary by the total number of adult offenses, it becomes obvious that burglary is progressively unprofitable as the burglar in time builds up a record of adult convictions. Since juvenile records do not pass on to adult court, it appears that the average burglar can commit a substantial number of offenses before the system begins bearing down with the law of averages. That is why the tables show a burglar's likely net income per break-in is likely to drop from an \$83 average on the first offense to only \$12 after committing as many as 300 burglaries.

ESTIMATED 1975 MINNESOTA BURGLARIES



AND DISPOSITIONS *



* The dispositions are not necessarily the same cases as the burglaries -- since the dispositions cover burglaries committed in earlier years, and many 1975 burglary cases were similarly carried over into 1976.

** The percentage figures are given in relationship to the total number of burglar contacts -- which is the estimated number of burglaries multiplied by the estimated average number of burglars per case.

ESTIMATED ECONOMICS OF BURGLARY BY RATE FOR ADULTS

<u>Aver. Weekly # of Burg- laries</u> (1)	<u>Aver. Value Per Burg lary</u> (2)	<u>Annual Rate Goods Taken</u> (3)	<u>Annual Burglar Inc. Rate</u> (3)	<u>Co-Bur- glars' Share</u> (4)	<u>Fence's Share</u> (5)	<u>Set-up Share</u> (6)	<u>Custo- mer's Share</u> (7)	<u>Average Arrests</u> (8)	<u>Aver. # of Con- vic- tions</u> (9)	<u>Average Con- finement</u> (10)	<u>Burglar % Time in Con- finement</u>	<u>Net Annual Comp.</u>
10	\$500	\$250,000	\$39,167	\$19,583	\$62,500	\$3,750 (6%)	\$125,000	17.5	5.3	71 mos.	86%	\$5,640
8	500	200,000	32,333	16,167	50,000	1,500 (3%)	100,000	14.0	4.2	57 mos.	83%	5,613
6	500	150,000	24,500	12,250	37,500	750 (2%)	75,000	10.5	3.2	44 mos.	79%	5,250
4	500	100,000	16,667	8,333	25,000	-----	50,000	7.0	2.1	29 mos.	70%	4,932
2	500	50,000	8,333	4,167	12,500	-----	25,000	3.5	1.1	6 mos.	54%	3,804
1	500	25,000	4,167	2,083	6,250	-----	12,500	1.8	0.5	4 mos.	23%	3,212


- (1) Based on testimony from burglars that an active week would include about 10 burglaries.
- (2) Assumes adults average \$500 per burglary, leaving juveniles \$100 per burglary--based on the known statewide average of \$300 per reported burglary in 1975.
- (3) Assumes payment of 25% of retail value less shared take. Fence may not pay that much on average, but cash taken should make up the difference.
- (4) Assumes an average of 1.5 burglars per burglary, which is higher than the 1.2 ratio shown in the 1975 state arrest data, but lower than most burglars and police we asked estimate.
- (5) Assumes fence on average pays 25% of the retail value to thief and sells at 50% retail value...the most common figures used by resource persons. (However, in some cases the burglar will fence some or all of the goods he takes...giving him both burglar and fencing income.)
- (6) Assumes high-volume burglar uses set-up assistance slightly over 50% of time, and lower-volume burglar does not use a set-up.
- (7) Assumes goods sold to users at 50% of retail.
- (8) Assumes 3½% arrest percent for all adult burglaries and correspondingly juveniles at 7%, or double the adult rate, to maintain an average of 5.25%.
- (9) Assumes 30% of adult burglary arrests lead to convictions, based on 1975 experience.
- (10) Assumes 80% confinement per conviction for burglars averaging one or more convictions per year out of prison and 40% for those with less than one per year.

ESTIMATED
ECONOMICS OF BURGLARY BY TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENSES AS ADULT

<u>Burglaries</u>	<u>Value Taken (1)</u>	<u>Burglar Income (2)</u>	<u>Arrests on Average (3)</u>	<u>Convic- tions on Average (4)</u>	<u>Confinement on Average</u>		<u>Lost Income (\$500/month) Due to Prison (6)</u>	<u>Net Income (7)</u>	<u>Net Income/ Additional Burglary</u>
					<u>#</u>	<u>(5) Mos.</u>			
1	500	83	0.035	0.01	--	--		\$ 83	\$83
10	5,000	833	0.35	0.11	0.01	0.19	95	738	73
25	12,500	2,083	0.875	0.26	0.04	0.68	340	1,743	65
50	25,000	4,167	1.75	0.52	0.12	2.04	1,020	3,247	58
100	50,000	8,333	3.50	1.05	0.33	5.61	2,805	5,528	48
150	75,000	12,500	5.25	1.58	0.50	8.50	4,250	8,250	39
200	100,000	16,667	7.00	2.10	0.82	13.94	6,970	9,697	30
250	125,000	20,833	8.75	2.63	1.20	20.40	10,200	10,633	21
300	150,000	25,000	10.5	3.15	1.62	27.55	13,775	11,225	12
400	200,000	33,333	14.00	4.2	2.46	41.82	20,910	12,423	12
500	250,000	41,667	17.50	5.25	3.30	56.10	28,050	13,617	12

- (1) Assumes value taken per burglary for adults is \$500.
- (2) Assumes 25% of retail value, shared with another burglar in 50% of the cases.
- (3) Assumes constant 3½% arrest rate.
- (4) 30% statewide average.
- (5) Assumes from 10% to 80% convictions lead to confinement based on number of previous convictions.
- (6) Assumes average burglar could earn \$500 income at some other employment.
- (7) Burglary income, less job income lost to confinement @ \$500/month.

ESTIMATED
AVERAGE INCOME AND CONFINEMENT TIME FOR ADULT BURGLARS
BY NUMBER OF BURGLARIES COMMITTED PER WEEK



3. Despite the poor prognosis for the adult burglar, it appears to be commonly accepted on the street that the system can be beaten. It appears to be assumed that the good burglar can avoid getting caught . . . and with money and connections one can fix the system, when caught. However, what we learned of the system tends to refute these assumptions in whole or in part. For example, the mature burglar we talked with was arrested for burglary nine times during his few months in the Twin Cities, and he has spent much of his adult life in jail.
- C. Burglary insurance, generally provided through a homeowner's package policy, disperses the cost of burglary losses so broadly as to focus relatively little direct loss-control pressure on the system. Nearly all homeowners with a mortgage on their property carry homeowner's insurance covering fire, burglary and personal liability -- as do most homeowners with mortgage-free residences. The cost of the burglary portion of a homeowner's policy is so low (about 10%) and so hidden that it is relatively painless. . . particularly when it is placed as a part of a much larger mortgage payment.
 1. One's homeowner's policy, with its \$50 deductible provision, puts the individual burglary victim in a position of little direct financial loss. Under a standard homeowner's policy, the contents of a home are covered up to a maximum of 50% of the face value of the policy. In other words, a \$20,000 policy covers \$20,000 on the building and normally \$10,000 on the contents. Supplemental insurance on scheduled (listed) high-value items such as jewelry is also available -- as are options for more or less insurance on the contents.

Police officers who talked with our committee expressed the opinion that many burglary victims may pad their reported losses to in part cover their deductible portion and to upgrade the used items stolen with a new counterpart. Unlike automobile insurance, where the rate may increase following an accident, the homeowner's insurance policy rates are insignificantly affected by the homeowner's own experience.

2. The insured residents of an individual municipality or county providing law enforcement services are also largely sheltered from much of the financial consequences of a relatively high local burglary loss rate. This is because most insurance companies use a statewide experience rating in setting the non-fire loss portion of a homeowner's policy. This means that the individual homeowner in a community with relatively low burglary losses pays the same amount for the burglary coverage provided in his policy as does the homeowner in a community with relatively high burglary losses. Put another way, if a community should be able to dramatically cut burglary losses through law enforcement programs or expenditures, the savings would accrue more to the insured residents of the state at large than directly to the insured residents of the given community.
3. Insurance company sales representatives and, to a lesser extent, the insurance companies themselves, have little financial incentive to see the overall burglary loss rate stabilize or decrease. In fact, the commissions to an individual insurance agent are generally based on a fixed percentage of the total package cost. An individual insurance com-

pany's competitive position is unaffected by indiscriminate losses applied equally among different insurers. However, it should be noted that rapid increases in burglary losses can be costly to the insurance company, since rate adjustments may lag behind the loss experience on which they are based.

4. The financial loss from a residential burglary is most likely to be felt by renters and certain homeowners who tend to be the least well financially situated to withstand the loss. The lowest-income people, living in areas with the highest burglary rates, tend to be renters with the least opportunity to secure insurance that would cover a burglary loss, even when insurance coverage -- federal crime insurance, for example -- is available.

In these very same neighborhoods, homeowners may be able to secure only the assigned risk building (fair plan) insurance protecting a lending agency, but not insuring the home's contents against crime loss. Among homeowners, people in this situation again tend to be in the poorest position to personally absorb the cost of a burglary loss. The poor also are at a relative disadvantage due to the fact that income tax deductions for burglary losses are far more helpful to those having higher incomes and being more likely to routinely itemize their tax returns.

- D. Burglary and other crimes against property -- not being as threatening as violent crimes against people -- are likely to be given relatively lower priority by police, prosecutors, courts and corrections. In our discussions with resource persons, the relative concern with burglary with local police departments appeared to be the greatest not in those communities with the highest burglary rates but in those communities where the relative importance of burglary was greater due to relative freedom from violent crimes against people.

1. The general public is relatively less concerned about property crime than violence. As one might expect, public opinion polls show that people primarily fear violent crimes against people. With burglary, people are not likely to get hurt, as 92% of all burglaries occur while the victim is not present. If there is someone home, the burglar generally has made a mistake.
2. Limited police and prosecutor resources work in the burglar's favor. Assigned case loads per detective in the central city burglary divisions almost assure that only superficial treatment can be given to most of them. In a similar vein, a prosecutor explained how his office must limit the number of cases it can bring to court and still handle them sufficiently well to maintain a respectable rate of convictions. It appears that a defense attorney plea bargaining during portions of the year when the prosecutor's case load is the highest, may be in a better bargaining position. The prosecutor, of course, is in a central position in dealing with burglary, since he has a full range of independence and discretion as to how and if to proceed with a case.
3. Elected prosecutors have little incentives to aggressively pursue certain cases like fencing, where there is very little public outrage and convictions are difficult to obtain. In any community, the law is in effect limited to local enforcement standards. The enforcement of all laws is not

equally pursued and cannot be. Therefore, it is natural, and to be expected, that the priorities of elected officials reflect community sentiment. Thus, until the general public has a better understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship between fencing and the original theft of the property, there is likely to be little concentration of community sentiment against the fence.

4. The use of regulating licensed activities or establishments to discourage illegal activities such as fencing is not well understood. Even the local law enforcement agencies are just now beginning to explore the ties between such diverse activities as funding political campaigns, issuing municipal licenses, and illegal activities that are planned or conducted within licensed establishments.

Only after such ties are more fully understood can these agencies and the public begin developing strategies to discourage criminal activity through the authority to control licensed activities and establishments.

IV. WHILE THE CURRENT APPROACH TO BURGLARY REMAINS LARGELY AN ATTEMPT AT APPREHENSION, CONVICTION AND CORRECTIONS AFTER A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED, SOME NEW PROGRAMS HAVE A NEW EMPHASIS.

We were repeatedly told by police officers that case load assignments on routine functions such as traffic control and administrative procedures give the police officers very little time to take affirmative action to prevent crime, catch targeted criminals, or crack down on particularly harmful categories of criminal activity.

- A. The Minnesota Crime Watch program represents a new emphasis on reducing the opportunity for crime to occur. Minnesota communities such as Edina and St. Paul were among the first nationally to recognize the importance of crime prevention activities. With federal funding, we now have a statewide program called Minnesota Crime Watch. As a demonstration grant project, state assumption of the program funding will be required for its continuation past 1976.

The Minnesota Crime Watch program is coordinated by the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control (hereinafter referred to as the Governor's Crime Commission), which works with local law enforcement agencies to (a) reduce the opportunity for a criminal to commit a crime, (b) get law enforcement agencies more actively involved in preventive activities, and (c) involve the community itself in crime prevention programs.

1. The best known of the Crime Watch programs is Operation I.D. Working with the Crime Watch program, 45 law enforcement agencies in the state have created crime prevention units, 75 agencies have three or more officers working with crime prevention, 23 agencies have a crime prevention budget, and 262 departments (serving over 95% of the state's population) are participating in the Operation I.D. program.

Operation I.D. is a program whereby an individual is assigned an identification number by his local law enforcement agency. This number is then engraved, or otherwise placed, on valuable items belonging to the participant. Stickers are used to alert potential burglars that the property in a dwelling is marked as part of the Operation I.D. program. State law makes it a crime to remove identification markings on an item.

2. The overall effect of Operation I.D. is currently under dispute nationally. Advocates of Operation I.D. and the Crime Watch program in general note that they have found that in Minnesota a person is four times more likely to be burglarized if he is not enrolled in Operation I.D. than if he is enrolled in the program. They noted to our committee that, as a result of the program, it appears that considerably more people are taking steps to protect their property against burglary.

On the other hand, the committee reviewed information from "An Evaluation of Operation Identification As Implemented in Illinois", a study produced by the University of Illinois Center for Research in Criminal Justice, September 30, 1974, which questioned the value of Operation Identification programs. Their analysis of crime statistics indicated there was no significant difference between burglary rates among communities based on the level of their participation in Operation I.D.

It appears that, although Operation Identification has reduced burglary for the individual participant, the burglars may only have been diverted to the residence of a neighbor who is not participating in Operation I.D. The question then arises as to what would be the effect if everybody within a neighborhood were enrolled. Some suggest that the burglar would be diverted to other crimes, other areas, or out of crime altogether. Others suggest that since Operation I.D. markings lower the value of stolen goods, the criminal would increase his volume in order to secure the same amount of income.

- B. Organizational changes have been made in some state, county and local law enforcement agencies to improve their investigative function. Some of these changes have been designed to better take into account the organized nature of certain criminal activity. Other changes have been prompted by an attempt to better utilize and coordinate the work of the uniformed patrol officer with that of the investigator-detective.

1. Newly formed intelligence or organized crime units have been established in some of the larger local police departments and at the county and state level. These units generally are not assigned case loads, and accordingly have much greater latitude to take the initiative in gathering general information than taking on sophisticated cases. However, even here, we were told, they have had to concentrate more on targets of opportunity. . . rather than to select targets based on overall strategy or problem analysis. Put another way, these units have been able to follow up extensively where they receive a lead on a large important criminal activity. They have not yet reached the point of determining who or what it is most important to stop, and then initiate a program to meet that objective.

The Organized Crime Unit in the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension helps coordinate the activities of the local units on specific cases, as well as undertake some of the intelligence work directly. However, the Bureau will intervene locally only at the request of a local law enforcement agency, and does not have authority to secure search warrants. The Bureau is not able to furnish very extensive information to local agencies about related developments in other jurisdictions within the state.

2. Establishment of county-wide major crime investigation units represents a major attempt to strengthen the post-crime investigation function. This approach was initiated several years back in Anoka County, and more recently in Washington County.

Captain William Hoogestraat of the Anoka County major crime unit noted that there had been a great deal of duplication in law enforcement investigations in Anoka County before the unit was established. He cited a lack of funds and a lack of trained people as major factors that helped lead to the creation of the unit. However, he also stressed the important role of the County Attorney, who expressed his dissatisfaction with local police investigative procedures by refusing to accept cases prepared by some local police departments.

Creation of the major crime units to conduct felony investigations in Anoka and Washington Counties highlight a number of major law enforcement policy issues. One is the role of the uniformed policeman and the detective in criminal investigations. In some communities, the uniformed officer receives both instruction and physical evidence kits to allow him to play a major role in the investigation of a crime. Other communities assign a rather minimal investigatory role to the uniformed officer, relying more on trained detectives to conduct the full investigation.

3. Some communities have turned to a team policing approach to improved police utilization and coordination. In discussing this approach with our committee, Thomas Morgan, the Director of Public Safety in Richfield, explained that they have divided their department into five teams each having five patrol officers, a sergeant, an investigator, and an assistant. One of these teams is on duty around the clock.

In their system, the patrol officer is involved in an investigation from the time crime is first reported until the case is turned over to the prosecutor. At the same time, there is one detective investigator assigned to each team, and accordingly an investigator is available around the clock whenever the crime occurs.

In Minneapolis, the team policing approach is utilized in two high-crime precincts, while in St. Paul the patrol officer is utilized more extensively for investigations throughout the city.

There appeared to be general agreement among our resource persons that it is desirable to get the uniformed officer trained and equipped to play a significant role in preliminary burglary investigations. It appears that this could have the effect of both enriching the work of the uniformed officer, and giving the detective investigator more time to concentrate on those cases and activities where he can be most productive.

A policy issue that does arise is whether it is more important to centralize the investigatory function along the lines they have done in Anoka in order to coordinate efforts against individual criminals operating in a large geographic area, or whether it is more important to decentralize in order to coordinate the work of the uniformed officer and the detective, as well as various types of crimes such as burglary, narcotics, armed robbery and auto theft at the community level.

C. The Creation of a new Metropolitan Area District Prosecutor's Unit is designed to help the metropolitan counties to better prosecute multi-jurisdictional crimes, unusual crimes and career criminals. The Urban County Attorneys' Board has received a grant from the Governor's Crime Commission to establish the new unit. The project prosecutor has been granted authority to have prosecutorial powers in all seven metropolitan counties through arrangements made by each of the separate county attorneys.

1. The District Prosecutor's Unit will be working with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) Organized Crime Unit as well as with local agencies on major fences. Major fencing operations not only receive goods stolen from a number of different jurisdictions, but often move the stolen goods from one jurisdiction to another after the property has been acquired from the original thief.
2. The project prosecutors can request a grand jury be impaneled by the county attorney of any participating county, or have a grand jury called upon a majority vote of the Urban County Attorneys' Board. This is important since there are almost no current checks or balances working on a county attorney's office as to whether a certain case will actually be prosecuted. The Minnesota Attorney Generals Office can be called in on the investigation and/or prosecution of a given case only at the request of the local county attorney, who could conceivably be directly or indirectly involved in the alleged wrongdoing.

V. THE PROBLEM OF BURGLARY IS COMPOUNDED BY A LACK OF PLANNING AND COORDINATION AMONG THE MANY PARTIES DEALING WITH THE CRIME.

A. The rapid growth in damage from burglary is of some direct concern to almost everyone, but is the fixed responsibility of no one. As such, professionals and the lay public sense a need to establish responsibility and do more about the problem.

1. No other crime affects as many people in as direct and personal a way as burglary. The principal victims include not only 1 in 25 Minnesota families that are actually burglarized each year, but also those whose sense of security and life style are eroded out of concern that they might be robbed and/or assaulted by a burglar.

The crime of burglary involves each of us to some extent in both direct and indirect ways. We are direct actors. . .as the owner and protector of specific items that might be stolen. . .as the owner, renter, or simply an occupant of a dwelling. . .and even as a potential buyer-consumer of stolen goods. Indirectly, we are involved as a resident of a community, as a taxpayer, as an insurance policy holder, or in our role as a citizen.

2. The criminal justice system festers with a frustration and resentment on the part of professionals, as the response of one public agency often appears to be inconsistent with the work of others. Resource people appearing before our committee from each of the various facets of the criminal justice system expressed rather strong dissatisfaction with

the overall working of the system. Many tended to be somewhat defensive, wanting to make clear that most of the blame belonged elsewhere.

Each of the elements appears to highly value its own discretion in dealing with an offender, but strongly feels that once it has acted, subsequent discretion by others should be reduced. Judges are sufficiently concerned by the discretion of the Department of Corrections that they may give some problem offenders a split sentence with the maximum one year's incarceration allowed under this procedure to keep jurisdiction over the offender and assure the sentence time will actually be served. In 1975, there were 124 adult burglars given split sentences, and 264 with sentences under the jurisdiction of the State Corrections Department. Similarly, police, prosecutors and case workers see merit in their own exercise of judgment as to when an offender should get a break, but want a greater certainty of consequence once they decide it is necessary.

3. Only the criminal has the job of worrying about how the various actors and their actions relative to burglary fit together. The policeman has his role in helping to manage burglary. So do the home owner, landlord, tenant, insurance company, prosecutor, judge, caseworker, and corrections employee. They are not coordinated in their efforts. The role of one may not even be well understood by the others. However, the independent act of almost any of the actors may affect the jobs of the others.

For example, the homeowner with an unattended, open garage door may invite a teenager to steal a bicycle and thus activate most of the other parties in response to the given case. Or, action by the corrections board on a parole could trigger a number of new burglaries, starting the chain back in motion.

4. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration planning agencies in Minnesota have not assumed leadership in resolving conflicts or rationalizing the system. In a 1969-70 study by the Citizens League, we found a critical need for the Governor's Crime Commission to fill a void by becoming a comprehensive planning agency for criminal justice. Central to this greater role was a recommendation that the Commission prepare specific legislative proposals for improving the efficiency and equity of criminal justice in Minnesota.

In our assigned study area of burglary, we have found that the Crime Commission has been a leader in developing a highly visible and active grass-roots deterrent program through the Minnesota Crime Watch. It has not provided the leadership and coordination needed for a system-wide attack on the problem. The Crime Commission has not advocated policy positions before the Minnesota Legislature nor advocated change in the operations of the state's operating criminal justice agencies.

- B. Criminal justice data is not now collected, analyzed and shared in a manner to facilitate effective planning and coordination of the burglary problem. There is an inadequate supply of information both among agencies involved in the same function in different geographic areas, and between the different elements of the criminal justice system.

1. Burglars operating in more than one jurisdiction have little chance of having the information from the different communities shared. This applies not only among law enforcement agencies but among prosecutors as well. This latter point should be corrected in the metropolitan area with reporting by the seven counties of cases they are prosecuting to the new Metropolitan Prosecutor's Office.
2. Currently, criminal records are not recorded in such a fashion as to be able to follow statistically a given group of adult criminals through the criminal justice system. Accordingly, it is not now possible to use the state's record system to measure the relative effectiveness of different parts of the system. No statewide adjudication data is kept for juveniles.

Although there are uniform reporting procedures in effect, they are not necessarily followed at the grass roots. Some local law enforcement agencies simply do not bother to report some information. . . even when it is required by law that they do so.

3. Some collected and tabulated data is not readily available to the public. In securing data on the adjudication and disposition of burglary cases, we found that the data gathered by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension in the area can only be released by the Supreme Court. The Clerk of the Supreme Court generously shared his time in personally reading to the committee staff the data on burglary adjudication specifically requested. However, actual copies of the source documents were not made available.
4. A Minnesota Justice Information System Advisory Council has as its responsibility the coordination and improved usability of criminal justice data. The 12-member council has participation from law enforcement, court and corrections; legislators, state finance, administrative and criminal justice planning agencies; as well as local elected and non-public members. In addition, there are three individual advisory committees to the council from the criminal justice sub-systems.
5. Planned improvements in the state criminal justice data processing system will, in time, provide the capacity to analyze what happens as specific groups of individuals move through the criminal justice system. However, once the system has this capacity, there will still remain policy questions as to what information should be made public. Juvenile data is not kept in the state, in part because the individual records are kept closed. Similarly, privacy legislation could be a barrier to the collection and analysis of adult criminal data.

OUR CONCLUSIONS

I. STRONG, POSITIVE STEPS MUST BE FOUND TO TURN THE TIDE AGAINST MINNESOTA'S MOUNTING DAMAGE FROM BURGLARY.

The quadrupling of Minnesota burglaries over the past 15 years represents a growth rate that can no longer be tolerated. Better control must be established if the state's quality of life is to be preserved.

- A. The greatest damage from burglary is not the economic loss of property, but the serious effect it has on individual victims, entire neighborhoods or communities, and the burglars themselves. While burglary is, of course, a crime against property, it is an even greater offense against the security and well-being of the public. Accordingly, it should be recognized as such by all elements of the criminal justice system.

We are particularly concerned about residential burglaries, where the most serious psychological effects occur. Not only do residential burglaries account for over two thirds of the burglaries in the state, but it is at the residential level that the victim's sense of security is threatened and the juvenile is most likely to get involved in crime through burglary.

1. An individual's home provides a source of personal security that is undercut when it is invaded by a burglar. With the likelihood of a home's being burglarized now up to 1 in 25 each year, residential burglaries have become a recognized threat to most people. The problem is particularly acute for the poor and the elderly, who tend to be concentrated in neighborhoods with the highest burglary rate and who are the least secure and able to protect themselves.
 2. For many young people, burglary now provides a positive reinforcement of the notion that crime can be a paying proposition. Our committee found this particular facet of the problem to be especially disturbing. It appears to us that, by not taking meaningful steps with a child who has come into contact with the law for burglary, society may inadvertently be encouraging further criminal behavior.
- B. The commission of a burglary appears to have a low risk/reward factor. Despite the fact that, on the average, burglary is a poor paying proposition, burglary appears sufficiently attractive to draw the participation of thousands of Minnesotans each year.
1. For the adult burglar, the system of punishment appears far less certain than it actually is. Despite the grim statistic that the average adult burglar committing 10 or more burglaries per week when free will be spending more than 85% of his time in correctional confinement, adults involved in burglary tend to believe that the "system" can be beaten.

2. For the juvenile, the risk factor is less clear and generally less threatening. The preponderance of burglaries being committed by juvenile males undoubtedly reflects both a greater sense of reward and a lesser sense of deterrence on their part. The psychological factors of camaraderie and adventure are particularly strong for the teen-age boy, and the modest economic rewards match his needs reasonably well. On the deterrence side, the risks are much lower than for the adult, and the propensity to take risks is much greater.

C. Some profitable criminal activities related to burglary now are conducted with relative impunity. As we learned more about burglary, it became increasingly apparent that the professional criminal fence, the individuals setting up burglaries for a percentage, and the ultimate buyer-consumer tend to reap the greatest profits from stolen goods, with the incurrence of very little risk to themselves.

1. The major fence is a part of organized criminal activity, having, by necessity, connections with his counterparts in other areas of the country, as well as often having ties into other related legitimate and illegitimate businesses. The operation of a fence should be considered as a sinister proposition. Operating with high profitability and relative impunity, the criminal fence has a base upon which to build unhealthy ties and connections over time into the political and criminal justice systems.
2. The "set-up man", who provides information on potential victims to burglars, operates with even greater impunity than the fence. While the police are just now beginning to make serious attempts to crack down on the criminal fence, the set-up man represents an even more difficult criminal activity to develop a convictable case against. Proof of this criminal's involvement is difficult to obtain, because once the actual crime has been committed he tends to no longer be involved except perhaps to collect his share when the goods have been sold.
3. The knowing buyer-consumer of stolen goods is a particular problem, since he tends to fancy himself as a legitimate bargain hunter rather than someone committing a crime. This perception is shared not only by the buyer-consumer of stolen goods, but also by many of the general public and even some law enforcement officers, who may accept this offense as being not "really" criminal.

II. STRONGER INCENTIVES ARE REQUIRED TO HELP CHANGE THE ACTIONS OF ALMOST ALL THE ACTORS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH BURGLARY.

The crime of burglary is a complex phenomenon generally incorporating a number of illegal acts, directly or indirectly involving a number of different parties. To be most effective, a strategy to deter burglary must recognize this complexity and work to discourage burglary through all the involved parties.

A. More direct and certain sanctions are required for those committing illegal acts of burglary or the distribution of stolen goods. The challenge is to design a system that is not unduly harsh or punitive to the convicted criminal, but one that is sufficiently strong and certain to discourage most individuals contemplating the commission of the crime.

1. Juveniles must be given a good reason to believe that the commission of burglary is likely to result in a fair, logical consequence that is certain and progressively more severe. The consequence should be as timely and direct as possible.

In designing the consequence, every effort should be made to help bring the juvenile back into the mainstream of legal behavior. In the interest of the juvenile, as well as his or her victim, the consequence should emphasize undoing or correcting the losses and damage done. It should also provide an incentive and means for the burglar to develop the skills needed to function successfully as an adult. Ideally, the consequence should occur with a minimum of direct exposure to the formal criminal justice system. However, voluntary "treatment" programs should be backed by a predetermined and certain system of rewards and sanctions.

2. Adults must also be given to know with more certainty what the likely consequences of the commission of burglary are going to be. The potential--real and imagined--for manipulating the consequences of the system for an apprehended criminal should be reduced. The timeliness and consistency of the consequences appear more important to discouraging the criminal than the severity of the sentence itself. Put another way, it is more important that the potential offender have the expectation that a consequence will in fact occur, than that the consequence will be more severe.

As with juveniles, the correction program for adults should emphasize the undoing or correcting for the losses and damages done. Accordingly, property restitution should be encouraged for adult burglars as a certain link in a chain of consequences and treatment.

3. Steps should be taken to increase the risk and lower the profits of the criminal fence. There are two primary reasons why the criminal fence should be given special attention in deterring burglary: First, fences represent a relatively small number of individuals compared to the other groups involved in burglary-related activities. Particularly in the case of the high-volume master fence, skills and connections are possessed that may not be easily replaced. Second, the fence, being more purely economically motivated than the burglar, can be more easily discouraged by changing the risk/reward factors.

A third, less direct reason for giving special attention to the fence is simply that it is an approach to the problem that has never been tried in any major way.

Police and prosecutors should give greater emphasis to making cases against the criminal fence. To assist in this effort, ways should be established to increase the potential for convicting fences. . . without undue risk to the unknowing possessor of stolen goods.

Greater use should be made of economic sanctions against the criminal fence. For example, retail stores, insurance companies, and others should explore, individually or collectively, how to take greater advantage of civil claims against the fence. Ways might even be sought to simplify the process by which such damage is established. Ways should also be found to better regulate the identification and proof of ownership of those goods most vulnerable to theft.

4. The buying public should be made aware of the consequences of buying stolen goods. Greater emphasis should be given to alerting the public of the crime they are committing when they buy goods known to be stolen. Efforts should be made to point out to the public the connection between the apparent bargain they get in buying stolen goods, and the robbery, burglary, shoplifting or hijacking that was committed to secure the goods. In addition, attention should be given to what additional sanctions, if any, might be warranted to discourage the customer from buying goods suspected of being stolen.

B. A combination of incentives and sanctions are required to stimulate new actions to retard burglary on the part of the non-criminal actors.

While burglary is committed by criminals committing illegal acts, it is facilitated by others who provide easy opportunities for the crime to occur with little risk to the burglar.

1. Property owners should be encouraged to take appropriate steps to protect their goods. The seriousness of not taking reasonable precautions is not just the potential loss of property, but also such psychological factors as encouraging a person to commit his or her first crime, potentially having to confront the criminal during the act, and the unsettling effect a burglary can have on one's family and the entire neighborhood.

Insurance companies could help by expanding financial incentives to the insured for crime prevention measures. Such incentives now include premium rate reductions for specific actions on the part of the insured. An indirect incentive would be to increase the amount of the deductible portion of the insurance coverage. Expansion of specific scheduling of valuable property for insurance coverage seems warranted.

Similarly, government might also provide financial incentives by establishing building code requirements for security.

Law enforcement agencies should be charged with promoting crime prevention measures. The police can play a very important role in channeling residents' concerns and fears into positive steps to better protect their property and discourage burglary within the neighborhood.

2. Community organizations and neighborhood groups should be encouraged and assisted to take steps to collectively discourage burglary within their own areas. One of the very best deterrents against a successful burglary is a community with concerned, alert neighbors.

Municipal resources and community revenue-sharing funds might effectively be used in some cases in the development of grass-roots anti-crime programs. Victimization studies show that a key variable in the likelihood of burglary is the neighborhood an individual lives in. Accordingly, it is logical to concentrate resources to discourage burglary at that level.

3. Property and casualty insurance agents should be further encouraged to spread the risk of burglary losses with all those in need of such coverage. On the one hand, the insured should be given the responsibility and incentive for reducing the risk of loss. On the other hand, coverage should be more readily available to those low-income individuals least able to afford a burglary loss. This should be largely accomplished as local participation in the federal crime insurance program becomes a working reality. The public interest is served when everybody has access to affordable crime insurance against large losses, but retains a significant portion of loss liability to demand active prevention measures.
4. Local law enforcement agencies should be challenged to improve their effectiveness against burglary. Presently, it appears that law enforcement agencies are under greater pressure to appear responsive and sympathetic at the time of a burglary loss, than to actually provide better protection against burglary.

Local communities should establish law enforcement goals and strategies to combat burglary and other crimes. As one police administrator pointed out, the community has not established just what it is they want the police to do. Even if it had, police generally are not geared to respond to problems with a planned systematic approach.

With regard to burglary, the law enforcement goal should not be just to solve cases, but to find ways to protect the public from the criminal activity. This means that reducing the opportunity for burglary and the market for stolen goods are important police functions.

Local communities and their law enforcement agencies should be given additional incentives to curb property crime losses. Some inducement might be given by insurance companies, or the State of Minnesota, to reward those communities meeting certain standards of police service and effectiveness. However, such incentives should not be based on the numerical incidence of crime. . .but on the programs to counter or discourage the crime.

As part of a law enforcement strategy, communities should be encouraged to explore new arrangements in an effort to increase police productivity. Assigning uniformed patrol officers a greater role in the prevention and investigation of burglaries could have multiple benefits in terms of improved morale and development of officers, and services to the public.

The redeployment of police special investigators to concentrate selectively on promising cases, and on taking the initiative against targeted crimes and criminals, could increase their contribution to protecting the public from criminal acts.

The effectiveness of law enforcement services provided might also be improved through the purchase of special services through arrangements with other agencies and groups, public or private.

The efforts of local law enforcement agencies should be better coordinated with other communities, as well as with state and county law enforcement units. The problem of multi-jurisdictional activity does not necessarily require the creation of new multi-jurisdictional agencies. Rather, an effective program targeted at such multi-jurisdictional crime can be designed to utilize existing agencies, if a better vehicle for coordinating their efforts and disseminating information is provided.

More information, technical assistance and trained investigators should be made available to assist local departments.

Where multi-jurisdictional crime is involved, it is desirable for a multi-county law enforcement agency to have authority and responsibility to become involved as needed. . . preferably at local invitation, but also at its own initiative.

5. Additional resources for public prosecution should be provided for dealing with such difficult and sensitive areas as fencing stolen goods; multi-county, organized crime; and political corruption. Under the present system, public prosecutors have immense discretion in the enforcement of criminal laws. A system of sanctions against crime is heavily dependent upon the aggressiveness and capability of the public prosecutor.

- C. Actions taken to reduce burglary should be monitored and changes advocated on an ongoing, continuous basis. The application of new incentives on the various actors involved in burglary should provide new and perhaps unanticipated opportunities or challenges for other elements of the system.

For example, if the deductible portion of theft insurance were substantially increased, the percentage of burglaries reported might drop. On the one hand this might free up some police resources for other uses. On the other, the police would have less information to use in attacking the problem.

1. The most important objective is not to improve the effectiveness of some individual elements of the burglary control system, but to prevent as much damage from the crime as possible. This perspective requires someone that can look at all the different elements, and work with each in relationship to the larger objective of reducing burglary.
2. Some mechanism with a principal interest or assigned responsibility to promote actions to protect the public from burglary should be created or designated this responsibility. It should be metropolitan or state-wide in scope, concerned with all aspects of the problem, and have the necessary independence to promote whatever change found to be required.

OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

The challenge of bringing burglary under better control is formidable. There are no simple answers. No single strategy is apparent that by itself is likely to be sufficient.

However, there are opportunities to significantly upgrade the effectiveness of almost all current activities working to help control the commission of burglary.

Strong, positive steps must be taken to make property more secure, to increase law enforcement effectiveness, to reduce the markets for stolen goods, and to change the behavior of burglars through criminal justice treatment.

I. TO MAKE PROPERTY MORE SECURE AGAINST BURGLARY, WE RECOMMEND:

- A. The Minnesota Legislature should direct the Building Code Division of the Department of Administration to develop minimum security standards to be applied to all new or substantially remodeled housing in the state. To the degree possible, the standards should contain performance specifications rather than specify hardware characteristics. However, a list of tested and approved ways to meet any of the performance standards adopted should be maintained and made available to the public. In the absence of state security code provisions, individual municipalities should be authorized to set their own.
- B. The Minnesota Legislature should strongly encourage municipalities to adopt security standards for existing housing.
 1. The Legislature should direct the Governor's Crime Commission to have a model residential security ordinance developed and made available to local governments. Local government agency participation in developing the model ordinance should be an integral part of the process.
 2. The legislation should specify that communities would have two years following the adoption of the model ordinance by the state to either develop their own residential security ordinance, or specifically pass a resolution indicating they do not want a residential security ordinance. Communities not taking either step should then automatically be brought under the provisions of the model state ordinance.
 3. The model state ordinance should specify that all residential property would have to be brought into compliance before the home could be sold. All rental property owners should be required to comply with the provisions of the ordinance within one year of the time it goes into effect in their community.
- C. The Minnesota Legislature should provide for continued funding of the crime prevention training, publicity and leadership now provided through the Governor's Crime Commission Crime Watch Program.
 1. Local communities should aggressively pursue Operation I.D., premises security surveys, neighborhood crime prevention programs, and other

general public education and informational efforts now being conducted in conjunction with the "Crime Watch" program.

2. The Governor's Crime Commission and its regional and county advisory committees should give priority to funding some demonstration projects in communities with differing characteristics to test the effect of upgrading the minimum security of all housing units in an entire neighborhood or community. Funding for such projects should be contingent upon securing a commitment to participate by some very high percentage of the affected property owners.
 3. Municipalities should assist local residents in the installation of basic security devices. This assistance could be provided through technical information and assistance, group contracting, funding improvements through municipal loans and property assessments, or perhaps through utilizing community revenue-sharing funds in some form of grant or loan program.
- D. The Minnesota Insurance Commissioner and the insurance industry should work together to develop incentives for property owners to improve their home security.
1. Specific discounts should be given to the individual property owner for complying with basic security procedures and standards. The deductible portion should be increased, where these steps are not taken.
 2. Programs to grade communities for their security and law enforcement standards should be explored, and then employed to the degree it can be done practically and effectively. However, it is very important that any grading be based on input or prevention measures, and not on the crime rate or insurance loss experience of the specific community. The intent is to encourage positive actions, and not to further penalize high crime areas.
- E. The Metropolitan Council should encourage communities to include a security evaluation as part of the communities' comprehensive development plan submitted to the Metropolitan Council for review.
1. To assist in such efforts, the Council should furnish local communities guidelines for security evaluations, and provide some technical staff assistance. Security aspects of concern in comprehensive development planning would include such items as population density for family housing, street design and traffic control, use or avoidance of alleys, and the deployment of police services.
 2. Local communities should plan for public safety as they work with any residential development, regardless of whether or not the development is of sufficient significance to be included in the communities' comprehensive plans.

II. TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE AND PROSECUTORS IN COMBATTING BURGLARY, WE RECOMMEND:

A. The Minnesota Legislature should provide direction and resources for local law enforcement agencies to upgrade their use of personnel in investigating burglaries.

1. The Minnesota Legislature should direct the Police Officers Training Board to require local police departments to provide their patrol officers with the training and equipment necessary for them to conduct preliminary and routine burglary investigations.

Local law enforcement agencies should assign patrol officers the responsibility for these investigations--with back-up investigative help to be made available as needed. The processing of insurance forms and other routine administrative follow-up should be turned over to "non-sworn" clerical employees.

2. Police chiefs and sheriffs should selectively utilize the talents of the skilled detectives against targeted crimes, in a consulting role with patrol officers on routine cases, and on the investigation of particularly promising or serious cases.
3. Detective time gained in this process should in part be used to gather information and evidence needed to crack down on fencing, burglary set-up arrangements, and other more organized aspects of burglary and the marketing of stolen goods.
4. The Minnesota Legislature should make funds available both for the additional investigatory training for patrol officers, and for advanced training for detectives to develop the skills needed in the more specialized role suggested for them. The actual training might be provided directly by the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), or through a state contract for services with individual law enforcement agencies possessing the necessary training capabilities.

B. The Minnesota Legislature should facilitate coordination of efforts against inter-jurisdictional crime by providing greater state assistance to the affected communities through the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.

1. The BCA should be assigned a more active role in the collection, analysis and dissemination of crime information of particular relevance to more than one agency. At a minimum, daily intelligence reports, including property crime information, should be developed and disseminated to law enforcement agencies throughout the state.
2. The BCA should be assigned greater responsibility and resources to work with and assist local agencies in criminal activity involving more than one jurisdiction.
3. The BCA should be authorized and charged to help coordinate multi-agency investigations of inter-jurisdictional criminal activity, initiate and conduct its own investigations of such activity, and secure search warrants as needed in the process.

- C. Local government policy boards should direct their law enforcement agencies to develop specific plans and strategies to reduce the damage from burglary and major criminal activities of particular concern to their communities.
 - 1. The League of Minnesota Cities, and the Association of Minnesota Counties, should provide leadership to their member communities and counties as to how they might proceed with a law enforcement planning and crime management program for their jurisdictions.
 - 2. A local strategy for burglary should include security steps to make it difficult for an individual to commit burglary, the planned response of the police to a reported burglary, and efforts to reduce the marketing of stolen goods.
- D. The new metropolitan area prosecutor's office to be established by the urban county attorneys board should be used to develop special talents available throughout the region to effectively prosecute criminal fencing, and other organized and complex aspects of crimes related to burglary.
 - 1. The new office should be particularly conscientious in pursuing the more organized aspects of crime such as fencing, bribery, tax evasion and corruption.
 - 2. All cases involving significant, large-volume fencing should be prosecuted through the new office, with some of the best talent from the individual attorney's office being drawn in on the prosecution.
 - 3. The individual county prosecutor should make a special effort to cooperate fully with the regional prosecutor. The regional prosecutor, and the majority of the urban county attorneys board, should be prepared to call a grand jury to look into any serious problems of corruption or organized crime. . . even without the support of the attorney in the affected county.

III. TO REDUCE THE MARKET FOR STOLEN GOODS, WE RECOMMEND:

- A. The United States Congress should mandate the establishment of uniform serial numbering to be used by manufacturers of high-value items particularly vulnerable to theft.
 - 1. The serial numbering system should be designed to help identify the geographic location and the identity of the original user-owner of the item.
 - 2. It should be made a federal law violation to alter a serial number established as part of the federal identification process.
- B. All metropolitan municipalities should opt to participate in the state bicycle licensing program. Those communities having their own programs should consider the advantages of being part of a uniform statewide system. Those communities without any licensing provisions should consider whether the problem does not now warrant their action.

- C. The Minnesota Legislature should amend the criminal code covering the receiving of stolen goods to make it a felony when the individual has a "strong cause to believe the goods are stolen".*
1. Factors which might be used to establish "a strong cause to believe specific goods are stolen" would include:
 - the price of an item relative to its market value.
 - the lack of identifying labels, serial numbers, and/or proof of purchase.
 - the terms and conditions of the transaction.
 - knowledge about the supplier of the goods.
 2. A misdemeanor offense should be retained in the code for individuals receiving stolen goods where the evidence that the goods were known to be stolen is not as strong.
- D. The Minnesota Legislature should simplify the process for recovering stolen goods by shifting the burden of proof of ownership from the victim to the wholesale or retail merchant-fence once he has already been found guilty of receiving other stolen goods from the victim. Once a wholesale or retail merchant has been found guilty of knowingly receiving stolen goods belonging to a specific victim, this victim would be given legal recourse to recover additional goods lost and damages by simply establishing that the loss occurred and the strong possibility that the contested goods belonged to the victim.
- E. The Minnesota Crime Watch Program should develop a publicity campaign to point out the damage from crimes committed by bargain hunters who buy goods they believe to be stolen. The campaign should stress at least three major points: (1) that the purchase of stolen goods is a necessary element to support burglary, armed robbery, shoplifting or other form of theft used to acquire the goods; (2) that it is illegal to buy goods known to be stolen; (3) that the marketing of stolen goods is very costly to the public.
- F. Insurance companies, retail merchants, and others suffering economic losses from the marketing of stolen goods should, to the degree possible, seek civil damages through the Minnesota statutory provision allowing the awarding of triple damages against criminal receivers of stolen goods. Industry groups such as the Minnesota Retail Federation, the Minnesota Association of Commerce and Industry, and the American Insurance Association should provide a leadership and assistance role to individual firms in seeking civil damages against the fence. Such suits should be encouraged both as a way to recover damages in a specific case, and as an example to discourage fencing by others.

* A felony is a major crime for which an adult may be imprisoned in a penitentiary for one year or more. A misdemeanor is a less serious crime subject to a fine and/or up to 90 days incarceration. A gross misdemeanor is subject to up to a year's incarceration.

IV. TO HELP DISCOURAGE BURGLARY AND BRING THE BURGLAR BACK INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF LEGAL BEHAVIOR THROUGH HIS OR HER TREATMENT BY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, WE RECOMMEND:

- A. The Minnesota Legislature should assume responsibility to assure that a consistent, immediate and certain response is given when a burglar comes in contact with criminal justice agencies.
1. The Legislature should direct the Governor's Crime Commission to organize and coordinate a major study leading to the development of specific policy procedures and guidelines for the use of criminal justice agencies. The project should be designed to promote continuity throughout the state among agencies providing the same function, and a more cohesive, integrated and effective handling of offenders as they move through the system from law enforcement through corrections.
 2. The Minnesota Legislature should establish the basic theme of the state's correction policy as being: (a) to provide both adults and juveniles a fair, logical consequence for their offenses, and (b) to make available opportunities to offenders for help with their basic personal problems. Our specific recommendations for applying these principles differ somewhat for the juvenile and the adult offender.
- B. The Minnesota Legislature should establish minimum consequences and supporting programs for the treatment of juveniles found guilty of burglary.
1. The Legislature should provide that minimum consequences be increased progressively as the offender is convicted of additional crimes.
 2. When a juvenile charged with a burglary is arraigned the first time for a crime that would be a felony for an adult, the judge should retain full current discretion as to how the juvenile should be handled. However, we would hope that on the first offense the judge would work with both the juvenile and his family in arranging for any assistance they may require in solving any economic, social or emotional problems that may have helped precipitate the commission of the crime. We also feel that restitution and other remedies tied to the specific crime may be valuable at this stage.
 3. The Legislature should provide by law that juveniles found delinquent for committing burglary with one or more previous findings of delinquency for felony offenses will be required to make restitution for the monetary losses or damage done to their victims, and/or suffer the loss of freedom for a limited period of time in a corrections program.
 - a. Each county should be made responsible to arrange for employment or work programs to provide jobs that conform with the needs and ability of the offender in order to make restitution.

- b. The amount of the restitution should cover the full damages to the degree this is within the reasonable earning power of the offender.
 - c. The employed offender should be allowed to keep up to 50% of the money earned as part of the restitution program -- based upon his individual needs as determined by the court.
 - d. Restitution payments should be made from money legitimately earned by the child, although work arrangements might include employment of the juvenile by the parents in certain cases arranged by the court.
4. The Legislature should provide a mandatory minimum length of confinement after a juvenile has been found delinquent of at least three separate offenses that would be a felony for an adult.
 5. The Legislature should provide that a juvenile 14 years of age or over would be certified and stand trial as an adult for any additional offenses committed after he or she has established a pattern of habitual criminal activity involving five or more findings of delinquency in separate cases involving felony grade offenses.
 6. A secure facility should be made available for juveniles found delinquent regarding felony-level crimes, when they are found not to be amenable to confinement or treatment in a less secure facility. Such a facility should be made available for statewide use by the Department of Corrections. However, communities eligible to participate in community corrections programs are urged to make such a secure juvenile facility available locally, whenever practical.
- C. The Minnesota Legislature should establish a system of adult corrections with the consequences made more certain for property offenses.
1. The Legislature should describe in more detail the consequences that should occur upon a conviction for committing a burglary. Only a very limited number of statutorily determined variables should be applied in determining a sentence length. The offender's past record of offenses is the type of variable that would be appropriate to apply.
 2. The Minnesota Department of Corrections should be allowed and encouraged to divert amenable offenders into supervised property restitution programs outside the regular correctional facilities. Time spent in such a supervised program should be deducted from the independently determined sentence length. Similar opportunities should be made available directly or through contract as part of the community corrections programs.
- V. TO PROVIDE AN ONGOING COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES TO DETER BURGLARY AND ADVOCATE THE PUBLIC INTEREST, WE RECOMMEND:
- A. A Private Crime Commission should be established and funded by the business community as an ongoing investigatory and educational group to promote the public interest in criminal justice proceedings.

1. The business community--through representatives from the Minnesota Association of Commerce and Industry, the Greater Minneapolis and St. Paul Chambers of Commerce, suburban chambers of commerce, the Upper Midwest Council, large corporations, and special industry associations--should form an ad hoc group to determine how the Private Crime Commission should be organized and funded.
 2. The principal functions of the Private Crime Commission should be to perform the following services:
 - Conduct ongoing investigations and evaluations of the effectiveness of the entire criminal justice system -- laws in the criminal code, coordination of functions, the effectiveness of specific sub-systems and individual agencies, and possible corruption.
 - Pay particular attention to burglary.
 - Analyze and disseminate criminal justice data.
 - Advocate changes in the system.
 - Provide counsel and possibly mediation for the resolution of disputes among various elements of the system.
 - Maintain a crime-information reward fund and gather intelligence on criminal activities.
 - Expose crime, corruption, and faulty public service.
 - Conduct public information and education campaigns.
 - Provide consulting services on security procedures.
 3. The Private Crime Commission should be provided a full-time, paid, professional staff from the outset.
- B. A Minnesota Academy of Criminal Justice should be established to encourage greater communication and cooperation among personnel from all criminal justice agencies and academics in criminology.
1. The Citizens Council on Delinquency and Crime should proceed with tentative plans they have to organize such an academy in Minnesota. If they do not decide to go ahead, someone else working with criminal justice problems should take the leadership.
 2. The academy should be supported by membership dues from participating agencies and individuals.
 3. The Academy should work to encourage discussion, research and dissemination of information on criminal justice issues. Policy positions should also be developed and advocated with the Legislature and other appropriate bodies.

DISCUSSION OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *What does the report do to create new incentives for property owners and public agencies to take more effective action to reduce burglary?*
 - a) We recommend a number of forms of rewards and assistance to encourage specific actions. Our recommendations would assist property owners to take basic steps to increase the security of their residences, and then would reward them for this action through lower insurance rates and/or greater coverage. Communities would be prodded, and assisted, to incorporate security standards as part of any local procedures they have of regulating the condition of existing residential property. And, additional state training, information and assistance would encourage some change in local law enforcement procedures.
 - b) We reject community crime insurance experience rating. The committee recognizes that, if the insurance industry were to move from generally using a statewide experience rating to a community-by-community rating of the theft portion of a home owner's policy, there would be a financial incentive on high-crime communities to get their losses down. The resident of a high-crime neighborhood would see a significant increase in the cost of his theft insurance coverage, and the balance of the state would have their costs modestly adjusted based on their experience relative to the state average.

However, the committee concluded that this would place an undue penalty on the residents in a high-crime area . . . something akin to alleged discrimination in being able to get home loans in these same areas. Accordingly, we feel that experience ratings for crime insurance is best left on as broad a base as possible. We feel that a community rating system based on community security standards and law enforcement procedures would be desirable.

- c) We find local government participation in covering the cost of property losses from increased burglary to be intriguing, but somewhat impractical. Some committee members favored the state's establishing a burglary victim reimbursement system in which local governments, assisted by the state, would provide a public fund to pay for a portion of the residential theft payments made through insurance in the community. The proposal would have had the state equalize the municipal burden based on current burglary rates, but the municipality would be responsible for loss growth above inflation and participation in the plan.

The committee deferred making specific recommendations in this area since other members felt that such a plan would be hard to administer, and might not be equally fair to people with different insurance carriers or opting to have no crime insurance at all.

2. *Why is it recommended that some security measures be mandated, and then that funding be provided for a security demonstration project to test the effectiveness of this approach?*

We are recommending steps designed to upgrade residential security as much as it can be done in a practical, cost-effective manner. We do know many burglaries are committed by pre-teenagers and others who are able or willing to commit such crimes only when they are presented with a relatively simple opportunity. Accordingly, improved security will prevent--not just displace--some burglaries that would otherwise occur. We feel this justifies mandating some procedures.

On the other hand, it is less clear what effect consistently improved security in a neighborhood would have on some of the older juveniles who are more determined to "rip someone off". Would these individuals, who now tend to hit the easiest marks in their own communities, attempt more difficult or more distant burglaries if the easy jobs nearby were to dry up? To the extent they do, it is logical they will be caught sooner and the sanctions of the justice system brought to bear more quickly. Steps ought to be taken to find out the effect of an entire neighborhood maintaining a high standard of security procedures.

3. *What would be included in the basic security standards the report frequently mentions?*

The committee had in mind the relatively easy steps that can be taken at modest expense. This would include such things as dead-bolt locks; relatively solid exterior doors and door frames; either inside or non-removable door hinges; break-resistant, glass-substitute materials for use in or adjacent to doors; and pin latches to lock windows in closed or partly opened positions.

The cost of these steps would be negligible for new construction, inexpensive for the owner-handyman of an existing structure, and modest for those hiring someone to do the work. For example, a drill and a nail is all that is required to provide a pin latch arrangement on a standard window.

4. *Why is it proposed that the police patrol officer be given greater responsibility for investigating burglaries?*

We see a critical need to enrich the role and increase the productivity of law enforcement officers in fighting crime. This applies to both the uniformed patrol officer and the detective-investigator.

The role of the patrol officer is central in handling a specific burglary. As he is the first policeman assigned to the crime scene, most burglary arrests will be made by him at that point.

He also has an important public relations opportunity to stress crime prevention with the victim and the victim's neighbors and to establish greater rapport with them in the process. With proper training and equipment, he can conduct as much of an investigation as warranted under normal circumstances and can emphasize crime prevention steps.

The patrol officer's lot was characterized for us by an officer as involving "endless hours of boredom, punctuated by moments of stark terror". Giving the patrol officer the responsibility for routine burglary investigations would add more variety to his job and allow him to follow through with the work he starts when first called to the crime scene. The work done on one investigation can also be related to his other contacts in the community he serves.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of turning over routine burglary investigations to the patrol officer is that it will avoid some expensive duplication in many cases, and allow the redeployment of the detective-investigator in a more productive and stimulating manner. As a practical matter, in many cases the patrol officer will not need to spend much more time processing the entire burglary investigation than he would now spend as the first officer assigned to the crime scene.

Our proposal would use the detective as a consultant or supervisor with the patrol officer on most investigations, as needed; as the principal investigator on more difficult or serious cases; and as an offensive resource to attack the more organized and professional levels of criminal activity.

We suspect that police intelligence work can be one of the most productive tools for crime prevention and control. By targeting some investigations on a criminal activity or given criminals, rather than just specific cases, the chances of apprehending certain criminals and stopping their criminal activity may be dramatically improved.

5. *What are the implications of this report in regard to moving toward a state police force in Minnesota?*

To the contrary, our proposals are designed to provide local law enforcement with the organization, incentives and resources they need to more effectively attack the problem of burglary and the marketing of stolen goods. We do feel this will require greater assistance from the state, and organized cooperation and coordination with other criminal justice agencies, per our recommendations.

By urging the role of the uniformed patrol officer be expanded, we are in effect urging a decentralizing of what is currently done in response to burglary in many communities. We would also be drawing the local departments into the larger inter-jurisdictional aspects of the problem with an improved flow of crime information from other communities.

6. *Is the approach developed in the recommendations a hard line against the juvenile and adult offender?*

Our intent is not to increase the punishment of persons involved in burglary and related property crimes. In fact we concluded that the certainty of a consequence is far more important than the severity.

Our proposal is carefully designed to be not only fair and rational in treating convicted offenders...but to seem fair and to be clear to the criminal.

It offers assistance to the offender, without imposing it. It channels the offender into acknowledging the damage he has done and then to undoing or correcting some of the victim's loss. Finally, it resorts to incarceration only after other steps have proved to be insufficient.

The challenge we hope to meet is not more punishment for criminal activity, but a set of consequences that are more efficient in deterring crime, and bringing the convicted offender back into a pattern of legal behavior.

7. *Does the report favor determinate sentences?*

We favor more fair and consistent treatment of offenders with similar circumstances throughout the criminal justice system -- from apprehension through corrections. At each point where discretion is used in handling the offender, attempts should be made to base the discretion on consistent, fair and rational criteria that are understood by everyone involved. To this degree, our proposal is more certain or determinate than the current criminal code requires in Minnesota.

We feel that if police do not charge two similar cases alike, there should be an objective reason. If court services, prosecutors, judges and corrections do not treat similar cases alike, there should be a known explanation.

We have recommended that the Governor's Crime Commission organize and coordinate a major study that would recommend policy procedures and guidelines that could be used with greater consistency through the system. We, of course, would also help establish greater consistency by prescribing more narrowly by law the consequences for burglary upon conviction.

8. *Did the committee explore learning disabilities, family problems and other underlying problems that contribute to juvenile crime?*

We were unable to take more than a passing look at the basic societal problems that underlie criminal behavior. We recommend that resources to help offenders with basic problems be concentrated to work with the individual who voluntarily agrees to participate in a program. This can be particularly valuable when provided at the first contact with the courts.

9. *Why is a private crime commission needed, and how would it relate to the proposed Minnesota Academy of Criminal Justice?*

We saw very clearly that someone with independence, outside the criminal justice system, is required to look at crime and the working of the criminal justice agencies with a general public interest on an ongoing, continuous basis.

In the Citizens League's 1971 report, "Getting Answers for the Control of Crime", it was hoped that the Governor's Crime Commission could do much more in this area. In retrospect, it is apparent that the federal guidelines for criminal justice agency representatives on the Commission probably prevent it from taking a critical stance on the actions of any represented groups.

Our proposal for a private crime commission would provide an outside pressure to get criminal justice agencies to do their assigned jobs, and would give public exposure to conflicts and breakdowns in the working of the system. The commission would be able to speak out and expose fencing operations and other organized criminal activities in a way that public law enforcement officers would not be inclined or able to do.

The idea of a private crime commission is not new or untried. The Chicago Crime Commission was founded in 1919, and in a manual on "How To Organize and Operate a Citizens Crime Commission" the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions describes the activities of 20 different private crime commissions from metropolitan areas around the country.

Whereas the proposed private crime commission would be an outside group looking at crime problems, the proposed Minnesota Academy of Criminal Justice would provide the academic community and agency professionals a vehicle to encourage research and discussion among the different elements of the system.

The organization and funding of the academy would be essentially carried by the participants. The academy would provide a forum for presenting scholarly papers and discussing ways to better coordinate and improve the state's justice system.

10. *What should be done to improve the collection and dissemination of criminal justice data in Minnesota?*

We identified three major problems with the processing of criminal justice data in Minnesota. This first is that the data is not recorded consistently or accu-

rately by the grass-roots criminal justice agencies in the state. This is compounded by the fact that the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension has the somewhat conflicting role of having to work with the local agencies on law enforcement matters, and enforce data collection procedures.

The second major problem is that the data collected is not processed in a manner that allows a tracking of cases to examine the effect of different agencies or treatment on the offender. The Supreme Court does not even make public some data collected and tabulated on the working of the state courts.

The third major problem is that juvenile data on activities following an arrest are not even collected statewide.

We hope that the relatively new Minnesota Justice Information System Advisory Council will give top priority to correcting these problems by developing a data-collecting system that is accurate, and by designating a tracking system that will help analyze movements through the system.

11. *What recommendations should be given highest priority?*

The committee felt all of the approaches can be important. There was disagreement, however, as to the relative importance of security, law enforcement and corrections. The committee did feel that the Private Crime Commission would be central to long-term maintenance of a coordinated and balanced attack on the problem. It is the one proposal that can be important in achieving the thrust of the other proposals.

12. *Is there a problem of people not being able to get insurance covering burglary losses at a reasonable cost?*

With the federal crime insurance program being extended to Minnesota, everyone should be able to secure insurance covering burglary at a modest cost. The rates are scheduled to be \$30 per year for \$1,000 worth of coverage, \$50 for \$5,000, and \$70 for \$10,000. Individuals will be able to buy their policies through any licensed Minnesota property insurance agent, or through the Safety Management Institute, the company designated by the U.S. Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) for servicing Minnesota.

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT

The Citizens League has had an interest in crime and criminal justice issues from the time of our founding to the present. In the early 1950s we had a standing committee on law enforcement issues. From 1954 to 1970 we conducted 11 separate studies on specific problems relating to some criminal justice agency.

The last major study in this area looked at the Governor's Crime Commission and the state's criminal justice planning process as part of the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration program (LEAA). In that study we identified many problems in the administration of criminal justice, and the then new LEAA planning program. However, we did not look at how the system worked with respect to specific crimes or criminal activity.

The Board of Directors of the Citizens League, recognizing the growing damage caused directly and indirectly by burglary, programmed a committee to study this problem beginning in the fall of 1975. The charge to the committee by the Board of Directors reads:

INCENTIVES TO REDUCE BURGLARY: We will focus chiefly on the economic aspects of burglary in the Twin Cities area. Where do the incentives lie to cut down on losses suffered by the individual who is burglarized? On the individual himself? On his insurance company? On his local community acting through its police department? We will look at the market for disposal of burglarized goods and its relationship to the extent of burglary. It will be necessary for us to develop an understanding of how the complete system works: who the burglars are, how they are recruited, how their locations are selected, how burglars dispose of their goods, the role of the "wholesalers" and the "retailers" of stolen property, and who, ultimately, buys the goods.

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION

The committee had the active participation of 25 members, and was chaired by Dr. E. Gary Joselyn, School Testing Consultant, Minnesota Statewide Testing Program, University of Minnesota. Staff assistance was furnished by Calvin Clark, Citizens League Membership Director, and Jean Bosch, Citizens League clerical staff.

In addition to Chairman Joselyn, the following members served on the committee: Eleanor Colborn, A. Stoddard Crane, William A. Dunn, Jr., Marvin E. Engel, Ross J. Farmer, Richard J. Fitzgerald, John R. Flicker, Virginia Flygare, Leo Foley, William Hempel, Paul Hilstad, Margaret Jepson, Gerald F. Legrand, Betty Mackey, Julia Nutter, Susan Ousley, Tony Policano, Robert Provost, David D. Schaaf, Gary Specker, Gordon Stephenson, Kathy Winkler, Mark Winkler, and Fred Zimmerman.

In addition to committee members we were most fortunate to have Paul Tschida, Superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, attend regularly and provide an invaluable source of information. Bruce Jones, now with the Dade County, Florida, Organized Crime Unit, had been a very active member until he left the Minnesota Attorney General's Office to take the Florida job midway into the study.

COMMITTEE ACTIVITY

The committee met 38 times from November 4, 1975, to August 17, 1976, in 2½-hour evening sessions. From the November start-up to March, the committee received extensive written background materials, and discussed the various aspects of the topic with 45 resource persons. They represented nearly all aspects of the criminal justice system, as well as burglars, business and insurance.

From March through August, 1976, the committee worked internally on the findings, conclusions and recommendations. During this period, informal discussions were held outside the regular committee sessions with small groups from the committee and additional resource persons.

The following persons met with the full committee as resource persons for one or more sessions:

Robert Provost, president, Minnesota Insurance Information Center.
Paul Tschida, superintendent, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.
Glen Dornfeld, security director, Dayton's.
Dr. Paul Reynolds, researcher on crime victimization, University of Minnesota.
Mark Winkler, former staff member on Legislative Commission on Organized Crime.
Lt. Gaylord Gladwin, burglary division, Minneapolis Police Department.
Stan F. Kano, director, Helping Industry Recruit Exoffenders (HIRE), Inc.
Marlys McPherson, director, Minnesota Crime Watch, Governor's Crime Commission.
Sgt. Keith Wall, Eden Prairie Department of Public Safety.
Mancel Mitchell, crime prevention officer, Edina Police Department.
William Head, manager, General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (insurance adjustment agency).
Betsy Reveal, director of planning, Governor's Crime Commission.
William J. Mavity, criminal justice planner, Metropolitan Council.
Peter Franklin, staff, St. Paul-Ramsey County Criminal Justice Advisory Committee.
John O'Sullivan, staff, Hennepin County Criminal Justice Council.
Bruce H. Jones, then an investigator with the Minnesota Attorney General's Office.
Capt. William Hoogestraat, major crime investigative unit, Anoka County Sheriff's Office.
Lt. John Splinter, law enforcement aid unit, St. Paul Police Department.
Lt. Gary McGaughy, then with the organized crime intelligence division, Minneapolis Police Department.
Ken Heidelberg, Hirshfield's Paint & Wall Coverings.
William Kennedy, furniture buyer, Powers Department Stores.
Capt. Donald Arneson, juvenile division, Minneapolis Police Department.
John Trojohn, juvenile division, Hennepin County Attorney's Office.
Manley Zimmerman, former juvenile public defender, Hennepin County, and private attorney.
Michael Fetsch, St. Paul defense attorney.
Robert Earl Barnes, burglar.
Jack Morse, then chief, New Hope Police Department.
William McCutcheon, deputy chief, St. Paul Police Department.
Judge Archie L. Gingold, Ramsey County Juvenile District Court.
Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, Hennepin County Juvenile District Court.
Joe, Bob, Tim and Rick, former burglars participating in a residential home program for criminals with a drug problem.
Daniel Kammeyer, Anoka County Attorney's Office.
Lt. William Quinn, former department chief for investigation, Minneapolis Police Department.
David Hozza, president, St. Paul City Council.

John Gustafson, director, Minneapolis Licensing Department.
Harvey Everson, licensing division, Minneapolis Police Department.
Robert Alfton, Minneapolis City Attorney's Office.
Paul Presbrey, Minneapolis Star.
Sgt. Joseph Doran, St. Paul Police Department.
Richard Mulcrone, chairman, Minnesota Corrections Board.
Robert Mowatt, then director, Property Restitution Center.
Orville B. Pung, deputy commissioner, Department of Corrections.
William B. Randall, Ramsey County Attorney.
Jan Smaby, Hennepin County Office of Planning and Development.

APPENDIX

BURGLARY STATISTICS

Care must be taken in interpreting the reported criminal justice statistics. First, there is confusion over what activities should be reported as burglaries. Second, some activities appear to be deliberately mis-reported to make the local record take on a desired appearance. Third, some items are never reported because some individual in a law enforcement agency never bothered to get it done. Fourth, many burglaries are never reported to the police.

The data reported to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension should conform to the definitions of crimes in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). However, since burglary under Minnesota law is defined differently, this contributes to some inconsistent reporting. For example, in Minnesota law a burglary does not occur unless entry is secured into a building or structure closed to the general public. The UCR contains a burglary category involving an unsuccessful attempted entry.

In audits done by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension of local crime reporting they have found such things as police departments recording some of their burglaries under the heading of theft from a public building, even though they occurred in cases with no possible basis for the listing...except that additional burglaries would have looked worse on the local record.

The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension does very few of these audits, in part due to a lack of staff available for this function. However, as a primarily law enforcement training and assistance agency, the Bureau also has a vested interest in not upsetting the local police and sheriff's offices over crime reporting procedures.

Supplemental Burglary Data*

Who is committing burglaries in Minnesota? In 1975, two-thirds of the arrested burglars were under 18 years of age; 96% were males; 83% were white.

When are burglaries committed? Of the cases where the time was established in 1975, 73% occurred at night and 27% during the day. However, the time was not known for one-third of the cases.

Where are burglaries committed? Slightly over two-thirds of burglaries in 1975 were residential and roughly one-third were non-residential. Eighty-one percent occurred in urban areas over 2,500 population. However, the number of burglaries and the reported value of goods taken per capita have been increasing much faster in the rural portion of the state...although they still remain at about one-half the urban rate.

*Furnished by Stephen Hatchet of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension staff.

TOTAL REPORTED BURGLARIES IN MINNESOTA

<u>Total Burglaries</u> <u>1970-1975</u>	<u>% Change</u> <u>Burglary</u>	<u>% Change</u> <u>Crime Index</u>
1970 - 30,766	+5.8	+8.6
1971 - 33,827	+9.9	+9.6
1972 - 36,063	+6.6	-3.9
1973 - 39,581	+9.7	+5.4
1974 - 43,322	+9.4	+10.5
1975 - 46,218	+6.6	+10.7

TOTAL REPORTED RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES

<u>Total Residential Burglaries</u> <u>1970-1975</u>	<u>% of Total</u> <u>Burglaries</u>	<u>% of Change</u> <u>Res. Burgs.</u>	<u>Stolen</u> <u>Value (\$)</u>	<u>% of Change</u> <u>Stolen Value</u>
1970 - 18,377	63	*	*	*
1971 - 19,867	63	+8.1	5,312,133	*
1972 - 22,078	62	+11.1	6,150,602	+15.7
1973 - 26,163	66	+18.3	6,294,356	+2.3
1974 - 28,349	65	+8.5	7,378,942	+18.0
1975 - 31,129	67	+9.8	9,371,862	+27.0

*Figures not available.

TOTAL REPORTED RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES - TIME OF DAY

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Resid. Burgs.</u>	<u>Nighttime</u>	<u>Daytime</u>	<u>Unknown</u>
1970	18,377	8,269	5,329	4,778
1971	19,867	8,940	5,364	5,562
1972	22,078	9,614	6,409	6,506
1973	26,123	10,924	7,322	7,876
1974	28,349	11,956	7,364	8,230
1975	31,129	12,719	7,486	10,924

TOTAL REPORTED BURGLARIES - TIME OF DAY

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>Nighttime</u>	<u>% Of Total</u>	<u>Daytime</u>	<u>% Of Total</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>% Of Total</u>
1970	16,329	53%	6,071	20%	6,581	21%
1971	18,205	54%	5,958	18%	7,581	22%
1972	19,230	53%	7,122	20%	9,259	26%
1973	20,305	51%	7,995	20%	11,281	28%
1974	22,394	52%	8,283	19%	12,644	29%
1975	22,846	49%	8,280	18%	15,089	33%

TOTAL REPORTED BURGLARIES - PLACE OF OCCURRENCE

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>Residential</u>	<u>% Of Total</u>	<u>Non-Residential</u>	<u>% Of Total</u>
1970	18,377	60%	10,606	40%
1971	19,867	59%	11,879	41%
1972	22,079	61%	13,532	39%
1973	26,123	66%	13,458	34%
1974	28,349	65%	14,972	35%
1975	31,129	67%	15,086	33%

REPORTED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUE LOSS
URBAN - RURAL

	<u>URBAN</u>		<u>RURAL</u>	
	<u>\$ VALUE</u>	<u># of Burglaries</u>	<u>\$ VALUE</u>	<u># of Burglaries</u>
1974	6,286,076	23,500	1,092,866	4,849
1975	7,815,337	25,366	1,556,525	5,763
% Increase	24.3	7.9	42.6	18.8

THE CITIZENS LEAGUE

. . . formed in 1952, is an independent, nonpartisan, non-profit, educational corporation dedicated to improving local government and to providing leadership in solving the complex problems of our metropolitan area.

Volunteer research committees of the CITIZENS LEAGUE develop recommendations for solutions to public problems after months of intensive work.

Over the years, the League's research reports have been among the most helpful and reliable sources of information for governmental and civic leaders, and others concerned with the problems of our area.

The League is supported by membership dues of individual members and membership contributions from businesses, foundations, and other organizations throughout the metropolitan area.

You are invited to join the League or, if already a member, invite a friend to join. An application blank is provided for your convenience on the reverse side.

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What The Citizens League Does

Study Committees

- 6 to 10 major studies are undertaken each year.
- Each committee works 2½ hours per week, normally for 6-9 months.
- In 1974 over 250 resource persons made presentations to an average of 25 members per session.
- A fulltime professional staff of 6 provides direct committee assistance.
- An average in excess of 100 persons follow committee hearings with summary minutes prepared by the staff.
- Full reports (normally 25-50 pages) are distributed to 1,000-3,000 people, in addition to 4,000 summaries provided through the CL NEWS

Citizens League NEWS

- Published twice monthly, except once a month in June, July, August & December.
- Provides reader with general information, original data and League analysis on public affairs issues.

Information Assistance

- The League responds to many requests for information. Substantial amounts of staff time are devoted to explaining local developments to out-of-town visitors, providing background information to the news media, and serving as resource speakers to community groups.

Community Leadership Breakfasts

- Minneapolis Community Leadership Breakfasts are held each Tuesday at the Grain Exchange Cafeteria, 7:30-8:30 a.m., from September to June.
- St. Paul Community Leadership Breakfasts are held on alternate Thursdays at the Pilot House Restaurant in the First National Bank Bldg., 7:30-8:30.
- An average of 35 persons attends the 55 breakfasts each year.
- The breakfast programs attract good news coverage in the daily press, radio and, periodically, television.

Question-and-Answer Luncheons

- Feature national or local authorities, who respond to questions from a panel on key public policy issues.
- Each year several Q & A luncheons are held throughout the metropolitan area.

Public Affairs Directors

- A Public Affairs Directory is prepared following even-year general elections, and distributed to the membership.

Public Affairs

- Members of League study committees have been called on frequently to pursue their work further with governmental or non-governmental agencies.

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