CITIZENS LEAGUE REPORT

We Make It Too Easy for the Arsonist
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A proposal for reducing the incentives to commit arson through better prevention, detection, investigation and insurance practices.

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INTRODUCTION

Recent national attention to arson has been considerable. Articles in major national magazines have coined a number of phrases to describe arson such as "the fastest growing crime" and "the malignant crime". Congress is debating the merits of re-classifying arson in the FBI's system for tracking crime. Major advertising campaigns, launched by the insurance industry, have been alerting the public to arson for profit. Fraud schemes involving high level individuals have been uncovered in a few major cities.

All of these factors resulted in increased attention to Minnesota's arson situation. In 1973, a number of arson investigators in the state formed the Minnesota Chapter of The International Association of Arson Investigators. The chapter attracted the interest and involvement of Minnesota's insurance industry. A large fraud and arson seminar was held by the chapter in 1976. Also, in the 1976 legislative session, laws relating to the crime of arson were changed to create three degrees of arson and a statute for negligent fires.

Within this context, this study of arson was undertaken. The desire was to understand the nature of the state's arson problem and whether the existing methods for dealing with arson are adequate.

The following report is not a study of the quality of fire protection in the state, although arson does involve the fire service. It is not, solely, a report on insurance fraud. The totality of arson encompasses far more than arson for profit. It is not an assessment of the criminal justice system as a whole. Instead, each of these issues is examined relative to the arson problem in Minnesota.

As discussions continue on ways to deal with arson, this study should provide the basis for understanding the nature of the problem in Minnesota and for developing sound solutions to reduce arson in the state.
Knowledge of Minnesota's arson problem is severely limited by inadequacies in the system for reporting fires and arson.

- Arson is a serious problem...but assessing the size and nature of the problem is a difficult task using available crime and fire statistics.

- No information is available on what motive accounts for the commission of the crime.

A system must be devised to provide accurate and detailed information on the arson problem.

- Individuals should be required to report fires to fire departments before receiving insurance claims.

- Fire departments should report all arson incidents to local law enforcement agencies for reporting to the state.

- The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension should develop a mechanism for identifying and recording motives for arson incidents.

- A statistically accurate sampling method should be developed for the metropolitan area to gather in depth information on the nature of the arson problem.

**Resources to reduce arson incidents have not been maximized.**

- Attempts to prevent arson have been limited.

- Undetected arson probably constitutes a major segment of the arson problem.

- Detection of arson has been limited by non-involvement of the fire fighter in the determination of the cause of the fire.

- Responsibility for investigating arson is not clear in theory or in practice.
Steps should be taken to decrease the ability to commit arson and get away with it.

- To increase the likelihood that fire hazards will be eliminated, results of fire inspections should be shared with the insurer of the property and with the public.

- Training of fire fighters should include training for assistance in determining the cause of the fire.

- Impediments to arson prosecution should be examined and methods to make sure arson is prosecuted must be put in place.

- Criminal investigation of arson should be performed by local law enforcement agencies... fire departments should be responsible for determining the cause of the fire.

The system for insuring property can create opportunities to burn for profit.

- Inflated values on insurance policies can provide the incentives to burn for profit.

- Fast payment of fraudulent insurance claims contributes to the incentives for arson.

The potential to exploit the insurance system must be reduced.

- Insurance companies should be required to examine properties physically before they are insured to guard against over-insurance.

- The application for property insurance should become a part of the policy... any fraudulent information contained in the application should be cause for voiding the policy or non-payment of claims.

- A method to make it possible to delay claims payments during criminal investigations of arson for profit should be installed.

- Insurance companies should be required to share certain factual information relating to an insured's policy history with the criminal investigators.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Confusion about the arson problem can be attributed to the fact that arson cuts across so many aspects of the fire service, the criminal justice system, and the insurance industry. To understand the arson situation requires an examination of each of these pieces which, together, provide the incentives or disincentives for committing arson. These aspects are reviewed in the following sections: the nature and size of the arson problem; arson prevention; arson detection; criminal investigation of arson; prosecution of arson; insuring property; and reimbursing losses.

THE NATURE AND SIZE OF THE ARSON PROBLEM

Findings

Definitions for arson vary greatly.

Among the general citizenry the most common definitions of arson relate to the motive. Arson is thought of as the crime of burning property to collect a profit from insurance proceeds, or it is thought of as an act of vandalism. Even among the experts there is a difference in the definitions. Some call arson the willful and malicious burning of property and others consider any fire which is set by human hands to be arson. The latter definition would include the setting of fires by small children. According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, arson is defined as: the crime of maliciously burning the building or property of another, or of burning one's own for some improper purpose, as to collect insurance.

To avoid the necessity of interpreting the legalities of the words willful and malicious, arson could be thought of as the unlawful, intentional burning of property. This definition is based on the current Minnesota statutes relating to the crime of arson.

Reasons for committing arson include revenge, protest, pyromania, concealing other crimes, recognition, vandalism, and profit.

-Arson motivated by revenge is done for retribution for a perceived or real injustice.

-Protest motivated arson is related to social causes. This sort of burning occurs during times of social unrest.

-Pyromania is the compulsive setting of fires.

-An attempt to conceal other crimes with fire may be done in connection with a burglary, embezzlement, murder or other crime where fire can damage incriminating evidence.

-Those who burn to get recognition will start fires, then report and extinguish the fire to be considered heroic.

-Vandalistic arson is normally a juvenile act...the senseless burning of property for no clear reason.
Profit motivated arson is most commonly thought of as the burning of property to collect excessive insurance proceeds. It can also include the burning of a property at a loss because, off in the future, the owner sees that business won't be profitable. In some cases, burning may simply be the quickest way to liquidate. And, burning for profit includes everything from a homeowner intentionally damaging a small amount of property to get money for redecorating to the large commercial business hiring a "torch", someone who burns buildings for pay, to eliminate an entire business.

No matter what motive accounts for the commission of the crime, the nature of fire is such that it can damage far more than the arsonist intended. In fact, the National Fire Protection Association* (NFPA), a private non-profit organization which provides the only source of national arson statistics, estimates that 1,000 persons die and 10,000 persons are injured each year in fires set by arsonists.

Arson is receiving a great deal of attention in the national press.

Numerous articles have appeared in national magazines and newspapers reporting a large increase in the number of arson incidents and the dollar losses from property damage due to arson. The insurance industry has, also, launched major advertising campaigns to alert the public to the presence and magnitude of the crime.

These articles and advertisements usually point to estimates of the National Fire Protection Association; that property loss from arson and suspicious fires totaled $563 million in 1974...up nearly ten-fold from the estimated $60 million loss in 1964.

In this same time period, as estimated by NFPA, the number of fires in the nation attributed to arson or suspicious causes went from 30,000 to 144,000. These figures represent only the direct property losses from arson. Through a diminished tax base, loss of jobs, the expense of operating fire departments, and other factors, total losses from the crime of arson exceed losses from property damage alone.

Locally, it is not clear if arson is increasing at the estimated national rate.

In Minneapolis, according to the annual reports from the fire department, the number of reported fires has remained quite constant for the last ten years. Annually, since 1967 the number of reported fires has been around 5,000. Reported arson incidents totaled 211 in 1967. A slight increase in fires attributed to arson occurred in 1968, then the number dipped to 182 incidents in 1970. From 1970 to 1973, the number of known arson incidents doubled to 371 in 1973...the highest number of recorded arson incidents in Minneapolis in the last decade. Since then, the number of reported arson incidents has decreased to 202 in 1976. (See Appendix)

The dollar loss attributed to arson and suspicious fires showed a similar pattern...from just under $1 million in 1967 to a high of just under $3 million in 1973; then a decrease occurred to 1.8 million in 1976. Adjusting for inflation eliminates some of the disparity between the figures from 1967 to 1976. Also, a single large loss fire attributed to arson have a great impact on the ability to accurately spot trends from dollar loss figures.

*For fuller description of NFPA and other organizations mentioned in this report see Glossary on Page 24.
The situation in St. Paul has been roughly comparable to that found in Minneapolis. According to the annual reports of the St. Paul Fire Department, the number of fires reported in the last ten years is about 3,500 annually. The number of fires attributed to arson and suspicious causes in 1967 totaled 170. The highest number of fires due to arson and suspicious causes was in 1974 with 371 recorded incidents. Since 1974 there has been a decrease in annual arson incidents to 283 in 1976. (See Appendix)

According to the figures available from the State Fire Marshal's Office, a division of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety responsible for fire inspections, fire data and assistance to local fire departments in determining the cause of fires, there has been an increase in reported fires in the state in the last ten years. The State Fire Marshal receives reports on fires from the approximately 780 fire departments throughout the state. Before 1976, St. Paul and Minneapolis did not have to report fires to the state, so the available figures do not include these two cities.

In 1967, 5,354 fires were reported to the State Fire Marshal. In that year, the State Fire Marshal received 300 requests from local fire departments for assistance in investigating the cause of fires. Subsequent investigations resulted in determinations that 68 of the fires were caused by arson and 81 were of suspicious origin for a total of 149.

In 1976, the total number of fires reported to the State Fire Marshal's Office had increased to 7,465. Requests for assistance from the State Fire Marshal totaled 667. These investigations resulted in a determination that 134 of the fires were caused by arson and 122 were attributed to suspicious origins for a total of 256.

Reported fires, in the state, increased 25% in the last decade, but requests for investigations increased over 100% and determinations of suspicious or arson fires had increased 65%.

Crime reports submitted by local law enforcement agencies to the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), another division of the Department of Public Safety, are another source of arson statistics. The cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul do not submit reports on arson incidents to the BCA. For the remainder of the state, there were reports of 796 arson incidents in 1976. In 1972, the earliest year with comparable reporting methods, 431 arson incidents were reported to the BCA.

Local law enforcement officials also report arrests to the bureau. In 1976, arson arrests totaled 322, as reported by local officials. In 1972, reported arson arrests totaled 179. Again these figures do not include Minneapolis and St. Paul. (See Appendix)

In Minneapolis arrests were made in 27 of the 202 cases of arson in 1976. In St. Paul, in the same year, 22 of the 283 arson cases resulted in arrests.

Nationally, according to a study done for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for every 100 fires classified as arson or suspicious, only 9 persons are arrested, 2 convicted and .7 incarcerated. These figures were arrived at using information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation information on arrests and the State of California statistics for convictions and incarcerations.

Using available statistics, it is difficult to tell how much arson is occurring.

It is not known how many fires are never even reported to a fire department...fires where the occupant extinguishes the fire and does not
notify a fire department. According to a 1975 household fire survey done for two federal agencies, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (NFPCA) and the Consumer Products Safety Commission, only 8% of household fires are reported to fire departments.

If a fire is reported to a fire department, it might not be reported to the State Fire Marshal. Minnesota state law mandates that fire incidents be reported to the State Fire Marshal if the property loss from the fire exceeds $100. However, no incentives exist for adhering to the law and the law contains no enforcement provision.

For purposes of reporting fires to the state, Minnesota recently began participation in the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration's Uniform Fire Reporting System. This system was designed as a fire planning and management tool for local governments. After a fire occurs, local fire departments fill out forms provided by the NFPCA and send them to the State Fire Marshal's Office. The information is forwarded to the NFPCA where it is analyzed and the results are returned to the state and locality.

In the first year of operation, 65% of the fire departments in the state participated. Reportedly, the complexity of the forms has kept some fire departments from taking part in this system.

At this point a national system for reporting fire or arson does not exist. The national estimates of arson incidents and dollar losses due to arson, made by the National Fire Protection Association, are based on an annual mail survey of 2,000 fire departments. After establishing per capita experience rates on fires and dollar losses, projections are made for total United States population. The NFPCA also uses data from supplementary sources as bench marks for these estimates.

Crime records for arson only include those incidents which the police or sheriff came into contact with. Because arson is usually identified by the fire service, the information may not be reported to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.

National statistics on crime, kept by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, do not include arson. The FBI only requires the reporting of certain crimes—called Part I crimes by the FBI—and arson is currently classified as a Part II crime. A bill has been introduced in Congress to change the classification of arson to a Part I crime. Arson would then be reported to the FBI on a regular basis.

Currently, the insurance industry has no requirements to report fires by incident, by cause, or by loss. Reporting trends on fires or settlements based on insurance records is not possible, under present reporting mechanisms.

Efforts underway by the insurance industry include the development of a Property Loss Insurance Register National to be operated by the Property Claims Services of the American Insurance Association. The goal is to create a computerized register of property insurance claims which can enable insurers to spot potential signs of fraud such as multiple claims by an individual or double insurance coverage.

In Minnesota, insurance companies have established a voluntary system for notifying local fire departments that a fire claim has been made. After an insurance company receives a claim, a postcard is sent to the local fire department where the fire occurred. The purpose of this system is to alert the fire department if the insurance company has received a claim from a fire that the fire department didn't know about. Identifying the presence of double insurance coverage is another aim of this effort. Also, getting the name of the insurer to the fire department makes it possible for the fire department
to make further investigations if needed. Although not all companies are participating at this point, it is seen as a first step in cooperation between the insurance industry and the fire service.

Understanding the arson problem is further limited in that no estimates of motivations for the crime are recorded or reported. The number of arson incidents by each motive is not available.

Undetected arson probably constitutes a sizable part of the arson problem.

Even if the reporting of fires and causes of fires is performed with precision, some arson fires won't be detected at all. These may end up in the "undetermined" category, or they may be attributed to other causes. Arson experts are certain that many fires caused by arson escape the attention of investigators, but it is not known how much arson slips by. Estimates range as high as 50% of fires attributed to undetermined causes may, in fact, be caused by arson.

Conclusions

The current system for reporting arson has severely limited the ability to identify the size and nature of the problem.

Although it will always be difficult to know exactly how much arson is occurring, the current system for reporting arson has minimized the ability to identify the appropriate level and type of resources which should be directed at the problem. Arson is a serious problem and unless the reporting system is improved, assessing how serious the problem is will continue to be perplexing.

Available data, however, does not substantiate the presence of a dramatic increase in arson. In fact, in Minneapolis and St. Paul, arson incidents have actually decreased since 1974.

Recommendations

A system must be devised to provide accurate and detailed information on the number and nature of arson incidents.

To improve the methods for reporting fire, the following actions should be taken:

-The Legislature should require that individuals report any fires to local fire departments before receiving insurance claims.

Requiring the individual to report the fire may act as a deterrent to decorative arson...arson where the occupant burns the property to defraud the insurance company but avoids contact with the fire department. This requirement will assist in solving the problem of not knowing how many fires are occurring.

Responsibility for developing the mechanism to ensure that fires are reported to fire departments should be placed with the State Fire Marshal and the State Insurance Commissioner.

-The State Fire Marshal's Office should take the lead role in making sure that all fire departments are fully complying with fire reporting requirements including the reporting of causes of fires.

The objective is to identify the parameters of the arson problem as a function of total fire incidents. The State Fire Marshal should initiate a review process for providing information to the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration on changes which may
be needed in the fire incident reporting form. Examination of possible incentives for fire departments which have complied with reporting standards should also be considered.

To better understand the insurance aspects of the fire problem, we recommend the following steps be taken.

-The Insurance Commissioner should require that insurance companies annually report the number of fire incidents and the resulting dollar loss from fires by locality.

-The Insurance Commissioner should encourage insurance industry participation in the new national Property Loss Insurance Register.

To improve the reporting of the crime of arson, we recommend the following specific actions.

-The Legislature should require that any company providing property insurance in the State of Minnesota participate in the newly established postcard system for notifying local fire departments that a claim has been received.

Notification that a claim has been made can alert the fire department to the presence of multiple insurance coverage and can give the fire department the name of the insurance company if further investigation of possible arson for profit is necessary.

-The Legislature should specifically require that fire departments report arson incidents to the local law enforcement agencies and that the incidents then be reported to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.

Arson does not have to be reclassified as a Part I crime under the FBI's system to get accurate statewide data on the crime's prevalence. Achieving a level of accuracy in the statewide statistics is possible if the crime is brought to the attention of law enforcement officials and is routinely reported to the BCA.

-The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension should take responsibility for developing a mechanism for recording suspected motives in fires caused by arson.

Understanding the motives responsible for the commission of the crime is essential for appropriately directing resources at the crime of arson.

-A statistical sampling method should be developed by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension to get an in depth understanding of the arson problem in the metropolitan area.

Priority for funding this effort should be established by the Criminal Justice Advisory Committee of the metropolitan area. The Criminal Justice Advisory Committee sets priorities for the spending of federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Funds. This effort should be undertaken to produce a statistically accurate profile of the arson problem including information on what is being burned and who is responsible for the burning. This could be part of a larger system for developing an understanding of other crimes or could be carried out with a focus toward arson, specifically.
ARSON PREVENTION

Findings

Attempts to prevent arson have been limited.

Very little is known about how arson can be prevented. Locally, the only prevention efforts which have been directed specifically at arson are special inspections which are performed if there are suspicions that an owner is contemplating arson. Alerting an owner that inspectors are suspicious may discourage the owner from attempting arson. Of course, it is difficult to tell what impact this has had on arson incidents and, apparently, this kind of inspection is unusual.

Although not commonly directed at arson prevention, security improvements can act as preventive measures—particularly against arson by vandals or arson which is motivated by revenge. At least one insurance company, Factory Mutual Systems, has developed arson loss prevention strategies directed toward industrial and commercial property. Strategies include identification of preventive measures which should be taken in target locations—properties which might be particularly vulnerable to arsonists. Vulnerability, according to Factory Mutual, can occur through a variety of circumstances including employee layoffs, strikes, or through a business falling into disfavor with a protest group. Factory Mutual has also outlined general precautions which can be taken at any commercial or industrial site to protect against arson.

Locally, the Minnesota Chapter of the International Association of Arson Investigators, with the help of the insurance industry, has started an arson reward program for tips leading to the arrest of arsonists. Similar campaigns have been launched in other cities as preventive efforts.

Increased attention to arson and the investigation and prosecution of arson are considered to be major deterrents to the commission of the crime of arson.

Nationally, efforts are underway to develop mechanisms for alerting officials to the potential for arson. In Seattle, Washington, the Seattle Fire Department has developed a database on arson incidents, by census tract and other variables, which enables the department to anticipate where arson incidents are likely to occur. Although this system is not used extensively, it is intended to be used to effectively deploy resources based on predictions of where arson will occur.

In Boston, Massachusetts a citizens group has proposed a system for monitoring deterioration of property and real estate transactions to identify likely targets for profit motivated arson. The group has developed a model of circumstances which should point to arson prone property. The impact of these systems for preventing arson is not yet known.

Other local prevention efforts which impact on arson are routine inspections for fire hazards. Because buildings with few fire hazards are harder to set on fire and afford less opportunity to conceal the fact that a fire was set, these inspections have a bearing on arson prevention.

In Minnesota, inspections specifically for fire hazards are the responsibility of the State Fire Marshal. In 1977 the State Fire Marshal's Office performed just over 4,000 inspections. These resulted in the issuance of 642 written orders where minimum fire standards were not met. Both St. Paul and Minneapolis have inspectors for fire hazards. Also, many municipalities have inspections for fire hazards performed by off-duty fire fighters.
Conclusions

Steps should be taken to maximize the communities' arson prevention efforts.

The potential deterrent effect of property inspections has not been realized because the results of these inspections have not been routinely shared with the public or with the insurance industry. We should not continue to limit the impact of inspections. If the public and the company insuring the property are aware of the fire hazards additional pressure can be put on the owner of the building to remove the hazards. The insurance company, particularly, has a need to know if fire hazards are present in a building.

Recommendations

1. We recommend that a state law be passed requiring the posting of fire code violations or fire deficiencies in buildings open to the public whenever such deficiencies are detected by inspectors.

2. The State Legislature should also mandate that information concerning violations and deficiencies be forwarded to the insurance company which insures the property.

To ensure that violations are forwarded to the insurance company will require a provision in the law which mandates that a public inspector can ask and receive the name of the insurance company from the insured.
ARSON DETECTION

Findings

Identifying the crime of arson begins with determining the cause of the fire.

State law mandates that the cause of all fires be determined by the local fire chief if the loss exceeded $100. In addition, the state law provides for on-call assistance from the State Fire Marshal's Office for determining the cause of a fire. Unless the cause of a fire is determined, positively, to be due to arson there will not be a criminal investigation of the incident.

Just how much arson goes undetected is unknown. The nature of fire is such that the evidence to indicate arson may be burned in the fire or destroyed when the fire is being extinguished. Or, when cleaning the building, the evidence may be disturbed. Also, it is to the arsonists' advantage to have the cause of the fire be undetermined or attributed to a cause other than arson. The arsonist may take extra effort to try to limit the ability to determine the cause.

Much of the critical information that would point to arson is only available while the fire is burning. The color of the smoke may indicate the kinds of materials that are burning. The way the fire travels may indicate the presence of flammable liquids which may have been used to increase the speed of the fire. The presence of more than one fire also points to an arson cause and would only be present while the fire is in its early stages but not after the fire had burned substantially.

In fact, for purposes of identifying the cause of a fire, the observations that take place while the fire is burning or being extinguished may be the major inputs to assist the local fire chief in making a determination. As first on the scene, the fire fighter has a unique opportunity to gather this information, but current training of fire fighters does not emphasize or focus on this important role.

Current training programs in the state, including those provided through vocational technical education, focus on training of fire fighters for fire suppression. However, little uniformity exists in the training of fire fighters because there are no mandated standards. Some departments have adopted nationally recognized training standards but it is clear the number of fire fighters actively involved in cause determination is small.

The Houston Fire Marshal's Office contends it has been successful in adding expertise and experience to arson investigations without increasing personnel through requiring all fire department members to complete a twelve hour program in the fundamentals of arson detection.

Conclusions

We cannot continue to under-utilize and under-equip the fire fighter in determining the cause of the fire.

Because determination of the cause of the fire is essential for creating a criminal case for arson, it should involve the fire fighter. Also, advanced training for determining the cause of fires should be available for personnel with ultimate responsibility for cause determination.

Recommendations

1. Determination of the cause of the fire should continue to be the responsibility of the local fire chief with
on-call assistance from the State Fire Marshal. What should change is to have the fire fighter directly involved in determining the cause of the fire.

2. The Governor should direct the State Advisory Council on Fire Service Education and Research to take the lead in getting cause determination training included in all the fire fighter training programs.

3. The State Advisory Council on Fire Service Education and Research should identify an organization which can develop and disseminate a training package for this purpose. The package must be low cost, easily accessible for local fire departments and must require a relatively short amount of time to complete. Funding for this type of effort should be given priority by the Criminal Justice Advisory Committee.

4. The State Advisory Council on Fire Service Education and Research should further examine possible methods for making advanced training available for fire service personnel with final responsibility for determining the cause of the fire.
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF ARSON

Findings

Criminal investigation of arson is carried out in a variety of ways.

After the cause of a fire is determined to be arson or suspicious, the investigation of the crime of arson can take many different forms. At times, the local fire chief will carry out the complete criminal investigation and will get assistance from local law enforcement officials only if the case gets to the point where an arrest is needed. Or, the State Fire Marshal might be called in by the local fire chief or by the local law enforcement agency to assist in the criminal investigation of the crime. Sometimes only the local law enforcement agency will investigate the crime or, at times, the assistance of the county sheriff will be added. The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension may also be involved in criminal investigations—either as operators of the state's crime lab or to lend assistance to arson investigations.

In Minneapolis, the determination of the cause of a fire and any subsequent criminal investigations are carried out by the Minneapolis Arson Squad, a division of the Minneapolis Fire Department. The City of St. Paul is using a police-fire team approach. Cause determination is performed by fire personnel and criminal investigation is performed by the police with the assistance of the fire personnel.

Throughout the nation, local governments are struggling with the question of who should be responsible for the criminal investigation of arson. In Seattle the issue has been resolved in a nationally acclaimed arson program. The Seattle Fire Department has been given the responsibility for investigating the crime of arson. The department has access to police resources as needed. In other cities, the issue has been resolved by putting responsibility for investigating arson with the police department and by giving the police department access to fire service resources. To date, no clear information exists on the relative merits of these different systems.

Conclusions

Local investigation of arson is limited by a lack of understanding of who is responsible for investigating the crime.

While it is essential the investigation of arson be flexible to allow for the vast differences in the motives for the crime, it is of utmost importance that the responsibility for investigating arson be clear. An urgent need exists for clarification of the responsibility for investigating arson. The role of the State Fire Marshal, the local fire departments, the local law enforcement agencies and others is not clear in theory or in practice. Assessing how the lack of clarity of responsibility has affected the quality or thoroughness of arson investigation is difficult, but it is clear the confusion must be eliminated.

Recommendations

Legislation must be enacted to establish a consistent method for investigating the crime of arson. Without consistency, no assurances can be made that arson will be thoroughly investigated by anyone.

Specifically, we recommend:

1. The Legislature should be explicit in mandating that the responsibility for investigating the crime of arson be placed with the local law enforcement agency unless the agency is granted a waiver from the Commissioner of Public Safety.
The fire service should continue to be responsible for determining the cause of fires and should assist in investigations as needed by the law enforcement agency. But, responsibility for investigating the crime should be with the law enforcement agency.

The granting of waivers should only be done in situations where the community has assigned staff specifically to arson investigation and this staff has criminal investigation training.

2. The Legislature should further clarify that the local law enforcement agency should utilize the assistance of the county sheriffs and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension as needed for adding expertise to the investigation.
PROSECUTION OF ARSON

Findings

It is not clear what impediments exist to the successful prosecution of arson.

In the 1976 Minnesota Legislature Session, several changes were made in the laws relating to arson which impact on the prosecution of the crime. Until then, the burning of one's own property was not a criminal offense unless it was for the purpose of defrauding the insurer. In fact, the most commonly used arson statutes in the nation are based on English Common Law which considered arson to be an act motivated by revenge rather than profit.

The 1976 changes in the state laws relating to arson has eliminated this problem, specifically, but it remains unclear whether this has impacted on the willingness of prosecutors to prosecute arson cases. It is not clear whether impediments to arson prosecution are real or imagined. If impediments are real, it is not clear if they relate to the laws on arson, the circumstantial nature of arson cases, or the procedural requirements for any criminal case.

Hennepin County, has taken an active interest in the prosecution of arson with the assignment of attorneys specifically to arson cases. It appears this is one possible method for eliminating reticence toward arson prosecution.

Conclusions

Prosecution of arson cases should not be limited by a lack of understanding of what is needed for successful prosecution. Similarly, prosecution should not be avoided because of shortcomings in the laws relating to the crime.

Recommendations

The Minnesota Crime Control Planning Board, in conjunction with the Minnesota County Attorney's Council, should examine impediments to arson prosecution and recommend methods to ensure that arson will be prosecuted successfully.
INSURING PROPERTY

Findings

An understanding of property insurance is essential for understanding the creation of incentives for arson for profit.

A number of kinds of insurance policies is involved in any discussion of arson.

- Homeowner insurance, which covers an owner against several perils including fire, is the most common insurance for owner-occupied residences.

- Renter policies cover the contents of rental units against fire.

- Automobile coverage can include protection against loss from fire.

- Commercial or business properties have a type of policy for the structure and contents.

- Business interruption insurance is available to insure against loss of business in the event of a fire.

- Builders risk insurance is used to cover properties while they are being built.

In addition to these types of insurance available in the private marketplace, a high risk pool for properties is available in 10 Minnesota cities. This pool is commonly called the FAIR Plan—Fair Access to Insurance Requirements. This was established in the late sixties, mostly as a means of allowing properties in riot prone areas to get insurance.

The boundaries for each of these insurance pools is the state. Minnesota does not share the cost of its losses with other states. Each of these types of insurance has its own pool of money and, for purposes of paying losses, these funds are not co-mingled. For example, if a significant increase occurs in commercial fires, the cost of homeowner policies would not increase. The exception is the FAIR Plan. This plan is subsidized by the other insurance pools.

The biggest factor in how much the property insurance costs is the loss level experienced by the company on that type of property in recent years. Also included in arriving at the rate for property insurance may be the rating of the fire department by the Insurance Services Office, a national organization established by the property and liability insurance industry to provide certain services to insurers. Many companies use these ratings to determine what different rates should be paid by persons living in different cities.

The community ratings are based on an assessment of the fire protection service, the water service, and other factors relating to fire defense.

Not included in determining the rate an insured pays is that individual's loss record. Property insurance is not like automobile insurance where higher rates are paid by persons who have more accidents. Generally, if an individual experiences several losses, the insurance company will try to solve the problem through higher deductibles or will cancel the policy. If an owner cannot get property insurance through the private market, because of past claims or other reasons, the owner may then be eligible for coverage in the FAIR Plan.

On homeowner policies, the structural property is insured to replacement value. The term, "replacement value", causes a great deal of confusion, but it should be interpreted as the amount it would cost to replace the square footage of the property with a comparable quality of construction. The contents under homeowner policies are insured to actual cash value.
Virtually all insurance policies, insure for actual cash value of the structure and the contents of the property. The meaning of actual cash value isn't always agreed on, but it is generally considered to be the replacement value of the property minus the depreciation. In no case should actual cash value exceed what it would cost to replace or repair the loss with comparable materials and quality.

The amount of the total value of an insurance policy is very significant because of a Minnesota Statute which states that in the event of a total loss, the insurance company cannot try to pay a smaller amount than the amount on the policy. Even if there is evidence that the property wasn't worth the amount on the policy, the insurance company is bound to that amount. The declaration of the property as a total loss is sometimes challenged by insurance companies as a way to avoid paying the total value of the policy.

For partial losses, on commercial properties, the insurance companies and insureds negotiate the actual cash value of the loss. Under replacement value policies, if partial loss to the property occurs and the owner wants to move elsewhere, then the owner will only receive the actual cash value of the loss. To receive replacement value, the owner must replace that which was lost in the fire.

A major way to make a profit from the burning of a property is to have it insured for more than it is worth in the marketplace.

For properties other than those covered by homeowner policies, over insurance occurs if the agents and underwriters of an insurance company agreed to insure the property to a higher level than the actual cash value of the property. On homeowners policies, if the value of the policy exceeds the replacement cost of the structure, the property is over insured. To reduce the ability to over-insure property, several area companies have instituted requirements that all properties be inspected before policies are written. Some interpretations of an existing state statute conclude that pre-inspection of property is required by law, but evidence indicates that not all companies have been inspecting all properties. Furthermore, some companies will upgrade the value of an existing policy at the owners' word.

Mortgage companies generally require insurance coverage to the amount of the mortgage making it common for insurance companies to insure property to the level of the financial investment in the property. In some cases the insurance company may simply accept the owners' word as to the financial investment in the property.

Problems are created when the financial investment includes the land as well as a structure and if the structure burns, the land is still of value.

Most insurance policies include a clause which states that the mortgage will be paid off if the property burns. Even if the owner is responsible for the fire, payment of the mortgage will occur. If the value of the property has been falsely escalated using contracts for deed, and the insurance company has accepted these values for insurance purposes, all the phony interest holders will be paid off when the property burns.

On commercial property, with the structure and the contents insured to actual cash value, to profit from the burning of the property requires having the property insured for more than it is worth. With homeowner policies, where the owner can get the structure replaced if it burns, incentives to burn the property might
exist if the property is old or in need of repair. The availability of replacement value insurance probably doesn't create an incentive to burn a property which is relatively new or in good shape. Then, the property's market value is likely to equal or exceed its replacement value. As the property gets older, it might cost far more to replace the property than it is worth in the marketplace. How much arson is occurring as a result of replacement coverage is not known. Certainly some decorative arson is occurring to get rooms redone but, the degree to which this is occurring is not known.

An owner may also become overinsured through fluctuations in market value. However, this area has been fortunate to have not had any substantial areas of the community lose market value over the last several years. In fact, recent changes in property values have probably caused properties to become underinsured.

Conclusions

We must not continue to operate a system of insuring property which allows an owner to make more money burning property than selling it.

The economic incentives to commit arson for profit must be lessened by decreasing the ability to overinsure property.

Recommendations

1. To reduce the ability to overinsure a property we recommend that state law explicitly mandate a review of properties before they can be insured...this may involve clarifying an existing provision of state law.

On residential property, where homeowner insurance is desired, a representative of the insurance company should actually see the property and prepare a brief report on the characteristics of the property. Because of the potential incentive for arson if the replacement value far exceeds the market value, checks for current market value of the property may be necessary and might include referring to the assessment of the property on the tax records or confirming value with the lender.

On commercial and business property, more extensive inspections should be required and should include an assessment of the value of the business as well as the property. The value of the insurance policy should then be closely tied to the value of the property in a fair market situation. For all properties, photos should be required prior to insuring. Enforcement of such law should be the responsibility of the Insurance Commissioner.

2. To guard against future inappropriate levels of insurance, the law should require that property be reinspected when requests to increase coverage exceed that which would be attributable to inflation.

If property is being improved through renovations and repairs, full value of those repairs should not be included on the insurance policy until the repairs have increased the value of the property or its contents.

3. State law should require that the actual application for property insurance became a part of the policy and that any fraudulent information contained in the application should be considered cause for voiding the policy or non-payment of the claim in the event of the loss.

Particularly appropriate would be to gather information relating to all ownership interests in the property, all
other insurers of the property, and past fire claims.

4. The State Insurance Commissioner should examine the following issues:

- Provisions in state law which require full payment of the policy amount in the event of a total loss. If there is evidence these provisions of law have caused insurance settlements to exceed the actual value of the property, changes in the law should be recommended.

- The practice of providing insurance coverage to the level of the mortgage. If insuring to the mortgage level is causing properties to be over-insured because the mortgage includes the cost of the land, changes should be made in the requirements of the lender and the ability of insurers to insure to this level.

- The use of replacement cost policies. If evidence exists that replacement cost coverage may be inadvertently, creating the incentives for owners to burn property to have it replaced with a new structure, changes in the use of these policies may be needed.

- Possible use of a different standard insurance policy. If there is any reason to adopt certain provisions of other standard policies to decrease possible incentives for arson, such changes should be made. One provision which should be examined is the ability of an insurance company to question the insured under oath.
REIMBURSING LOSSES

Findings

The method for reimbursing an insured after a loss may create incentives to burn property.

Within thirty days after proof of loss, the insurance company must pay the loss unless it intends to deny the claim. A company cannot try to deny a claim unless it is willing to defend the denial in a civil suit which might be brought by the insured. The only time an insurance company would try to deny a claim would be in a situation where arson by the owner was suspected or where certain provisions in the policy had been violated.

Because insurance companies need to have reputations for prompt payment of claim, few claims are ever denied. Unfortunately, prompt payment of questionable claims may act as an incentive to a potential arsonist. Burning a property may prove to be a faster way of liquidating the structure and contents than selling the property.

Denial of claims in civil suits requires less proof than trying to establish a successful criminal prosecution of an arsonist. Because denial of claims can effectively remove the profit motive, it is an important key in limiting arson for profit. The insurance company can defend a denial of a claim on circumstantial evidence without the need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

Another way to profit after a fire has occurred is to falsify that which was lost in the fire. If damage from the fire was extensive, this is especially possible.

Insurance companies largely depend on public, criminal investigations of fires to identify suspicious and arson fires. Insurance companies will, at times, perform investigations. This is often the case in large loss fires. Small loss fires will usually be reviewed by an insurance company adjuster. The insurance company will want to find out if there is an opportunity to collect for the loss from another insurance company. Establishing grounds for collecting from another company requires that the cause of the fire be determined. For example, if a faulty furnace caused the fire, it might be possible to collect from the company that insures the manufacturer of the furnace. Increasingly, insurance adjusters have been alerted to the potential of fraud fires.

Serious question exists concerning the appropriate relationship between public investigators of fire and arson and insurance company investigators. The understanding of what information can be exchanged, relative to privacy laws, is clouded. Confusion about the impact of these laws has limited the sharing of information between the public and the private sector.

In the State of Ohio, specific legislation was passed mandating that the insurance companies share certain information with the investigators of fire and arson relative to an insured's policy. The legislation limits the insurance companies' liability for sharing this information. It also attaches a penalty to the insurance company if information is not shared at the time a loss occurs.

The Ohio legislation was passed to encourage and foster the exchange of information from the insurance companies to the public investigators but it does not allow for the movement of information from the public fire investigators to the insurance companies. Insurance companies would like to have access to enough informa-
tion to know if there is a case for denying a claim payment.

Because of the way arson cuts across criminal and civil law, a federal law, passed in 1970, may prove to have a bearing on cases relating to fraudulent arson involving organized parties.

The Racketeer Infiltrated and Corrupt Organizations Law (RICO) is directed, mainly, at organized crime infiltration of legitimate business but, the law also contains a provision directed at any illegal operation run or managed as a racket. In addition to the benefits of being able to build criminal cases with the assistance of the federal government, the law provides for civil penalties, allowing a victim of racketeering to sue for three times the damages incurred. Under this provision, the City of Milwaukee has filed a suit against an arson team for $750,000--three times the cost of extinguishing the fires.

It appears that it may be possible for others including insurance companies, to sue for damages relating to the direct and indirect cost of the crime of arson. The law has a provision for freezing the assets of the defendant until the suit has been resolved. Also, the law has a provision that the defendant does not have to be convicted of the criminal aspects of the suit in order to be found responsible for the civil side of the suit. Instead, only the requirement of a preponderance of evidence is necessary for the civil side of the suit.

Conclusions

The incentive to burn a property because it is a fast way to get money must be eliminated. When there is suspicion of fraud, it is unwise to continue to encourage the insurance industry to settle claims quickly.

Criminal investigation of arson for profit should not be limited by an inability to receive information relating to the insured's policy history. The insurance companies must be required to provide certain information to criminal investigators of arson.

Recommendations

1. Legislation should be enacted allowing for criminal investigators to petition for a delay of claims payment in a civil proceeding to get injunctive relief until a criminal investigation is complete.

2. Legislation should be passed requiring insurance companies to share information with criminal investigators relating to an insured's policy history if a criminal investigation is underway. The law should provide immunity from civil or criminal prosecution for the furnishing of this information.

3. The Attorney General's Office should examine the desirability of legislation, which would allow criminal investigators of arson to give factual information to insurance companies relating to arson for profit cases. Judgment should be made concerning the balance between the interest of the community and the rights of the individual in the exchange of this information.
is arson America's fastest growing crime?

According to the estimates of the National Fire Protection Association, arson is the fastest growing crime of all major crimes in America. Locally, the data doesn't indicate that it is. In fact, in the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, where a high level of growth in arson might be expected, the number of arson incidents has actually decreased since 1974.

Some of the increase in estimated arson incidents is probably due to the increased awareness of the crime over the last several years. Better identification and reporting of the crime certainly would impact on the statistics. In at least one Twin Cities' suburb, no arson incidents had ever been reported until the community hired an arson investigator. Then the community discovered that it does have an arson problem. It is clear that this area is not experiencing a level of arson similar to that experienced in the South Bronx or other major deteriorating urban areas where fires caused by arson have gutted entire blocks.

should arson be classified as a Part I crime by the FBI?

Considering the diverse definitions of arson and the diverse methods for reporting and investigating arson, it isn't clear what would be accomplished by making arson a Part I crime. Statistics on the crime of arson would be kept on a national basis, but these statistics would have little meaning if discrepancies in reporting arson aren't first resolved on a state level.

Proponents of making arson a Part I crime suggest that the re-classification will bring attention to the crime of arson. The findings in this report indicate national attention to the crime of arson is already considerable. This report does conclude that it is necessary to get an improved method for keeping statewide statistics on arson. In doing this Minnesota's ability to direct resources at the crime of arson should be greatly enhanced.

After the issues of who should report and investigate arson are resolved by individual states, it may be appropriate to set up a system for gathering nationwide statistics on arson incidents.

How do the proposals in this report compare with the 1978 legislative changes concerning the operation of the State Fire Marshal's Office and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension?

The law passed at the end of the 1978 session does relate to the proposals in this report in four different areas:

1. The new law mandates that the BCA and the State Fire Marshal's Office resolve the discrepancies in the reporting of arson. The recommendations in this report should prove to be a method for accomplishing this.

By ensuring that the local law enforcement agency is notified of all arson incidents and that the law enforcement agency as well as the fire departments report these incidents to the state, the statistics should
match up. There will be some problem if both the local police and the county sheriff report a single incident to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, but this problem is common to reporting of all crime.

2. The new law also provides for an increased number of fire inspections to be performed by the State Fire Marshal's Office or by localities. A greater number of inspections will increase the impact of the recommended action that results of inspection be shared with the insurance industry and the general public.

3. Contrary to the recommendations contained in this report which call for the training of fire fighters and fire service personnel in the determination of cause of the fire, provisions in the new legislation call for making investigation training courses available to members of the fire service.

This report recommends that the criminal investigation of arson be carried out by local law enforcement agencies. The recommendations here suggest that the role of the fire service be analogous to the role of the coroner... the coroner determines what killed the person, but does not investigate murder. Similarly, this report recommends the fire service determine what caused the fire, but that it not investigate the crime of arson.

4. The 1978 law calls for the State Fire Marshall to notify the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension if there is evidence indicating arson has occurred. The law states that the BCA may supervise and direct any subsequent investigations.

The recommendations of this report call for the BCA to be notified of all incidents of arson through the crime reporting system and involved in investigations upon request from local law enforcement agencies. However, if the BCA deems supervision of an arson investigation necessary, it is likely this would be due to the presence of a possible fraud fire and it is appropriate the BCA supervise such an investigation. It is not necessary to seek BCA assistance for investigating small arson fires which were not motivated by profit.

Shouldn't the insurance of property be tied to the individual's experience rating with fire instead of communities' capability to extinguish fires?

It is not likely the lack of experience ratings for insurance impact significantly on incentives for arson. Profit motivated arsonists who have had other fire claims probably wouldn't be too concerned about the possibility of paying higher insurance rates than owners who have had no losses. The one area where this change might impact on arson would be in the incentives for an owner to keep property secured from possible vandalism, protest, or revenge motivated arson. Currently, higher deductibles are used as a means of encouraging owners with repeated losses to keep property protected.

Doesn't this report direct most recommendations to the problem of arson for profit?

No. All of the recommendations relating to keeping track of how much arson is occurring will impact on the understanding of the total arson problem... not just arson for profit. Also, the recommendations for preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting arson will affect arson caused by all motivations. The recommendations for the insurance system are directed, primarily, at profit motivated arson. Arson for profit, the insidious part of the arson problem, can only be attacked by reducing the incentives in the insurance system.
APPENDIX

TRENDS: FIRES DUE TO ARSON AND SUSPICIOUS CAUSES

MINNEAPOLIS: FIRES 1967-76

ST. PAUL: FIRES 1967-76

Source: Minneapolis Fire Department; Annual Report

Source: St. Paul Fire Department; Annual Report
REPORTED ARSON OFFENSES AND ARRESTS: MINNESOTA 1972-1976*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Offenses</th>
<th>Total Arrests</th>
<th>Urban Offenses</th>
<th>Urban Arrests</th>
<th>Rural Offenses</th>
<th>Rural Arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures do not include Minneapolis and St. Paul.

Source:
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
Uniform Crime Reports
1972-1976
# GLOSSARY OF ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA)</th>
<th>International Association of Arson Investigators, Minnesota Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A division of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety responsible for gathering criminal justice information for the state, operation of the state's crime laboratory, training of peace officers, and investigation of certain crimes upon request from localities.</td>
<td>Established in 1973 by area arson investigators to educate its members in arson investigation and prevention. The chapter has also attracted the interest of insurance companies in the state in the steps that can be taken to limit arson for profit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Justice Advisory Committee of the Metropolitan Council</th>
<th>Minnesota Crime Control Planning Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sets priorities for the expenditure of federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funds in the metropolitan area. Also acts as the planning body for metropolitan criminal justice matters.</td>
<td>Established by statute as the state agency responsible for administering the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants in aid program. Also, advises the State Legislature and acts as a state-wide planning organization on crime related matters.</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division of Fire Marshal</th>
<th>National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (NFPCA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The State Fire Marshal's Office, a division of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, is charged with inspection and investigation of certain occupancy and use types of structures and with fire code enforcement. The division is responsible for investigation of certain fires and fire related deaths and injuries. In addition, the division is charged with fire prevention through tabulation of fire statistics and provision of some education programs for localities.</td>
<td>Established in 1973 as an agency of the United States Department of Commerce. The NFPCA is charged with national coordination of planning, research, and training for fire protection and prevention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurance Services Office (ISO)</th>
<th>National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A national organization established by the insurance industry to provide insurance services to member and subscribing companies. ISO was formed in 1971 through the consolidation of several insurance industry service organizations. ISO provides a wide range of services including actuarial, community ratings, rate making, and research services. Locally, ISO provides the management of the high risk pool for properties (Fair Plan).</td>
<td>A private non-profit member supported organization of representatives of fire related businesses, public safety officials, insurance companies, and others with an interest in fire safety information. The NFPA serves as a clearinghouse for fire information and establishes advisory standards on many aspects of fire protection and prevention. The NFPA provides the only current source of nationwide statistics on arson.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State Advisory Council on Fire Education and Research - Formally established in 1969 to advise the governor, the legislature and others on the needs of the fire service and on the development and provision of coordinated programs of education and training for the fire service.
COMMITTEE ACTIVITY

The Citizens League Board of Directors, in June, 1977, authorized creation of the study committee on arson. The committee's charge from the League Board was:

Arson is our fastest-growing crime. More than one-half of all fires are intentionally set. In 1973, dollar losses nationally from arson were three times as great as dollar losses from robbery. Arson appears to be growing particularly fast in suburban and rural communities with the fewest arson investigators. About 36% of fire insurance premiums can be attributed to arson settlements. Nevertheless, there appears to be little public understanding or awareness of the arson problem.

The committee shall review (a) the extent of the problem in the Twin Cities metropolitan area; (b) the adequacy of existing systems for investigating arson; (c) the impact of recent state legislation on controlling arson; and (d) the relationship between arson and insurance, including incentives to commit arson to collect insurance.

A total of 27 League members originally signed-up for the committee, with 14 actively participating in the work of the committee. The active members of the committee were:

Sandra Berthene, chairman
Clifford Carlson
Jim Carlson
Richard T. Cox
Scotty Gillette
Robert E. Hannon
William Hoogestraat
Fred Landgraf

David R. Moe
John D. Rukavina
Richard L. Simpson
Irma Sletten
Gordon A. Stephenson
Ron Wilmot

Staff assistance for the committee was provided by Judith Alnes. Paula Werner provided secretarial support.

The committee held a total of 23 meetings from November 2, 1977, to April 19, 1978, an average of one per week. For the convenience of committee members and resource persons, meetings were held in both Minneapolis and St. Paul.

As is always the case with Citizens League reports, the work of this committee could not have been possible without the important participation of a number of resource persons. We offer our sincere thanks to the following persons who acted as resource persons for our arson committee. The titles and positions shown are the ones they held at the time they spoke to our committee.

Thomas Bauer, assistant county attorney, Hennepin County Attorney's Office.
Jim Carlson, chief investigator, Minneapolis Arson Squad.
John Carruth, fire claims supervisor, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.
Lieutenant Jerry Dolan, St. Paul Police Department.
Mike Goetsche, fire investigator, Bloomington Fire Department, president, Minnesota Chapter, International Association of Arson Investigators.
Lieutenant Brian Holzer, Burnsville Public Safety Department.

Bill Howard, special assistant attorney general, State Attorney General's Office, Commerce Division.

Paul Lindholm, assistant county attorney, Ramsey County Attorney's Office.

Dave McCullough, coordinator, adult programs, State Department of Vocational Technical Education.

Don Minnick, claims manager, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.

Rick Myre, fire inspector, Edina Fire Department.

Doug Peterson, underwriting superintendent, commercial property, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.

Stan Pittman, general adjuster, St. Paul Companies.

Tom Polacek, insurance adjuster, Supornick and Associates.

Bob Provost, president, Minnesota Insurance Information Center.

Terry Reinhardt, branch underwriting manager, American Family Insurance Company.

Walt Shimek, fire marshal, St. Paul Fire Department.

Paul Tschida, superintendent, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Department of Public Safety.

Wes Werner, state fire marshal, Division of Fire Marshal, Department of Public Safety.

In addition, the committee reviewed several documents and articles on the national arson problem and on aspects of Minnesota's system for addressing arson.
THE CITIZENS LEAGUE

... Formed in 1952, is an independent, nonpartisan, non-profit, educational corporation dedicated to improving local government and to providing leadership in solving the complex problems of our metropolitan area.

Volunteer research committees of the CITIZENS LEAGUE develop recommendations for solutions to public problems after months of intensive work.

Over the years, the League's research reports have been among the most helpful and reliable sources of information for governmental and civic leaders, and others concerned with the problems of our area.

The League is supported by membership dues of individual members and membership contributions from businesses, foundations, and other organizations throughout the metropolitan area.

You are invited to join the League or, if already a member, invite a friend to join. An application blank is provided for your convenience on the reverse side.

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Francis M. Boddy
W. Andrew Boss

Allan R. Boyce
Lloyd L. Brandt
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Gerald R. Dillon
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Joan Forester
David Graven
Virginia Greenman
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Paul Hilstad
B. Kristine Johnson
Paul Magnuson
Harry Neimeyer
Martha Norton
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WHAT THE CITIZENS LEAGUE DOES

Study Committees

-- 6 major studies are in progress regularly.
-- Additional studies will begin soon.
-- Each committee works 2½ hours per week, normally for 6-10 months.
-- Annually over 250 resource persons made presentations to an average of 25 members per session.
-- A full-time professional staff of 7 provides direct committee assistance.
-- An average in excess of 100 persons follow committee hearings with summary minutes prepared by staff.
-- Full reports (normally 40-75 pages) are distributed to 1,000-3,000 persons, in addition to 3,000 summaries provided through the CL NEWS.

Community Leadership Breakfasts

-- Minneapolis Community Leadership Breakfasts are held each Tuesday at the Grain Exchange Cafeteria, 7:30-8:30 a.m. from September to June.
-- St. Paul Community Leadership Breakfasts are held on alternate Thursdays at the Pilot House Restaurant in the First National Bank Bldg., 7:30-8:30 a.m.
-- An average of 35 persons attend the 55 breakfasts each year.
-- The breakfast programs attract good news coverage in the daily press, radio, and television.

Question-and-Answer Luncheons

-- Feature national or local authorities, who respond to questions from a panel on key public policy issues.
-- Each year several Q & A luncheons are held throughout the metropolitan area.

Public Affairs Directory

-- A directory is prepared following even-year general elections, and distributed to the membership.

Information Assistance

-- The League responds to many requests for information and provides speakers to community groups on topics studied.

Citizens League NEWS

-- 6 pages; published twice monthly, except once a month in June, July, August and December; mailed to all members.
-- Reports activities of the Citizens League, meetings, publications, studies in progress, pending appointments.
-- Analysis, data and general background information on public affairs issues in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.

Public Affairs

-- Members of League study committees have been called on frequently to pursue the work further with governmental or non-governmental agencies.

Citizens League, non-partisan public affairs research and education in the St. Paul Minneapolis metropolitan area. 84 S. 6th St., Minneapolis, Mn. 55402 (612) 338-0791

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EMPLOYER/TELEPHONE

POSITION

EMPLOYER'S ADDRESS

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SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER/TELEPHONE

POSITION

EMPLOYER'S ADDRESS
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